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# LETTERS

AND

# TRACTS

ON THE

# CHOICE of COMPANY

AND

# OTHER SUBJECTS.

*LONDON:*

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MDCCLXI.

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TO THE

# Earl of HARDWICKE.

*My LORD,*

WHEN You have contributed ſo much to eaſe me of the *cares* of *life*, You have a right to know, how far I have been employ'd in the proper *buſineſs* of it.

I wiſh that I could have given Your LORDSHIP an *account* of this entirely to your ſatisfaction: You would, perhaps, have had a ſomewhat *better* than what you now receive, had I enjoy'd the ſame degree of *health*, that I have of *leiſure*.

My *intention*, however, you will find in my *attempt*; and if there be any merit in the *one*, I am ſure that

you will be diſpoſed to transfer ſome ſhare of it to the *other*.

An addreſs to Your LORDSHIP, on this occaſion, in the uſual ſtyle, would as ill ſuit your *Inclinations*, as it doth my *Age* and *Profeſſion*. We are both of us on the confines of *Eternity*, and ſhould therefore alike make Truth our care — that Truth, which duly influencing our practice will be the ſecurity of our *Eternal Happineſs*.

Diſtinguiſhed by my obligations to Your LORDSHIP, I would be ſo by by my acknowledgment of them: I would not be thought to have only then *owned* them, when they might have been *augmented*. Whatever teſtimony I gave of Reſpect to You, when in the *higheſt civil Office* under your Prince, I would expreſs the ſame when You have reſigned it; and ſhew as ſtrong an attachment to the Lord HARDWICKE,

as

as I ever did to the Lord Chancellor.

Receive, therefore, a *tribute of thanks*, the *laſt* which I am ever likely in this manner to pay.—— But I am haſtening to my *grave*, with a proſpect which muſt be highly pleaſing to me, unleſs diveſted of all juſt regard to thoſe who ſurvive me.

From a KING, whoſe ſolemn declaration it has been, that he hath the cauſe of *Religion* and *Virtue* at heart, and whoſe *Practice* gains entire credit to his *Profeſſions*, whilſt he has ſuch Counſellors as Your LORDSHIP, how much have we to *hope!*

And if that *Hope* cannot but be confirmed by *Prayer*, every Lover of his Country will moſt earneſtly and devoutly pray—That our great expectations may be fully anſwer'd ---That a Spring, which promiſes the faireſt fruit, may have the advancing

vancing year productive of it---That as experience has taught us the ſad conſequences of *Faction*, it may as fully convince us of thoſe not to be leſs dreaded ones of *Irreligion*---- That united as we are in the *love* of our *Sovereign*, we may be ſo in what is equally neceſſary to *his*, and to our *own*, *happineſs*, in a juſt concern for the progreſs of *Virtue*--- in our care to extend the influence of that *true Piety*, from which *Virtue* hath its only ſure ſupport.

Supplicating theſe *Bleſſings* for his *Country*, may *He* leave the *World*, who, whilſt he continues in it, muſt, if he retains any ſenſe of *Deſert*, be,

My Lord,

*With the utmoſt reſpect and gratitude,*

Your Lordship's *moſt obliged,*

*Moſt humble and obedient Servant.*

# PREFACE.

IF the following pieces had the ſame *recommendation* from the manner in which the ſubjects of them are treated, as they have from the importance of thoſe ſubjects, there would be no need of an Apology for their publication.

Nothing, certainly, ought to be more the care of every man, than to make himſelf of ſome uſe to his Species. If to be ſo but in a very ſmall degree, is all the hope which an obſcure perſon muſt entertain, that hope ſhould not be defeated by his negligence—he ſhould do his beſt—his *Endeavours*, how little ſucceſs ſoever may attend them, will not fail to recommend him to the common Parent, whilſt they correſpond to his *Abilities*.

Much, I grant, has been already ſaid on all the points on which I here treat: But on every moral point much has been ſaid; which, yet, no one, I am perſuaded, will

will think a reaſon why he ſhould decline offering his thoughts to the public, on any thing that concerns its Morals. The very ſame things expreſs'd in a different ſtyle---or placed in a different light---or enforced in a manner more ſuitable to the prevailing taſte, compoſe by far the *greateſt part* of the *Books* which have been *beſt* receiv'd.

It is the benefit of the *Young* which theſe letters and tracts chiefly conſult; furniſhing, it is hoped, ſome remarks not unworthy of their attention, and which, when engaging it, will convince them, that when they come to the uſe of *Reaſon*, they have ſomething elſe to mind beſides the pleaſures of *Senſe*.

It has been endeavour'd, that the advice here offer'd may clearly appear founded on the principles of right reaſon: but leſt there ſhould be any failure either in the Writer's argument, or in the Reader's apprehenſion of its force; care has been taken, to ſhew in the *moſt material articles*, what ſupport they have from the authority of thoſe excellent perſons, whoſe wiſdom their own and all ſucceeding times have concurr'd to applaud.

The

The *Letters on the Choice of Company* ſeem entitled to the firſt place in theſe *Miſcellanies*, as on that choice the influence of any right obſervation in them chiefly depends.

An attempt to perſuade the generality of mankind to think for themſelves, might truly be pronounced a very wild one: But where I ſhould idly ſay — Think for yourſelf; I might properly ſay — Be careful whom you ſuffer to think for you — Do not let thoſe direct *your reaſon*, who make no uſe, or the worſt uſe, of their *own*.

*Women*, indeed, take Rakes for their huſbands, in hope, as they pretend, to reclaim them; but none of our ſex, whom I meet with, allege ſuch a plea for making them their companions. The moſt which ſeems expected by any one virtuouſly educated, when he enters into a familiarity with the Vitious, is, that his attachment to their perſons will never induce him to imitate what is wrong in their practice. How ill grounded ſuch an expectation is, the following Letters will, if I miſtake not, fully prove.

Some time after my writing them, I met with *Keyſler*'s *Travels*, the firſt Volume of which, *p.* 217, furniſhes an inſtance of what may be feared even for the moſt commendably diſpoſed, and the moſt wiſely inſtructed, when they make a wrong choice of the perſons with whom they aſſociate, which very well deſerves to be here inſerted.

" It is with the greateſt pleaſure I men-
" tion young Prince EUGENE *de Soiſſons.*
" All thoſe qualifications and endowments
" that can procure love and eſteem ſhine
" conſpicuous in this young Prince. A
" graceful perſon, the moſt engaging affa-
" bility and ſweetneſs of temper, a quick
" underſtanding, an heroic ardour, a ſkill
" in the Sciences and other parts of polite
" literature, which is the more extraordi-
" nary in a Prince of fifteen years of age,
" juſtify the exalted hopes conceived of
" him. He ſhews a ſtrong inclination to a
" military life, and is already inuring him-
" ſelf to it, ſo that commonly a bare board
" ſerves him for a pillow.——————The
" King has taken the greateſt care of his
" education, and ſuffer'd him to be igno-
" rant

" rant of no branch of knowledge which
" may contribute to his future advance-
" ment. To keep him out of the way of
" public diverſions and other diſſipations,
" he has hitherto reſided at a diſtance from
" Court, having apartments at the Riding
" Academy: there he gives himſelf up to
" the ſtudy of the Sciences with ſuch ap-
" plication and intenſeneſs, that he ſcarce
" came to Court once in a week, nor ap-
" peared at any public diverſions.———
" ———The apartments of the Prince and
" his excellent Tutor are full of a philoſo-
" phical apparatus and mathematical in-
" ſtruments; the conſtruction and uſe of
" which the Prince has gained a perfect
" knowledge of, as it were by way of di-
" verſion. Nothing gives him greater ſa-
" tisfaction than to explain every thing to
" ſtrangers of curioſity, who happen to
" viſit him.———————The young
" Prince allows himſelf no other amuſe-
" ments, but ſuch as improve, as well as
" divert, the mind; and is as fond of ma-
" thematical problems and philoſophical
" experiments, as too many young Gentle-
" men are of ſuch diverſions as tend to

" alienate their minds from any intenſe ap-
" plication, and render them unable to
" bear the leaſt hardſhip."

How great things were to be expected from a Prince of ſuch endowments — ſo diſpoſed to the worthieſt purſuits—ſo cloſely applying himſelf to them — making ſo happy a progreſs in them! What could not but be expected from him, when he was both under the care of a Nobleman diſtinguiſhed as much by his Science as his Station, and under the inſtruction of an Eccleſiaſtic, an excellent Scholar and a very wiſe Man!

Alas! every pleaſing expectation form'd of him proved in the event vain. Bad examples found him unable to withſtand them. When the *Vitious* were his *companions*, their *Manners* were no longer his *abhorrence*. By aſſociating with them, he ſoon became as bad as the worſt of them. The Letter which I have quoted, ſo much commending this Prince, appears to be written about the end of the year 1729: He ſerved in the campaign on the *Rhine* in 1734, was then the reverſe of what *Keyſler* repre-

repreſents him—loſt his virtue, and with it his life.

I have given the ſecond place in this collection to the Tract on *Intemperance in Eating*; as the reproach which we have long ſince incurred with reſpect to the quantity of our food, may now receive a ſad addition from the extravagant expence which we are at in the kinds of it.

The price, formerly, of an elegant dinner is now that of a Deſſert——What would provide half a dozen plain diſhes, we now ſpend in rendering more palatable a ſingle one. —— The wages of a foreign Cook, whoſe naſtineſs ſhould as much diſguſt, as his poiſonous ſkill terrify, us, are thoſe of five or ſix Servants of our own country, whom we might uſefully employ.

You wonder, ſays a *Roman* Writer about the time of the height of the *Roman* luxury, at the number of the Diſeaſes among us: conſider the number of our Cooks. The increaſe of the former was the neceſſary conſequence of an encouragement that increaſed the latter. The principal buſineſs of Cookery, as an Art, is, to deceive

us in ſuch a manner, as will make it pleaſing to us to deſtroy ourſelves. —— Its buſineſs is to counteract Nature — to invite us to eat when we are not hungry — to create an appetite which it is ſafeſt for us to be without — to give us that reliſh of our food, which we ſhould only ſeek from exerciſe or abſtinence — to render us unmindful how abundantly our natural wants have been already ſupplied — to make even a freſh meal agreeable to us, when our Veſſels are yet loaded with the preceding.

In conſidering how much our health ſuffers by this ſpecies of Intemperance, I may appear to have meddled with the buſineſs of a Profeſſion, in which I cannot but be unſkilled. My plea here muſt be —— That as every Phyſician will think it reaſonable to inform himſelf, what errors in Religion may endanger his happineſs in a future ſtate; ſo every Eccleſiaſtic, and, indeed, every man, may fairly be allowed to enquire, what errors in Diet may either ſhorten the continuance of his preſent exiſtence, or leſſen its comforts; may occaſion either a ſpeedy death, or a painful life.

It is highly fitting, that he, whoſe enquiry it has for many years been, what ſymptoms attend the ſeveral kinds of diſeaſes to which the human body is ſubject, and what methods of treating them have been moſt ſucceſsfully purſued, ſhould be thought the beſt qualified to remove them: But it is not leſs fitting, that All who are ſubject to thoſe diſorders ſhould know —how they are moſt likely to be eſcaped —what neglect of ourſelves will bring the moſt diſtreſſing of them upon us, and render the ſkilfulleſt of his Profeſſion unable to relieve us.

An ingenious Gentleman of the Faculty giving the character of a perſon whom he did not think *devout*, though the writer of a Book of *Devotion*, ſaid, That *he had put all his Devotion into his Book.*

They who ſee the feeble frame which I with ſo much difficulty ſupport, may be tempted to judge of *my Temperance*, as this Gentleman did of *his neighbour's Devotion*; or elſe to think Temperance not very wiſely preſcribed by one whom it has ſo little benefited.

But were it to be conſidered for how many years a conſtitution has been upheld, which ſeemed originally unable to withſtand the very ſlighteſt ſhock, there would not appear any ground to treat the infirmities of a perſon of ſuch an advanced age, as proofs, either, that he did not ſpeak in character when he *recommended Temperance*, or ſo much diſcredited it, that he ſhould not expect to make Converts to it, by what he could ſay in its recommendation.

Of the pieces in this ſmall collection, that on *Drinking to exceſs* will, probably, be look'd upon as the leaſt ſeaſonable.

But, Since it is chiefly the Diſcountenance ſhewn this Vice, ſome years paſt, by thoſe in the higheſt poſts among us, which has been its Reſtraint —— Since we may juſtly think the forbearance of it to be in Many rather from a compliance with Faſhion, than from a regard to Duty—rather from their ſeeing that the *Great* do not practiſe it, than from their knowing the inducements which *All* have to deteſt it—— Since there is not, perhaps, even now any part of the Kingdom, in which ſome are not

not to be found, who are much leſs ſober than their good ſenſe ought to make them, and who do not too frequently ſubject themſelves to as vile a transformation as the *Circean* cup could produce—Since, further, though it may be cuſtomary with very few of any Rank to affect, what Sir *J. More* called the praiſe of a Brewer's Horſe, that of bearing a great quantity of liquor; yet as various ſorts of wines are not leſs eſſential to an elegant table than a variety of food, and the *ſure effect* of them both is, to make us unmindful when we have reached the bounds of Temperance—Since, I ſay, this is the preſent ſtate of the Sobriety of our Gentry, I cannot think it an uſeleſs employment, to ſearch after thoſe arguments which may be likelieſt to convince the younger part of them, how much it was for their Anceſtors praiſe, that they wanted not the inflammatory draught to raiſe either their courage or their ſpirits, either to promote their mirth or alleviate their fatigue; and how amiable All will appear, of whom this is truly the character.

*Ageſi-*

*Ageſilaus*, when aſk'd—What the *Lacedæmonians* had gained by the Laws of *Lycurgus?* anſwer'd, A Contempt of Pleaſure. A Leſſon, the uſefulneſs of which ſeems not likely to be learn'd by us, 'til it will be too late, I fear, to profit by being taught it—'til we experience the Evils conſequent on Pleaſure ſo eagerly purſued.

The Eſſay upon this ſubject has been drawn up three times the number of years for which we are adviſed to confine our writings to our cloſets; and it is now publiſhed, not, indeed, with the hope that it will induce Any to divert their *attention* from the *Siren*'s Song which has already engaged it; but from an apprehenſion, that it may contribute to give ſome few a juſt ſenſe of the Danger to which they have not yet expoſed themſelves. *Alterations* many I would have made in it, could they have been *Amendments*; but——*Cupidum*—— *Vires deficiunt!*

My Decay is now ſuch, that it is with what I write as with what I act; I ſee in it the faults which I know not how to amend.

Church-

Churchmen and Old men are under theſe great diſadvantages, when they ſpeak of life as given us for a quite different purpoſe than to paſs it in ſchemes of Mirth and Diverſion, that the One are thought only to ſuit their language to their Profeſſion, and the Other to their Weakneſs. But, whatever can be objected to the advice of *ſuch perſons*—whatever can be ſaid to leſſen its weight; they, certainly, in the preſent caſe, ſpeak but the very ſame language with thoſe to whom no exception of a like nature can be made—whoſe ſentiments have a general deference paid them.

It would be eaſy to produce Poets, Hiſtorians, Philoſophers, the ableſt Generals, the wiſeſt Stateſmen, the moſt renowned Princes concurring in their Diſſuaſives from the ſeveral gratifications on which our People of Faſhion are ſo intent—from acting as if we were born only to conſume the produce of the earth, and to give our days as much Mirth and Amuſement as fancy and folly can afford them.

I don't know any topic on which more numerous paſſages might be collected from the

the beſt antient writers, than—on *Pleaſure* —on the unbecoming part that we act in abandoning ourſelves to it.

Even in the Poet who expreſſes ſo much complaiſance towards a *Lydia*, *Chloe*, *Phyllis*, *Glycera*, &c. and who, by the praiſes he gives, ſhews with what reliſh he drank, *Chian*, *Leſbian*, *Falernian*, *Cæcuban*, &c. wine, we meet with Inſtructions, to which if the Men of Fortune among us would attend, the employment of their time would be the very reverſe of what we every where at preſent ſee it.

" What is right and becoming engroſſes " his ſearch. He is uneaſy when he loſes " the time which he might have employ'd " in actions alike advantageous to the Poor " and the Rich, and the neglect of which " is alike hurtful to the Young and to the " Old.

" He conſiders *Homer*, as propoſing, in " *Ulyſſes*, an excellent pattern of wiſdom " and virtue; as inviting us, by ſuch an " example, to reſiſt thoſe pleaſures, in " which we cannot indulge ourſelves, but " we quit our Rank in the Creation, and " ſink into that of Beaſts.

" He

" He would have us ſhake off Sloth—
" apply ourſelves before the day breaks to
" what is worthy of us, and will be of
" real uſe to us, ſure that, if we fail here-
" in, great diſquiet will be the conſequence.
" His language is—Deſpiſe pleaſure—Con-
" ſider it as dearly bought, when your eaſe
" will be its purchaſe.—Dare to be wiſe.
" —To delay acting rightly is as abſurd,
" as it would be to ſtop at the River we
" are to paſs, 'til the water is run off,
" which will continue running to remoteſt
" ages.

" He glories in the Parent, whoſe eſpe-
" cial care it had been to preſerve his Vir-
" tue—who had kept him from many
" faults, and whoſe advice though he has,
" in ſome inſtances, neglected to follow,
" he yet hopes that ſuch failure will, at
" length, be in no ſmall degree corrected.
" He is not wanting to himſelf, either when
" taking his walk, or retired to his cham-
" ber—He *then* conſiders, how it will be
" right for him to proceed, what courſe it
" will be moſt for his benefit to take—
" He *then* turns his thoughts on the
" *miſconduct* of this or that perſon of his

" ac-

" acquaintance, and aſks himſelf, how im-
" prudent he ſhould be, if he were to act
" in the ſame manner? He regards it as
" wrong, to think any Happy but the wiſe
" and virtuous." *&c. &c. &c.*

The Letter on *Public Worſhip* was written under very great concern from an account of the indecent neglect of it, by a Gentleman, whom his friends conſidered as likely to be a bleſſing to his Country: Such the Poet's excellent Inſtructors — *Longa ætas, liber Amicus, Conſilium proprium,* may yet make him; Such, I am perſuaded, he will be, When it is not any man's practice, but his own Reaſon that guides him — When he becomes convinced that there are None whoſe examples it will be more abſurd and dangerous to follow, than thoſe of his Acquaintance, either who rank themſelves among the Learned, or who are called Great. In order to counteract the force of theſe, it was judged expedient to ſhew what different Patterns former ages afford in the perſons moſt celebrated for their Knowledge or their Rank — what ſentiments of Piety they have left us---the part they took in

in ſupporting a reverence of the Deity by joining in public acts of it.

Theſe particulars will, I truſt, appear fully ſhewn.

I cannot, indeed, without the utmoſt indignation behold a Rabble of Pretenders to Science and Honour making their infamy their boaſt—taking pains to publiſh how far they have diveſted themſelves of thoſe awful ſentiments of the Supreme Being, which have been the moſt carefully expreſſed by the worthieſt of mankind—by men, with whoſe *Characters* it is a reproach for one of a liberal education to be unacquainted, though the world has for ſo many Centuries been deprived of their *Perſons*---whom when we neglect to *imitate*, we do not fail to *applaud*; and of whoſe merit not to ſhew *eſteem*, would be thought a clear proof how ill we were entitled to it. The large addition that might be made to what will occur in its proper place on their religious ſentiments cannot be unknown to any, who are at all converſant with the writings of the Antients.

A very

A very few obſervations on this head it may not be improper to inſert here.

Of the Seven Perſons antiently diſtinguiſhed by the title of Wiſe, and ſeveral of whoſe maxims are tranſmitted to us, we have, from Six, leſſons of Piety; ſuch as---" Honour, Worſhip, the Gods---Whatever Good you do, aſcribe it to the Gods---Aſſert every where their exiſtence----Think that they ſee all things----It is ſo far from being poſſible to conceal from them the Ill you do, that you cannot conceal from them your very thought of doing it---Cultivate Piety."

Nor was this the language of ſpeculative men. There is only one of thoſe here referred to, who came under the denomination of a Philoſopher; and ſurely no man ever better deſerved it: The wiſdom ſo conſiderable in the reſt was diſcovered in their civil prudence, in their political capacity; it was the wiſdom of the Stateſman, or Prince, or Legiſlator.

The doctrine of *Pythagoras* was, That as God is Lord of all things, we ſhould apply to him for whatever is good for us, and be

be careful to do the things with which he will be pleaſed.

The life of *Socrates* is ſaid to have been a life of Prayer.

As it has been obſerved of the writings of *Plato*, that they throughout tend to give us worthy conceptions of the Deity; it may be as truly remarked of *Xenophon*, that he deſcribes his Hero *Cyrus*, as under the ſtrongeſt influence of the Principles of Religion. He even introduces him appealing to his *Soldiers*, as *knowing*, "that in all "his undertakings, whether of leſs or "greater moment, his firſt care was, to "addreſs himſelf to Heaven."

Such is the language that an *Officer*, alike famous for his literary and military accompliſhments, puts into the mouth of one, whom he propoſes as a pattern to the *Great* —as a model on which the *Prince* ought to be formed, who would have his *Worth* ſuit his *Station.*

I muſt not forget that I am writing a Preface, and ſhall therefore only add what a *Greek* writer ſays of the *Romans*——That their affairs were kept in ſuch order by their

great care for Religion. POLYB. Lib. VI. p. 497.

Moſt ardently is it my wiſh, that this may one day be truly ſaid of my Countrymen! But, alas, how unpromiſing of ſuch an event are ſome preſent appearances!

The large military force, which the reſtleſs ambition of a powerful neighbour obliges us to have always in readineſs for our defence, muſt, neceſſarily, in the manner in which it is now diſpoſed of, be utterly ruinous of our morals.

A late able Writer thus expreſſes himſelf —"What I lament is, to ſee the ſenti-" ments of the Nation ſo amazingly re-" conciled to the proſpect of having a far " more numerous body of regular Troops " kept up, after the Peace, than any true " Lover of his Country in former times " thought could be allowed without en-" dangering the Conſtitution. Nay, ſo un-" accountably fond are we become of the " military Plan, that the erection of Bar-" racks, which twenty years ago would " have ruined any Miniſter who ſhould " have ventured to propoſe it, may be pro-

" poſed

" poſed ſafely by our Miniſters now-a-days,
" and, upon trial, be found to be a fa-
" vourite meaſure with our Patriots, and
" with the Public in general."

I am by no means qualified to ſpeak to the expediency of keeping up, even in the time of Peace, *a far more numerous body of regular Troops than what a Lover of his Country would formerly have thought dangerous to the Conſtitution.* But of this I am *certain*, that no Lover of his Country can have his reſidence where Soldiers are quartered, without wiſhing them at ſome diſtance from it. Oaths he would hear as familiar to their mouths, as any of the terms of ordinary diſcourſe——The ſucceſs of lewd Intrigues he would find to be the cuſtomary topic of Converſation——He would know that allowance is given to be abſent from all public worſhip on one part of the Lord's day, and he would perceive a call to it on the other either very careleſsly obſerved, or wholly neglected.

When there has not been, in a pariſh abounding in public houſes, a *ſingle one*, I think, in which a Soldier was not quarter'd,

I have not ſeen a Soldier, on a *Sunday*, at Church.

I have been an eye-witneſs of the men entering the Church at one Door, and inſtantly going out of it at another.

Nor is it to be expected, but that the Licentiouſneſs of the Soldiers ſhould exceed in other towns what it is in that in which I am reſident, as here any very great irregularity would be ſo likely to come to the notice, and have the reproof, of a General Officer, of whoſe moſt amiable manners I always with great pleaſure ſpeak.

Suffice it here to ſay, he has as many friends as neighbours. All Sects and Parties he unites in the eſteem of him, and would unite the whole Nation in an approbation of the largeſt military force *even in time of Peace*, were He to be imitated by thoſe who compoſed it.

I am particularly concerned thus to mention this worthy Nobleman, as he, when repreſentation has been made to him of the Soldiers non-attendance on the public worſhip, has moſt readily interpoſed, and by his interpoſition removed the cauſe of complaint.

But,

But, really, it is not more dangerous to the Morals of *Others*, that the Soldiery ſhould be diſpoſed of as they now are, than it is to their *Own*.

The Idleneſs in which they live — the *weak women* to whom they get ſuch eaſy acceſs—the *very bad women* often under the ſame roof with them — the intoxicating liquor ſold at a low price in every houſe in which they are lodged — the artifices by which their Hoſt can ſo conveniently tempt them to a debauch with it — the ſecrecy with which their guilt can be attended, render it next to impoſſible that groſs immorality ſhould not prevail among them.

The apprehenſion, that by ſeparating the Soldiers from their fellow-ſubjects our liberty would be endanger'd, is juſt as reaſonable, as a Phyſician's fear to preſcribe bleeding in a high inflammatory fever, leſt a tendon ſhould be injured. In both caſes, the greateſt immediate hurt is ſuſtained, and a danger is apprehended which is quite remote — which any degree of care would prevent, and which is not to be ſuppoſed when a ſure evil of ſuch a magnitude is to be obviated.

The

The loſs of *Liberty* is to be feared from nothing ſo much as from the loſs of *Virtue* —is, indeed, the unavoidable conſequence of it. Slaves to their own Paſſions will be readily ſuch to their Prince's will——They are to be bought by any who will come up to their Price.——When we make no *ſcruple* of doing *the worſt actions to gratify our luſts*, it is not to be thought that we ſhould ſcruple to obey the *moſt unjuſt command* of Him who will ſupply us with the means of *gratifying them*.

Common Soldiers in every State have the leaſt ſhare of the liberty enjoy'd in it, and daily feel that they have ſo: they are only to be made good Citizens, by being made good Men. Let no other ſenſe of Duty be inculcated on them, than that towards their Officers, (and with what care and zeal is this continually inculcated!) what muſt be the conſequence, but their regarding no WORD except that of COMMAND? This will be thought to licenſe any action, how contrary ſoever to the Word of God, or to the Voice of Reaſon, and howſoever miſchievous to the Peace of the Nation, or ruinous of its Liberty.

I know

I know not what can be more obvious than the Danger in which we ſhould be from 20,000 able-bodied Men quarter'd among us — well armed — well diſciplined — but without property or virtue — with no check on their conſciences — with nothing to loſe but a life, which for ſix-pence a day they frequently hazard.

I would ſeparate the Soldiers from their fellow-citizens, not that they might be alienated from them, or be induced to think that they have not a common Intereſt with them, but that they might be better fitted to ſerve them — that they might be made more happy themſelves, and more uſeful to others---that their health and their morals might be better preſerved---that they might have fewer temptations to vice, or, if not to be hindered from contracting Guilt, might be reſtrained from ſpreading it.

I have been for ſo many years an eye-witneſs of the extreme hurt done by the preſent method of billeting Soldiers, that I cannot but moſt earneſtly wiſh myſelf able to repreſent this evil in ſuch a manner, as might give thoſe a juſt ſenſe of it, who have the power to remedy it.

The

The laſt piece in this collection is a Letter written towards the end of the year 1737, or in the beginning of 1738, but never ſent to the honourable perſon for whom it was intended; and I have lately ſeen ſuch proofs given by him of his Abilities, very little after the time when I was thus addreſſing myſelf to him, as have fully convinced me how prudent a ſtep I took in ſuppreſſing Advice to one, from whom I might, with ſo much Advantage, have received it.

Should I be aſked, why that which has been ſo long ſuppreſſed is now publiſhed; I can truly ſay, becauſe there were thoſe whoſe opinion it was, that what I thought needleſs to a particular perſon, might be of uſe to others. And where there is a proſpect of being able *in any inſtance* to ſerve the cauſe of Religion and Virtue, I hope that it will always appear to me a ſufficient inducement not to decline the attempt.

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ERRATA.

P. 124. l. 18, for *ſome* read *ſome.*
P. 133, in the Note, for [illegible] read [illegible].
P. 236, in the Note, for *peſpicitur* read *perſpicitur.*
P. 277. l. 20, for *lwo* read *two.*

# LETTERS

## ON THE

# CHOICE of COMPANY.

Οστις δε ομιλων ηδεται κακοις ανηρ,
Ου πωποτ' ηρωτησα, γινωσκων οτι
Τοιουτος εστιν οισπερ ηδεται ξυνων.

Si quis malorum paſcitur conſortio,
Inquirere ultra parco, compertum hoc habens,
Talem eſſe quemque quali amicitia utitur.

EURIP.

# LETTER I.

SIR,

AS you are now no longer under the eye of either a parent, or a governor, but wholly at liberty to act according to your own inclinations; your friends cannot be without their fears, on your account; they cannot but have ſome uneaſy apprehenſions, leſt the very bad men, you are ſure to keep company with, ſhould be able to efface thoſe principles, which ſo much care was taken at firſt to imprint, and has been ſince to preſerve, in you.

The intimacy, in which I have, for many years, lived with your family, ſuffers me not to be otherwiſe than a *ſharer* of their concern, on this occaſion; and

you will permit me, as ſuch, to lay before you thoſe conſiderations, which, while they ſhew you your danger, and excite your caution, may not be without their uſe in promoting your ſafety.

That it ſhould be the endeavour of our parents, to give us juſt apprehenſions of things, as ſoon as we are capable of receiving them; and, in our earlier years, to ſtock our minds with uſeful truths—to accuſtom us to the uſe of our reaſon, the reſtraint of our appetites, and the government of our paſſions, is a point, on which, I believe, all are agreed, whoſe opinions about it you would think of any conſequence.

[a] From a neglect in theſe particulars, you ſee ſo many of one ſex, as much Girls at

[a] Natura tenaciſſimi ſumus eorum quæ rudibus annis percipimus; ut ſapor, quo nova imbuas, durat; nec lanarum colores, quibus ſimplex ille candor mutatus eſt, elui poſſunt. QUINCTIL. Lib. I.

Καθολε απειργειν προσηκει, &c. In univerſum malorum conſuetudine prohibendi ſunt pueri: nam affricatur illis aliquid inde vitii. Atque hoc etiam Pythagoras monuit ſuis præceptorum involucris. ——— *Non guſta quibus nigra eſt cauda.* Hoc ſignificat, non conſueſcendum cum hominibus ob malitiam nigris. PLUT. *de lib. Ed.*

Sixty,

Sixty, as they were at Sixteen—their follies only varied—their purſuits, though differently, yet equally, trifling; and you thence, likewiſe, find near as many of the other ſex, Boys in their advanced years—as fond of feathers and toys in their riper age, as they were in their childhood—living as little to any of the purpoſes of Reaſon, when it has gained its full ſtrength, as they did when it was weakeſt.[a] And, indeed, from the ſame ſource all thoſe vices proceed, which moſt diſturb and diſtreſs the world.

When no pains are taken to correct our bad *inclinations*, before they become confirmed and fixed in us; they acquire, at length, that power over us, from which we have the worſt to fear—we give way to *them* in the inſtances where we ſee plaineſt, how grievouſly we muſt ſuffer by our compliance—we know not how to reſiſt *them*, notwithſtanding the obvious ruin which

[a] Non pueritia in nobis, ſed, quod eſt gravius, puerilitas remanet: Et hoc quidem pejus eſt, quod auctoritatem habemus ſenum, vitia puerorum; nec puerorum tantum, ſed infantium. SEN. Epiſt.

will be the conſequence of our yielding to them.

I don't ſay, that a right *education* will be as beneficial, as a wrong one is hurtful: the very beſt may be diſappointed of its proper effects.

Though the tree you ſet be put into an excellent ſoil, and trained and pruned by the ſkilfulleſt hand; you are not, however, ſure of its thriving: Vermin may deſtroy all your hopes from it.

When the utmoſt care has been taken to ſend a young man into the world well principled, and fully appriſed of the reaſonableneſs of a religious and virtuous life; he is, yet, far from being temptation proof —he even then may fall, may fall into the worſt both of principles and practices[a]; and he is very likely to do ſo, in the place

[a] Sumuntur a converſantibus mores. Et ut quædam ad contactus corporis vitia tranſiliunt, ita animus mala ſua proximis tradit. Ebrioſus convictores in amorem vini traxit. Impudicorum cœtus fortem quoque & ſilicium virum emolliit. —— Eadem, ex diverſo, ratio virtutum eſt, ut omne, quod ſecum habent, mitigent. Nec tam valetudini profuit utilis regio & ſalubrius cœlum, quam animis parum firmis in turba meliorum verſari. Quæ res quantum

where

where you are, if he will aſſociate with thoſe who ſpeak as freely as they act; and who ſeem to think, that their underſtanding would be leſs advantageouſly ſhewn, were they not to uſe it in defence of their vices.

That we may be known by our company, is a truth become proverbial.[a] The ends we have to ſerve may, indeed, occaſion us to be often with the perſons whom we by no means reſemble: or, the place, in which we are ſettled, keeping us at a great diſtance from others, if we will converſe at all, it muſt be with ſome, whoſe manners we leaſt approve. But when we have our choice—when no valuable intereſt is promoted by aſſociating with the corrupt—when, if we like the company of

poſſit, intelliges, ſi videris feras quoque convictu noſtri manſueſcere; nullique immani beſtiæ vim ſuam permanere, ſi hominis contubernium diu paſſa eſt. Retunditur omnis aſperitas, paulatimque inter placida dediſcitur. SEN. *de Ira*, Lib. III. cap. vii.

[a] *Quinctilian* having mentioned ſome proverbial expreſſions, and among others this—Pares cum paribus facillime (or, as ſome MSS. maxime) congregantur, adds—Neque enim duraſſent hæc in æternum, niſi *vera omnibus viderentur*. Lib. V.

the wiſe and conſiderate, we may have it; that we then court the one, and ſhun the other, ſeems as full a proof, as we can well give, that, if we avoid vice, it is not from the ſenſe we have of the amiableneſs of virtue.

Had I a large collection of books, and never look'd into any that treated on grave and uſeful ſubjects, that would contribute to make me wiſer or better; but took thoſe frequently, and thoſe only, into my hands, that would raiſe my laughter, or that would merely amuſe me, or that would give me looſe and impure ideas, or that inculcated atheiſtical or ſceptical notions, or that were filled with ſcurrility and invective, and therefore could only ſerve to gratify my ſpleen and ill-nature; they, who knew this to be my practice, muſt, certainly, form a very unfavourable opinion of my capacity, or of my morals.[a] If nature had given me a good underſtanding, and much of my time paſſed in reading; were I to read nothing but what was tri-

[a] —Studio mores convenienter eunt.
OVID.

fling,

fling, it would ſpoil that underſtanding, it would make me a Trifler: And though formed with commendable diſpoſitions, or with none very blameable; yet if my *favourite authors* were—*ſuch* as encouraged me to make the moſt of the *preſent hour*, not to look beyond *it*, to taſte every pleaſure that offered itſelf, to forego no advantage that I could obtain—*ſuch* as gave vice nothing to fear, nor virtue any thing to hope, in a future ſtate; you would not, I am ſure, pronounce otherwiſe of thoſe writers, than that they would hurt my natural diſpoſition, and carry me *lengths of guilt*, which I ſhould not have gone without this encouragement to it.

Nor can it be allowed, that *reading* wrong things would thus affect me, but it muſt be admitted, that *hearing* them would not do it leſs.[a] *Both* fall under the head of *Converſation*; we fitly apply that term

[a] Τῃ μεν κακια, &c. Vitiis, multæ partes corporis, multaque loca aditum ſpatiumque per ſe ad animam penetrandi præbent. Unica virtuti, qua adoleſcentes arripiat, anſa aures ſunt, ſiquidem puræ ſint, & jam inde ab initio adulatoriarum corruptelarum vacuæ, intactæque a pravis ſermonibus ſerventur. Itaque Xenocrates aurium muni-

alike

alike to *both*; and we may be ſaid, with equal propriety, to converſe with books, and to converſe with men. The difference there is, as to the impreſſion we receive from what we read, and that which is made on us by what we hear, is, indeed, greatly on the ſide of the ſtrength of the latter. That which paſſes in our uſual intercourſe is liſtened to, without fatiguing us: Each, then, taking his turn in ſpeaking, our attention is kept awake: We mind throughout what is ſaid, while we are at liberty to expreſs our own ſentiments of it, to confirm it, or to improve upon it, or to object to it, or to hear any part of it repeated, or to aſk what queſtions we pleaſe concerning it.

Diſcourſe is an application to our eyes, as well as ears; and the one organ is here ſo far aſſiſtant to the other, that it greatly increaſes the force of what is tranſmitted to our minds by it. The air and action of

menta pueris potius quam athletis applicari jubebat. PLUT. *de Auditione.*

Τα ωτα σε μη πασι, &c. Aures tuas ne cuivis ſermoni præbe: malus enim ſermo malorum operum dux eſt. EPICHARM. apud STOB. 278.

the

the ſpeaker gives no ſmall importance to his words: the very tone of his voice adds weight to his reaſoning; and occaſions that to be attended to throughout, which, had it come to us from the pen or the preſs, we ſhould have been aſleep before we had read half of it.

That bad companions will make us as bad as themſelves, I don't affirm. When we are not kept from their vices by our principles, we may be ſo by our conſtitution; we may be leſs profligate than they are, by being more cowardly: But what I advance as *certain* is, That we cannot be ſafe among them—that they will, in ſome degree, and may in a very great one, hurt our morals. You may not, perhaps, be unwilling to have a diſtinct view of the reaſons, upon which I aſſert this.

I will enter upon them in my next.

I was going to write Adieu, when it came into my thoughts, that though you may not be a ſtranger to the much cenſured doctrine of our countryman *Pelagius*—a ſtranger to his having denied *Original* Sin; you

you may, perhaps, have never heard how he accounted for the depravity ſo manifeſt in the whole of our race——He aſcribed it to *Imitation.* Had he ſaid, that Imitation makes ſome of us very bad, and moſt of us worſe than we otherwiſe ſhould have been; I think he would not have paſſed for an Heretic.

*I am,* &c.

LETTER

# LETTER II.

SIR,

I Promiſed you, in my laſt, that you ſhould have the reaſons, why I think that there is great danger of your being hurt by vitious acquaintance. The firſt thing I have here to propoſe to your conſideration is, what I juſt mentioned at the cloſe of my laſt—our aptneſs to imitate.

For many years of our life we are forming ourſelves upon what we obſerve in thoſe about us. We do not only learn their phraſe, but their manners. You perceive among whom we were educated, not more plainly by our idiom, than by our behaviour. The cottage offers you a brood, with all the ruſticity and ſavageneſs of its grown inhabitants. The civility and courteſy, which, in a well ordered family, are conſtantly ſeen by its younger members, fail

fail not to influence their deportment; and will, whatever their natural *brutality* may be, diſpoſe them to check its appearance, and expreſs an averſeneſs from what is rude and diſguſting. Let the deſcendant of the meaneſt be placed, from his infancy, where he perceives every one mindful of decorum; the marks of his *extraction* are ſoon obliterated; at leaſt, his carriage does not diſcover it: And were the heir of his *Grace* to be continually in the kitchen or ſtables, you would ſoon only know the young Lord by his cloaths and title: In other reſpects, you would judge him the ſon of the groom or the ſcullion.

Nor is the diſpoſition to imitate confined to our childhood; when this is paſt, and the man is to ſhew himſelf, he takes his colours, if I may ſo ſpeak, from thoſe he is near—he copies their appearance[a]—he ſeldom is, what the uſe of his reaſon, or

[a] Πλατωνος απομιμεισθαι φασι, *&c.* Familiares aiunt Platonis curvitatem imitatos, & balbutiem Ariſtotelis, & Alexandri regis colli inflexionem inque dicendo vocis aſperitatem. PLUT. *de Ad. & Am. Diff.*

what

what his own inclinations would make him.[a]

Are the opinions of the Generality, in moſt points, any other, than what they hear advanced by this or that perſon high in their eſteem, and whoſe judgment they will not allow themſelves to queſtion? You well know, that one could not lately go into company, but the firſt thing ſaid was ——You have, undoubtedly, read——What an excellent performance it is! The fine imagination of its noble author diſcovers itſelf in every line. As ſoon as this noble author ſeriouſly diſown'd it, all the admiration of it was inſtantly at an end. Its merit, with thoſe who had moſt commended it, appeared to be wholly the name of its ſuppoſed writer. Thus we find it throughout. It is not *what* is written, or ſaid, or acted, that we examine; and approve or condemn, as it is, in itſelf, good or bad: Our concern is, who writes,

[a] Non ad rationem, ſed ad ſimilitudinem, vivimus.
SEN. *de Vit. beat.*

Incendent libidines tuas adulterorum ſodalitia. Si velis vitiis exui, longe a vitiorum exemplis recedendum eſt.
SEN. Ep. 104.

who

who ſays, or does it; and we, accordingly, regard or diſregard it.

Look round the kingdom. There is, perhaps, ſcarce a village in it, where the ſerioufneſs or diſſoluteneſs of the Squire, if not quite a driveller, is not more or leſs ſeen in the manners of the reſt of its inhabitants. And he, who is thus a pattern, takes his pattern—faſhions himſelf by ſome or other of a better eſtate, or higher rank, with whoſe character he is pleaſed, or to whom he ſeeks to recommend himſelf.[a]

In what a ſhort ſpace is a whole Nation metamorphoſed! Fancy yourſelf in the middle of the laſt century. What grave faces do you every where behold! The moſt diſſolutely inclined ſuffers not a libertine expreſſion to eſcape him. He who

[a] Ut cupiditatibus Principum, & vitiis, infici ſolet tota civitas; ſic emendari & corrigi continentia.——Non tantum mali eſt peccare Principes (quamquam eſt magnum hoc per ſeipſum malum) quantum illud, quod permulti imitatores Principum exiſtunt. Nam licet videre, ſi velis replicare memoriam temporum, qualeſcumque ſummi civitatis viri fuerunt, talem civitatem fuiſſe: quæcumque mutatio morum in Principibus exſtiterit, eandem in populo ſecuturam. Cic. *de Leg.* L. III.

leaſt

leaſt regards the practice of virtue, aſſumes its appearance.

None claim, from their ſtations, a privilege for their vices. The greateſt ſtrangers to the *influence* of Religion obſerve its *form*. The Soldier not only forbears an oath, but reproves it; he may poſſibly make free with your goods, as having more grace than you, and, therefore, a better title to them; but you have nothing to fear from his lewdneſs, or drunkenneſs.——

The Royal Brothers at length land—The Monarchy is reſtored. How ſoon then is a grave Aſpect denominated a puritanical; Decorum, preciſeneſs; Seriouſneſs, fanaticiſm! He, who cannot *extinguiſh* in himſelf *all ſenſe* of Religion, is induſtrious to conceal his having *any*—*appears* worſe than he *is*—would be thought to favour the crime, that he dares not commit. The lewdeſt converſation is the politeſt. No repreſentation pleaſes, in which Decency is conſulted. Every favourite Drama has its Hero a Libertine—introduces the Magiſtrate, only to expoſe him as a knave, or a cuckold; and the Prieſt, only to deſcribe him a profligate or hypocrite.

How much greater the power of faſhion is, than that of any laws, by whatſoever penalties enforced, the experience of all ages and nations concurs in teaching us. We readily imitate, where we cannot be conſtrained to obey; and become by Example, what our Rule ſeeks in vain to make us.

So far we may be all truly ſtyled Players, as we all perſonate — borrow our characters[a] — repreſent ſome other — act a part — exhibit thoſe who have been moſt under our notice, or whom we ſeek to pleaſe, or with whom we are pleaſed.

As the Chameleon, who is known
To have no colours of his own;
But borrows from his neighbour's hue
His white or black, his green or blue;
And ſtruts as much in ready light,
Which credit gives him upon ſight,
As if the Rainbow were in tail
Settled on him, and his heirs male:
So the young Squire, when firſt He comes
From country ſchool to *Will*'s or *Tom*'s;

[a] Nemo errat uni ſibi, ſed dementiam ſpargit in proximos, accipitque invicem. Et ideo in ſingulis vitia populorum ſunt. SEN. Ep. 94.

And

And equally, in truth, is fit
To be a Stateſman, or a Wit;
Without one notion of his own,
He ſaunters wildly up and down;
Till ſome acquaintance, good or bad,
Takes notice of a ſtaring lad,
Admits him in among the gang:
They jeſt, reply, diſpute, harangue;
He acts and talks as They befriend him,
Smear'd with the colours which They
lend him.
Thus, merely, as his fortune chances,
His Merit or his Vice advances.

PRIOR.

*I am*, &c.

# LETTER III.

SIR,

MY laſt endeavoured to ſhew you, how apt we are to imitate. Let me now deſire you to conſider the diſpoſition you will be under to recommend yourſelf to thoſe, whoſe company you deſire, or would not decline.

Converſation, like marriage, muſt have conſent of Parties. There is no being intimate with him, who will not be ſo with you; and, in order to contract or ſupport an intimacy, you muſt give the pleaſure which you would receive. This is a truth that every man's experience muſt force him to acknowledge: We are ſure to ſeek in vain a familiarity with any, who have no intereſt to ſerve by us, if we diſregard their humour.

In

In Courts, indeed, where the Art of pleaſing is more ſtudied than it is elſewhere, you ſee people more dexterouſly accommodating themſelves to the turn of thoſe for whoſe favour they wiſh[a]; but, wherever you go, you, almoſt conſtantly, perceive the ſame *end* purſued by the ſame *means*[b], though there may not be the ſame adroitneſs in applying them. What a proof have you in your own neighbourhood, how effectual theſe means are!

Did you ever hear *Charles* — tell a good ſtory — make a ſhrewd obſervation — drop

[a] Ἐν Συρακυσαις φασιν, &c. Ferunt Syracuſis, cum eo veniſſet Plato, ac Dionyſius inſano philoſophiæ ſtudio exarſiſſet, Regiam pulveris plenam fuiſſe ob multitudinem geometrica tractantem. Poſtquam Plato gratia excidit, Dionyſiuſque, philoſophia valere juſſa, rurſum ſe vino, nugis, libidinique & intemperantiæ, quaſi præcipitans, dedit; confertim univerſos, velut in Circes ædibus transformatos, inſcitia, oblivio, fatuitaſque occupavit. PLUT. *de Adul. & Am. diſcr.*

[b] Ἀλκιβιαδης Αθηνησι μεν σκωπτων, &c. Alcibiades Athenis dicteria jaciebat, equos alebat, vitamque facetam & gratioſam agebat: ad vivam cutem Spartæ radebatur, palliatus ibat, frigidaque lavabatur. Idem in Thracia militabat ac potabat: ubi ad Tiſſaphernem ventum eſt, mollitie & luxu atque arrogantia utebatur: hocque modo omnes demulcebat, eorum ſe moribus ſtudiiſque adſimilans. PLUT.

an expreſſion which bordered either on wit or humour? Yet he is welcome to all tables—he is much with thoſe who have wit, who have humour, who are, really, Men of Abilities. Whence is this, but from the approbation he ſhews of whatever paſſes? A ſtory he cannot *tell*, but he has a laugh in readineſs for every one he *hears*: by his admiration of wit, he ſupplies the want of it; and they who have *capacity* find no objection to the meanneſs of *his*, whilſt he appears always to think as they do. Few have their looks and tempers ſo much at command as this Man, and few, therefore, are ſo happy in recommending themſelves; but as in *his way* of doing it, there is, obviouſly, the greateſt likelyhood of ſucceſs, we may be ſure that it will be *the way* generally taken.

*Some*, I grant, you meet with, who by their endeavours, on all occaſions, to ſhew a ſuperior diſcernment, may ſeem to think, that to gain the favour of any one, he muſt be brought to their ſentiments, rather than they adopt his; but I fear theſe perſons will be found only giving too clear a proof, either how abſurdly ſelf-conceit ſometimes operates,

operates, or how much knowledge there may be, where there is very little common ſenſe.

Did I, in deſcribing the creature called MAN, repreſent him as having, in proportion to his bulk, more brains than any other animal we know of; I ſhould not think this deſcription falſe, though it could be proved that *ſome* of the Species had ſcarce any brains at all.

Even where favour is not particularly ſought, the very civility, in which he, who would be regarded as a well-bred man, is never wanting, muſt render him unwilling to avow the moſt juſt diſapprobation of what his companions agree in acting, or commending. He is by no means to give diſguſt, and, therefore, when he hears the worſt principles vindicated, and the beſt ridiculed; or when he ſees what ought to be matter of the *greateſt ſhame*, done without *any*; he is to acquieſce, he is to ſhew no token that what paſſes is at all offenſive to him.

Conſider yourſelf then in either of theſe ſituations—deſirous to engage the favour of

the bad man into whoſe company you are admitted—or, only unwilling to be thought by him deficient in good manners; and, I think, you will plainly ſee the danger you ſhould apprehend from him, the likelyhood there is that you ſhould at length loſe *the abhorrence* of his crimes, which, when with him, you never expreſs.

Will you aſk me, why it is not as *Probable* — that you ſhould reform your vitious acquaintance, as that they ſhould corrupt you? Or, why I may not as well ſuppoſe —that they will avoid ſpeaking and acting what will give you offence, as that you will be averſe from giving them any—that they will conſult your inclinations, as that you will theirs?

To avoid the length which will be equally diſagreeable to both of us, I will only anſwer—Do you know any inſtance which can induce you to think this *Probable?* Are not you appriſed of many inſtances, that greatly weaken the Probability of it?

The vaſt diſproportion, which there is between the numbers of the ſerious and the diſſolute, is ſo notorious, as to render it un-

unqueſtionable—that the influence of the latter far exceeds the influence of the former—that a vitious man is much more likely to corrupt a virtuous, than to be reformed by him.[a]

An anſwer of the ſame kind I ſhould have judged ſatisfactory, if, with reſpect to what I had urged in my former Letter, you queſtioned me—why the readineſs to imitate thoſe, with whom we are much converſant, might not as juſtly encourage you to *hope*, when you aſſociated with the leſs ſober, that they might be won to your regularity; as occaſion you to *fear*, that you ſhould be brought to join in their exceſſes? The Good have been for ſo long a ſpace

[a] Hæc ipſa magis pertinaciter hærent, quæ deteriora ſunt. Nam bona facile mutantur in pejus: nunc quando in bonum verteris vitia? QUINCTIL. Lib. I.

——————————Dociles imitandis
Turpibus ac pravis omnes ſumus; & Catilinam
Quocunque in populo videas, quocunque ſub axe:
Sed nec Brutus erit, Bruti nec avunculus uſquam.
JUV. Sat. XIV.

Omne tempus Clodios, non omne Catones feret. Ad deteriora faciles ſumus, quia nec Dux poteſt, nec Comes deeſſe: & res etiam ipſa ſine Duce, ſine Comite procedit. Non pronum iter eſt tantum ad vitia, ſed præceps, &c.
SEN. Ep. 97.

loſing

loſing ground among us, and the Bad gaining it; and theſe are now become ſuch a prodigious multitude; that it is undeniable, how much more apt we are to form ourſelves on the manners of thoſe who diſregard their duty, than on theirs who are attentive to it.

You will here be pleaſed to remark, that I don't conſider you as ſetting out with any reforming views—as converſing with the immoral, in order to diſpoſe them to reaſonable purſuits; but that I only apply to you, as induced to aſſociate with them from the eaſineſs of their temper, or the pleaſantry of their humour, or your common literary purſuits, or their ſkill in ſome of your favourite amuſements, or on ſome ſuch-like account: and then, what I have obſerved may not appear a weak argument, that they are much more likely to hurt you, than you are to benefit them.

I will cloſe my argument and my Letter, with a paſſage from a very good Hiſtorian,[a] which will ſhew you the ſenſe of one

[a] Diodor. Sic. Bib. Lib. XII. Sect. 12.

of

of the ableſt of the ancient Legiſlators on my preſent ſubject.

This writer, mentioning the Laws which *Charondas* gave the *Thurians*, ſays—"*He* "*enacted a Law with reference to an* Evil, "*on which former Lawgivers had not animad-* "*verted, that of keeping bad company. As* "*he conceived, that the morals of the Good* "*were ſometimes quite ruined by their diſſo-* "*lute acquaintance—that Vice was apt, like* "*an infectious diſeaſe, to ſpread itſelf, and* "*to extend its contagion even to the beſt diſ-* "*poſed of our Species———In order to pre-* "*vent this miſchief, he expreſsly enjoined,* "*that none ſhould engage in any intimacy or* "*familiarity with immoral perſons—he ap-* "*pointed that an Accuſation might be ex-* "*hibited for keeping bad company, and laid a* "*heavy fine on ſuch as were convicted of it.*"

Remember *Charondas*, when you are diſpoſed to cenſure the caution ſuggeſted by,

Dear Sir,

*Your*, &c.

LET-

# LETTER IV.

SIR,

SIR *Francis Walſingham*, in a Letter to Mr. *Anthony Bacon*, then a very young man, and on his travels, expreſſes himſelf thus—— "The danger is great that we are "ſubject to, in lying in the company of "the worſer ſort. In natural *bodies*, evil "airs are avoided, and infection ſhunned "of them that have any regard to their "health..... There is not ſo *probable* a "*reaſon* for the corruptions that may grow "to the *mind* of One from the *mind* of An-"other; but the *danger* is far *greater*, and "the *effects*, we ſee, more *frequent:* for "the number of evil-diſpoſed in mind is "greater than the number of ſick in bo-"dy..... Though the well-diſpoſed "will remain ſome good ſpace without

"cor-

" corruption, yet *Time*, I know not how,
" worketh a wound into him.....
" Which weakneſs of ours conſidered, and
" eaſineſs of nature, apt to be deceived,
" look'd into; they do beſt provide for
" themſelves, that *ſeparate themſelves*, as
" far as they can, from the Bad, and
" draw as nigh to the Good, as by any
" poſſibility they can attain to."[a]

To what I have already ſaid, in proof that we ſhould thus *ſeparate ourſelves*, I ſhall now add two further reaſons for our doing it: 1. The wrong inclinations, the proneneſs to violate ſome or other part of our duty, which we all find in ourſelves. 2. The power which Cuſtom hath, to reconcile us to what we, at firſt, moſt dreaded.

Need I tell you, that our natural depravity has not only been the theme of Chriſtian writers; but that the moſt eminent Heathen Authors——Poets, Hiſtorians, Philoſophers, join in confeſſing it?

[a] Memoirs of the Reign of Q. *Elizabeth*, by Dr. *Birch*, Vol. I. p. 13.

Where,

Where, alas! is the man, who has not his wrong tendencies to lament? Whom do you know able to conceal them, to prevent a clear diſcovery of them in his practice?

According as we are liable to act amiſs, we, certainly, muſt be in more or leſs danger from aſſociating with thoſe who either will ſeek to draw us into guilt—or will countenance us in it—or will diminiſh our abhorrence of it. Some danger from ſuch company there muſt be even to him whoſe *inclinations* are leaſt faulty; ſince they may be made worſe—they may produce bad actions, and a repetition of thoſe actions would form bad habits; and nothing could be ſo likely to heighten any depravity of diſpoſition, and carry it to the moſt fatal lengths of miſconduct, as a familiarity with thoſe who have no dread of guilt, or none that reſtrains them from complying with the temptations they meet with to guilt.

You may, perhaps, think, that you could be in no danger from any companion, to whoſe exceſſes you found not in yourſelf the leaſt propenſity: but believe me, my Friend,

Friend, this would by no means warrant your ſafety.

Though ſuch a companion might not induce you to offend in the very ſame way that he doth, he would, probably, make you the offender, that you otherwiſe never would have been. If he did not bring you to conform to his practice, would he not be likely to inſinuate his principles? His diſregard to *his duty* would tend to render you indifferent to *yours:* and, while he leſſened your general regard to virtue, he might make you a very bad man, though you ſhould continue wholly to avoid his particular crimes.

[a] The unconcernedneſs, with which he gave his worſt inclinations their ſcope, could hardly be day after day obſerved, without making you leſs ſolicitous to reſtrain your own wrong tendencies, and ſtrongly urging you to a compliance with them.

[a] Aſſiduitate quotidiana & conſuetudine oculorum aſſuescunt animi: neque admirantur, neque requirunt rationem earum rerum quas ſemper vident.

Cic. *de Nat. Deor.* Lib. II.

2. The

2. The danger there is in converſing with the Immoral will be yet more apparent, if you will, next, attend to the power of Cuſtom in reconciling us to that which we, at firſt, moſt dreaded.

Whence is it, that veteran troops face an enemy, with almoſt as little concern as they perform their exerciſe? The man of the greateſt courage among them felt, probably, in the firſt battle wherein he was, a terror that required all his courage to ſurmount. Nor was this terror, afterwards, overcome by him, but by degrees; every ſucceeding engagement abated it: The oftener he fought, the leſs he feared: By being habituated to danger, he learned, at length, to deſpiſe it.

An ordinary ſwell of the Ocean alarms the youth who has never before been upon it; but he, whoſe *fears* are now raiſed, when there is nothing that ought to excite them, becomes ſoon without *any*, even when in a ſituation that might juſtly diſmay him: He is calm, when the ſtorm is moſt

moſt violent, and diſcovers no uneaſy apprehenſions, while the veſſel, in which he ſails, is barely not ſinking.

You cannot, I am perſuaded, viſit an hoſpital—ſurvey the variety of diſtreſs there—hear the complaints of the ſick—ſee the ſores of the wounded, without being yourſelf in pain, and a ſharer of their ſufferings.

The conſtant attendants on theſe poor wretches have no ſuch concern: With diſpoſitions not leſs humane than yours, they do not feel the emotions that you would be under, at this ſcene of miſery; their frequent view of it has reconciled them to it—has been the cauſe, that their minds are no otherwiſe affected by it, than yours is by the objects ordinarily before you.

From how many other inſtances might it be ſhewn, that the things, which, at their firſt appearance, ſtrike us with the greateſt terror, no ſooner become familiar, but they ceaſe to diſcompoſe us? Let, therefore, our education have been the carefulleſt and wiſeſt; let there have been

uſed therein all the means likelieſt to fix in us an abhorrence of vice; we, yet, cannot be frequently among thoſe who allow themſelves in it, and have as few ſcruples about the concealment of any crime they are diſpoſed to, as about its commiſſion, without beholding it with abundantly leſs uneaſineſs than its firſt view occaſioned us.

When it is ſo beheld; when what is very wrong no more ſhocks us—is no longer highly offenſive to us; the natural and neceſſary progreſs is to a ſtill farther abatement of our averſion from it: And what is of force enough to conquer a ſtrong diſlike, may be reaſonably concluded well able to effect ſome degree of approbation[a]. How far this ſhall proceed, will, indeed, depend, in a good meaſure, upon our temper, upon our conſtitutional tendencies, upon our circumſtances: but ſurely we are become bad enough, when it is not the conſideration of what is amiſs in any practice, that with-holds us from it—when we only avoid it becauſe it is not agreeable

[a] Quod exemplo fit, id etiam jure fieri putant.
Cic. Ep. L. IV. Ep. 3.

to

to our humour; or, becauſe the Law puniſhes it; or, becauſe it interferes with ſome other criminal gratification, which better pleaſes us.

I begun this with an extract from a Letter of *Walſingham:* I will end it with one from a Letter of *Grotius*, when Ambaſſador in *France*, to his Brother, concerning his Son, whom he had recommended to that Gentleman's care.

After having expreſſed his wiſhes, that the young man might be formed a complete Advocate, he concludes thus---"Above "all things I intreat you to cultivate thoſe "ſeeds of knowledge, ſown by me in "him, which are productive of Piety; "and to recommend to him, for compa-"nions,[a] ſuch perſons as are themſelves "careful to make a proficiency therein."

GROT. Ep. 426.

*I am*, &c.

[a] His concern about the perſons with whom his Son contracted an intimacy is again expreſſed, Let. 429.

# LETTER V.

SIR,

WHEN I ended my laſt, I continued in my chair, thinking of the *Objections* which might be made to what I had written to you. The following then occurred to me.

That, when we are in poſſeſſion of truth, from fair examination and full evidence, there can be very little danger of our being induced to quit it, either by repeatedly hearing the weak objections of Any to it, or by remarking them to *act* as wrongly as they *argue*——That, as in *Mathematics* the propoſition which we had once demonſtrated would always have our aſſent, whomſoever we heard cavilling at it, or ridiculing our judgment concerning it: ſo in *Morals*, when once a due conſideration of the eſſential

tial and unchangeable differences of things hath rendered us certain of what is right and our duty; we can never be made leſs certain thereof, whatever errors in judgment or practice we may daily obſerve in our aſſociates, or daily hear them abſurd enough to defend —— That, when we not only plainly *perceive* the practice of Virtue to be moſt becoming us — to be what the nature and reaſon of things require of us; but actually *feel*, likewiſe, the ſatisfaction which it affords, the ſolid pleaſure which is its inſeparable attendant; there can be *no more ground* to *ſuppoſe*, that our having continually before us the follies and vices of any would lead us to depart from what we know to be fitteſt, and have experienced to be beſt for us, than there can be to *believe*, that a man in his wits would leave the food which his judgment approved and his palate reliſhed, for another ſort, which he ſaw, indeed, pleaſing to his companions, but which he was certain would poiſon them.

How little weight there is in this kind of arguing, I think every one might be convinced who would attend to his own

Practice, who would conſider the *numerous inſtances* in which he cannot but condemn it—in which he cannot but acknowledge it contrary to what his preſent welfare requires it ſhould be.

Let us think the moſt juſtly of our duty, and ſhun, with the greateſt care, all who would countenance us in a *departure* from it; we ſtill ſhall find *that departure too frequent*—we ſhall experience it ſo, even when it is truly lamented; and when, to avoid it, is both our wiſh and our endeavour. And if the influence of truth may receive ſuch hindrance from our *natural depravity*; from this *depravity*, even when we have kept out of the way of all who would encourage us to favour it; there, ſurely, muſt be an high degree of probability, that we ſhall be yet leſs mindful of our obligations, when we are not only prompted by our own appetites to violate them, but moved thereto by the counſel and example of thoſe, whoſe converſation beſt pleaſes us, and whoſe opinions and actions will, therefore, come with a more than ordinary recommendation to us.

The

The aſſent which we give, upon ſufficient evidence, to *moral* truths, could no more be unſettled by ridicule and ſophiſtry, than that which we give to *mathematical* truths, did our minds always retain the ſame diſpoſition with reſpect to the one, that they do as to the other.

With regard to the latter, we are never willing to be deceived — we always ſtand alike affected towards them: Our *conviction* about them was obtained, *at firſt*, upon ſuch grounds as muſt *always* remain our inducements to preſerve it: No luſt could be gratified, no intereſt ſerved, by its acting leſs forcibly upon us: In its defence the credit of our underſtanding is greatly concerned. And how vain muſt ridicule and ſophiſtry be neceſſarily thought, where their only aim is, that we ſhould acknowledge a ſuperior diſcernment in thoſe perſons, whoſe oppoſition increaſes our contempt of their *ignorance*, by making a plainer diſcovery of it?

As for *moral* truths, They are often diſagreeable to us — When we have had the

fulleſt *evidence* of them, we want not, occaſionally, the inclination to overlook it: If, under *ſome circumſtances*, we are ready to acknowledge *its force*; there are *others*, when we will not give it any attention. Here fancy and hope interpoſe: A *governing paſſion* allows us only a faint view of, or wholly diverts our notice from, whatever ſhould be our inducement to reſtrain it; and ſuffers us to dwell on nothing, but what will juſtify, or excuſe, us in giving way to it. Our reluctance to admit, that we have not *judged* as we ought to have done, is ſtrangely abated, when we thereby are ſet at liberty to *act* as we pleaſe.

When the endeavour is to laugh us, or to argue us, out of thoſe principles that we, with much *ſelf-denial*, adhere to; we ſhall but feebly oppoſe its ſucceſs. He has a ſtrong party on his ſide within our boſoms, who ſeeks to make us quit *opinions*, which are ſtill controuling our *affections*. If we are not ſecure from acting contrary to our *duty*, what cogent proofs ſoever we have of its being ſuch, and what ſatisfaction ſoever we have had in its diſcharge; we are highly concerned to avoid every *temptation* to offend:

offend: and it, undoubtedly, is a very ſtrong one, to *hear* continually what is likelieſt to remove the fear of indulging our appetites; and continually to *ſee*, that they who apply to us *act* as they *adviſe*—allow themſelves in the liberties they would have us to take; and are under none of the checks which they prompt us to throw off.[a]

Though what we did not reliſh, and what we thought would ſpeedily deſtroy us, we might not eat, when our *Companions* ſhewed themſelves fond of it, and preſſed us to taſte it; yet, if we apprehended *no immediate danger* from their meal—if we were eye-witneſſes of its being attended with *none*—if they were continually expreſſing their high delight in it, and repeating their aſſurances, that all, either our indifference towards, or diſreliſh of it, was only from prejudice and prepoſſeſſion; we, very probably, ſhould at length yield, and quit both our diſguſt of their repaſt, and

[a] —Monſtrata diu veteris trahit orbita culpæ.
Juv. Sat. XIV.

our

our dread of its conſequences. And if this might enſue, when we were invited to partake of that which was leſs agreeable to our palates; what ſhould be feared, when our company tempted us to *that* which we could be pleaſed with, and were only withheld from by ſuch an *apprehenſion of danger*, as nothing could ſooner remove, than our obſerving thoſe, with whom we moſt converſed, to be without it?

Reaſon is, certainly, always on the ſide of duty. Nor is there, perhaps, any man, who, when he ſeriouſly conſiders what is beſt for him to do, will not purpoſe to do that which is right. But, ſince we can act without conſideration in the moſt important articles, and nothing is leſs likely to be conſidered, than what we find quite cuſtomary with others—what we ſee them act without remorſe or ſcruple; when we are, day after day, eye-witneſſes of our aſſociates allowing themſelves in a wrong practice, perſiſting in it without expreſſing the leaſt dread of its Conſequences; it is as abſurd to think that our moral feeling ſhould not be injured thereby, as it is to ſuppoſe, that

our

our hands would preſerve the ſame ſoftneſs, when they had been for years accuſtomed to the oar, which they had when they firſt took it up; or, that hard labour would affect us as much when inured to it, as when we entered upon it.

I will, for the preſent, take my leave of you with an *Italian* Proverb, and an *Engliſh* one exactly anſwerable to it——

*Dimmi con chi tu vai, ſapro quel che fai.*

Tell me with whom thou goeſt, and I'll tell thee what thou doeſt.

*I am*, &c.

LETTER

# LETTER VI.

SIR,

I Know not what I can add on the preſent ſubject of our correſpondence, that may be of greater ſervice to you than the following ſhort relation.——I may not, indeed, be exact in every particular of it, becauſe I was not at all acquainted with the *Gentleman* whom it concerns, and becauſe many years have paſſed ſince I received an account of *him:* but as my information came from perſons on whoſe veracity I could depend, and as what they told me much affected me when I heard it, and has, ſince, been very often in my thoughts; I fear that the melancholy deſcription which you will here have of human frailty, is but too true in every thing material therein.

At

At the firſt appearance of —— in Town, nothing, perhaps, was more the topic of converſation, than his merit. He had read much: What he had read, as it was on the moſt uſeful ſubjects, ſo he was thoroughly maſter of it; gave an exact account of it, and made very wiſe reflections upon it. During his long reſidence at a diſtance from our Metropolis, he had met with few to whom he was not greatly ſuperior, both in capacity and attainments: yet this had not in the leaſt diſpoſed him to dictate, to be poſitive and aſſuming, to treat Any with contempt or neglect.

He was obliging to all who came near him; talked on the ſubjects which they beſt underſtood, and which would be likelieſt to induce them to take their full ſhare of the converſation.

They, who had ſpent every winter near the *Court*, ſaw nothing in his behaviour, that ſhew'd how far he had lived from *it*— nothing which was leſs ſuitable to any civility that could be learn'd in *it*.

His

His manners were only leſs courtly, in their ſimplicity and purity. He did not, often, directly reprove the *libertine diſcourſe* of his equals; but would recommend himſelf to none, by expreſſing the ſlighteſt approbation of *ſuch diſcourſe*: He *ſhew'd* it did not pleaſe him, though he declined *ſaying* ſo.

He forbore that invective againſt the manners of the age, which could only irritate; and thought that, at his years, the fitteſt cenſure he could paſs on them, would be to avoid them. It ſeemed, indeed, his particular care, that he might not be repreſented either as a Bigot, or a Cynic; but yet, as he knew how to defend his principles, ſo he ſhew'd himſelf, on every proper occaſion, neither afraid nor aſhamed to engage in their defence.

His converſation was among *perſons* of his own *Rank*, only ſo far as Decorum required it ſhould be: *Their* favourite topics were ſo little to his taſte, that his leiſure hours, where he could have his choice, were paſſed among thoſe who had the moſt learning and virtue, and, whether diſtinguiſhed,

or not, by their anceſtors worth, would be ſo by their own.

He had high notions of his duty to his country; but having ſeen what ſelf-intereſtedneſs, at length, ſhew'd itſelf, where he had heard the ſtrongeſt profeſſions of patriotiſm; it made him very cautious with whom he engaged, and utterly averſe from determining of any as friends to the Public, merely becauſe they were oppoſers of the Court.

No one judged more rightly of the hurt that muſt enſue, from irreligion ſpreading itſelf among the common people; and, therefore, where his example was moſt remarked, and could be moſt efficacious, he took particular care that it ſhould promote a juſt reverence of the Deity.

Thus did *A. A.* ſet out in the world, and thus behaved, for ſome years, notwithſtanding the bad examples he had every where before him, among thoſe of his own ſtation. In one of the accompliſhments of a Gentleman (though, ſurely, one of the very meaneſt of them) he was thought to excel; and many fine ſpeeches were made

him

him upon that account. They were but too much regarded by him; and, gradually, drew him often into the company that he would have deſpiſed, had he heard leſs of his own praiſe in it. The compliments ſo repeatedly paid him by the frivolous reconciled him, at length, to them. As his attachment to them got ground, his ſeriouſneſs loſt it. The Patriot was no more —The zeal he had for the morals of his countrymen abated.——

The tragical concluſion of his Story, let thoſe tell you, who would not feel that concern at the relation of it which I ſhould do: This you certainly may learn from it— That, as the conſtant dropping of water wears away the hardeſt ſtone, ſo the continual *ſolicitations* of the vitious are not to be withſtood by the firmeſt mind——All, who are in the way of them, will be hurt by them——Whereſoever they are uſed, they will make an impreſſion——He only is ſecure from their force, who will not hazard its being tried upon him.[a]

[a] Magna pars ſanitatis eſt hortatores inſaniæ reliquiſſe, & ex iſto cœtu invicem noxio procul abiiſſe.

SEN. Ep. 94.

In

In what you have hitherto received from me, I have argued wholly from *your own diſpoſitions*, and endeavoured to ſhew you, from thence, the danger of having bad companions: See now your danger from *their diſpoſitions*. And, firſt, let theſe perſons be conſidered only, in general, as partial to their notions and practices, and eager to defend them.

Whatever our *perſuaſion* or *conduct* is, we are uſually favourable to it; we have our plea for it; very few of us can bear, with any patience, that it ſhould be judged irrational: The approbation of it is a compliment to our underſtanding, that we receive with pleaſure; and to cenſure it, is ſuch a diſparagement of us, as doth not fail to diſguſt us. I will not ſay, there are *None* to be found, that give themſelves little or no concern, who thinks or acts as they do; but it is certain, that, ordinarily, we are deſirous to be joined in the cauſe we eſpouſe—we are ſolicitous to vindicate and ſpread our opinions, and to have others take the ſame courſes with us. Should I allow you to be as intent on this as any of your acquaint-

ance are; yet, pray, conſider what you may expect when you ſtand alone, or when a majority is againſt you—when each of them relieves the other in an attack upon you—when this attack is, day after day, repeated—when your numerous opponents join in applauding, or ſtrengthening, or enlivening their ſeveral objections to your ſentiments; and in treating whatever you can urge in your defence, as abſurd, or weak and impertinent—when your peace can only be purchaſed by your ſilence—when you find, that there is no hope of bringing thoſe you delight to be with into your opinions, that they confirm each other in oppoſition to you, and that you can only be agreeable to them by adopting their maxims and conforming to their manners.

It is next to be conſidered, what you may fear from an intimacy with the immoral, when they muſt look upon themſelves to be *reproached* by ſuch of their acquaintance as will not concur with them in their exceſſes. They cannot but do this; becauſe all who ſeek either to make them alter their manners, or to weaken their influence upon others,

others, charge them with what is, really, the higheſt *reproach* to them; and becauſe they are ſenſible that the arguments likelieſt to be uſed by any one for his not complying with them, are grounded on the *miſchief* of their conduct, or on its *folly*. Regard then yourſelf, as in their place. Reflect how you would behave towards the man, whoſe opinion of you was—That you acted either a very criminal or a very imprudent part:[a] Reflect, I ſay, how you would behave towards the perſon thus judging of you, if you wiſhed to preſerve a familiarity with him, but yet was reſolved to perſiſt in your notions and practice. You, certainly, would try every method to remove his diſtaſte of them: You would colour them as agreeably as you poſſibly could: You would ſpare no pains to weaken every objection he could have to them—you would, in your turn, attack his maxims and manners; you would ſeek to

[a] Υποπτοι οι τα βελτιω ζηλουντες, &c. Suſpecti ſunt qui meliora quærunt, quique amicorum peccatis offendi & ea moleſte ferre videntur. Quæ res & Dionem Dionyſio, & Samium Philippo, & Ptolemæo Cleomenem inviſum fecit atque perdidit. PLUT. *de Ad. & Am. diſcr.*

convince him upon what ſlight grounds he preferred them to yours—you would apply to every artifice, that could give them the appearance of being leſs defenſible, or that could incline him to overlook what might be urged in their defence.

And if this might naturally be ſuppoſed the part you would act towards others; you ought to expect that they, in the ſame circumſtances, would behave alike towards you. But can you think it prudent to let them try with what ſucceſs they may proceed? Would not caution be your moſt effectual ſecurity? Would it not be the wiſeſt method of providing for your ſafety, to keep out of the way of danger?[a]

You are, further, to look upon thoſe, from aſſociating with whom I would diſſuade you, as extremely ſolicitous to be kept in countenance. The vitious well know, to how many objections their con-

[a] Ελασσω κακα πασχουσιν, &c. Pauciora mala contingunt hominibus ab inimicis, quam amicis. Inimicos enim cum metuant, ab eis cavent: Amicis vero aperti ſunt, unde periculis exponuntur, & inſidiis ipſorum facile capiuntur.

DEMONAX apud STOB. 217.

duct

duct is liable: They are ſenſible, to what eſteem *good Morals* are entitled, what *praiſe* they *claim*, and what they, in the moſt corrupt times, *receive*.

*Virtue* is ſo much for the intereſt of mankind, that there can never be a general agreement to deny all manner of applauſe to the practice of *it:* Such numbers are made ſufferers by a departure from *its* rules, that there are few crimes which meet not with an extenſive cenſure.

You have long ſince learn'd it to be the language of Paganiſm itſelf, That

[a] "*All who act contrary to what the rea-*
"*ſon of things requires — who do what is*
"*hurtful to themſelves or others, muſt ſtand*
"*ſelf-condemned:*" and you cannot want to be informed, in what light they are ſeen by thoſe who do not ſhare their guilt. The *endeavour*, therefore, of ſuch men, while they are without any purpoſe of amend-

[a] Nulla major pœna nequitiæ eſt, quam quod ſibi diſplicet. SEN. *de Ira*, Lib. III.

Unus effectus eſt vitii diſplicere ſibi. SEN. *de Tranquil. Anim.* c. 2.

Se judice nemo nocens abſolvitur. JUV. Sat. XIII.

ment, will, unqueſtionably, be, to make their cauſe as ſpecious as poſſible, by engaging Many in its defence; and to ſilence cenſure, by the danger that would ariſe from the numbers it would provoke. The motives to this endeavour, when duly reflected on, will fully ſatisfy us, with what zeal it muſt be accompanied; and it may well, therefore, alarm all, on whom its power is likely to be tried — may well induce them to conſider ſeriouſly, what they have to fear from it, how much their virtue may ſuffer by it.

I will conclude this with a ſhort ſtory of the Poet *Dante*, for which *Bayle* quotes *Petrarch*. Among other viſits made by *Dante* after his baniſhment from *Florence*, one was to the then much-famed *Can*, Prince of *Verona*.

*Can* treated him, at firſt, with great civility; but this did not laſt: and by the little complaiſance at length ſhewn the Poet, he plainly perceived that he ceaſed to be an acceptable gueſt.

Scholars,

Scholars, it ſeems, were not *Can*'s favourites—he liked thoſe much better who ſtudied to divert him; and Ribaldry was by no means the diſcourſe that leaſt pleaſed him. Suſpecting that this did not raiſe *Dante*'s opinion of him, he one day took occaſion to ſingle out the moſt obnoxious of the libertine crew that he entertained, and, after high praiſes given the man, turning to *Dante* he ſaid, I *wonder* how it is that this mad fellow is *beloved* by us All, as giving us the pleaſure which, really, we do not find in your company, wiſe as you are thought to be.

Sir, anſwered the Poet, you would not *wonder* at this, if you conſidered, that our love of Any proceeds from their manners being ſuitable, and their diſpoſitions ſimilar, to our own.

*I am*, &c.

# LETTER VII.

SIR,

I Have but one thing more to propoſe to your Conſideration, as a diſſuaſive from aſſociating with the vitious; and it is—— The way in which they, ordinarily, ſeek to corrupt thoſe with whom they converſe.

The *Logic* of the immoral contributes but little to increaſe their numbers, in compariſon of what they effect by *raillery* and *ridicule*. This is their *ſtrength*; they are ſenſible of its being ſo; and you may be aſſured that it will be exerted againſt you.[a] There is nothing that cannot be jeſted with;

[a] Ου γαρ μονον ως φησι, &c. Non enim duntaxat, quod apud Phocylidem eſt—Qui vult eſſe probus, falli hunc perſæpe neceſſe eſt: ſed & derideri oportet ſæpe, & ignominiam ferre, & falſe dicta, & ſcurriles inſectationes.

PLUT. *de Aud.*

and

and there is nothing that we, univerſally, bear worſe, than to be made the jeſt of Any.

What reaſoning on moral ſubjects may not have its force evaded by a man of wit and humour; and receive a turn, that ſhall induce the leſs conſiderate to ſlight it as weak and inconcluſive? The moſt becoming practice—that which is moſt our duty, and the importance of which to our preſent welfare is moſt evident, a lively fancy eaſily places in a ridiculous view, and thereby brings it into an utter neglect.

That reverence of the Deity, which the beſt both ancient and modern writers have ſo ſtrongly recommended—which the worthieſt men in every age have ſo carefully expreſſed—which any obſervation of nature, any attention to our own frame, fails not to inculcate, is yet, by being repreſented under the garb of Superſtition or Fanaticiſm, ſeen among us to ſuch diſadvantage, that many, our military Gentlemen eſpecially, appear to take a pride in ſhewing themſelves diveſted of it.

Con-

Conjugal fidelity, though of ſuch moment to the peace of families—to their intereſt—to the proſperity of the commonwealth, that, by the laws of the wiſeſt and beſt regulated States, the ſevereſt puniſhment has been inflicted on the violation of it, is, nevertheleſs, by the levity with which ſome have treated it, ſo much, at preſent, ſlighted, that the *Adulterer* is well received: Women, who would think it the groſſeſt affront to have their virtue queſtioned, who affect the character of the ſtricteſt obſervers of Decorum, ſhun *him* not—ſhew *him* the utmoſt complaiſance. Whatever diſhonour, in this caſe, falls on any, it accrues wholly to the injured perſon.

Can you aſſign a better reaſon, why the intemperate, among the meaner people, have ſo prodigiouſly increaſed their numbers, than the banter they uſe towards ſuch as they meet with diſpoſed to ſobriety, the mockery with which they treat it, the ſongs and catches, with which they are ſo plentifully provided, in deriſion of it?

I cannot give you the very terms of Lord *Shafteſbury*, as I have not his Works; but I think

I think I may be certain there is an obſervation in them to this effect——That, *had the Enemies to Chriſtianity expoſed its firſt Profeſſors not to wild Beaſts, but to Ridicule; their endeavours to ſtop its progreſs might have had very different* ſucceſs *from what they experienced.*

Had the wit of man been only concerned in the ſpreading that *Religion*, I believe the conjecture well founded. But this ſucceſs could no more have affected the truth of that *Religion*, than it leſſens the worth of a public ſpirit, of honeſty, of temperance, that ſo many have been laughed out of them—that the jeſt made of them has occaſioned their being ſo rare among us.

The author of the *Beggars Opera* gives the true character of his *Newgate* tribe, when he exhibits them ludicrous on all pretences to virtue, and thus hardening each other in their crimes. It was the moſt effectual means to keep up *their* ſpirits under *their* guilt, and may well be judged the likelieſt method of bringing *others* to ſhare it.

*The Duke of Buckingham*, ſays a late Writer, *had the art of turning perſons or things into ridicule, beyond any man of the Age. He poſſeſſed the young King* [Charles II.] *with very ill principles, both as to Religion and Morality, and with a very mean opinion of his Father, whoſe ſtiffneſs was, with him, a ſubject of raillery.* It is elſewhere obſerved, That, to make way for the ruin of the Lord *Clarendon*, *He often acted and mimicked him in the King's preſence, walking ſtately with a pair of bellows before him, for the purſe, and Colonel* Titus *carrying a fire-ſhovel on his ſhoulder, for the mace; with which ſort of banter and farce the King was too much delighted.*

Such are the impreſſions, to the diſparagement of the beſt things, and of the beſt men, that may be made by burleſque and buffoonry: They can deſtroy the efficacy of the wiſeſt precepts, and the nobleſt examples.

The Monarch here ſpoken of may, perhaps, be thought as ill-diſpoſed as the worſt of his favourites, and rather humoured than corrupted by the ſport they made with all

that

that is, ordinarily, held ſerious. Were this admitted to be true of him—Were we to ſuppoſe his natural depravity not heightened by any thing ſaid or done before him, in deriſion of virtue or the virtuous: yet the effects of his being accuſtomed to ſuch repreſentations may be looked upon as extremely miſchievous; when we may, ſo probably, attribute to them the looſe he gave to his natural depravity—the little decorum he obſerved—that utter careleſſneſs to ſave appearances, whence ſo much hurt enſued to the morals of his people, and whereby he occaſioned ſuch diſtraction in his affairs, ſo weakened his authority, ſo entirely loſt the affections of the beſt of his ſubjects; and from whence that he did not experience ſtill worſe conſequences, may be aſcribed to a concurrence of circumſtances, in which his prudence had no ſhare.

The weakneſs of an argument may be clearly ſhewn—The arts of the ſophiſter may be detected, and the fallacy of his reaſoning demonſtrated—To the moſt ſubtile objections there may be given ſatisfactory an-

anſwers: But there is no confuting raillery —the acuteſt Logician would be ſilenced by a *Merry Andrew.*

It is to no manner of purpoſe that we have *Reaſon* on our ſide, when the *Laugh* is againſt us: and how eaſy is it, by playing with our words — by a quibble — by the loweſt jeſt, to excite that *Laugh!*

When the company is diſpoſed to attack your principles with drollery, no plea for them is attended to; the more ſerious you ſhew yourſelf in their defence, the more ſcope you give to the mirth of your opponents.

How well ſoever we have informed ourſelves of the motives to a right conduct, theſe motives are not attended to as often as we act: our ordinary practice is founded on the impreſſion that a former conſideration of them has made; which impreſſion is very liable to be weakened—wants frequently to be renewed in the ſame way that it was at firſt produced.

When we continually hear our virtue banter'd as mere prejudice, and our notions

of

of honour and decorum treated as the ſole effects of our pride being dexterouſly flattered—When our piety is frequently ſubjecting us to be derided as childiſhly timorous, or abſurdly ſuperſtitious; we ſoon know not how to perſuade ourſelves that we are not more ſcrupulous than we need to be; we begin to queſtion, whether, in ſettling the *extent* of our *obligations*, we have ſufficiently conſulted the *imperfections* of our *nature*—whether our *judgment* is without its bias from our *fears*.

Let our ſerioufneſs be exhibited to us in that odd figure, which wit and humour can eaſily give it; we ſhall be inſenſibly led to judge of it according to its appearance as thus overcharged, and under the diſadvantage in which it is ſhewn us: We ſhall, firſt, ſeem unconcerned at the greater liberties that others take, and, by degrees, proceed to take the very ſame ourſelves.

The perſon whom we moſt highly and juſtly honoured, if the buffoonry of our companions were conſtantly levelled at him, would ſoon have his worth overlooked by us; and, though we might not be brought

to

to think of him as contemptibly as they appeared to do, our reverence of him would, certainly, at length abate, and both his advice and example have much leſs influence upon us.

Of this you ſhall have an inſtance in my next.

I will here only add what *Jamblichus*[a] mentions as practiſed by *Pythagoras*, before he admitted any into his School—He enquired, "Who were their Intimates"—juſtly concluding, that they who could like bad companions would not be much profited by his inſtructions.

*I am*, &c.

[a] De Vit. Pyth. c. 17.

LETTER

# LETTER VIII.

SIR,

WHAT follows will diſcharge the promiſe which I made you towards the concluſion of my laſt.

*S.* was the Oracle of his County: To whatever point he turn'd his thoughts, he ſoon made himſelf maſter of it. He entered, indeed, ſo early upon buſineſs, that he had little time for books; but he had read thoſe which beſt deſerved his peruſal, and his memory was the faithful repoſitory of their contents.

The helps that he had not received from reading, he had abundantly ſupplied the want of by obſervation and converſation.

The compaſs of his knowledge was amazing. There was ſcarce any thing, of

which one in his ſtation ought to be informed, wherein he appeared to be ignorant. Long experience, great ſagacity, a ready apprehenſion, a retentive memory, the reſort to him of all ſorts of people from whom any thing could be learned, and an intimacy with ſome of the worthieſt perſons of every profeſſion, enabled him to ſpeak on moſt points with ſuch juſtneſs and copiouſneſs, as might induce you to conclude, upon firſt being with him, that the topic on which his diſcourſe turned was what he had particularly and principally attended to. Though he owned himſelf never to have ſo much as look'd into the writings of Atheiſts or Deiſts; yet, from the promiſcuous company he had been obliged to keep, and the freedom with which all ſpoke their ſentiments to him, there was not, perhaps, a material objection to the Chriſtian Religion, of which he was not appriſed, and which he had not well conſidered.

Senſible of his ſtrength, and ever deſirous to uſe it in the beſt of cauſes—in the ſervice of that truth which operates on men's practice, and would, if attended to, rectify it

it throughout; he did not diſcourage the moſt free ſpeakers: He calmly and willingly heard what they could ſay againſt his faith, while they uſed reaſon and argument; but drollery and jeſt he failed not, though with great good humour, to reprove, as a ſpecies of miſrepreſentation—as a ſure evidence, that truth was not ſought—as an artifice, to which none would apply, who were not conſcious of their weakneſs, who did not deſpair of ſupporting their notions by rational proofs.

Virtue and true Religion had not, perhaps, an abler Advocate than this Gentleman; but whatever ſervice his tongue might do them, his manners, certainly, did them far greater: He convinced you of their *excellency*, by exhibiting to your ſenſes their *effects*—he left you no room to queſtion how amiable they were, when it was from *their* influence upon him, that *he* ſo much engaged your eſteem and affection; he proved undeniably, how much they ſhould be our *care*, by being himſelf an inſtance, how much they contributed to our *happineſs*.

Never, certainly, did Piety ſit eaſier upon any man —— Never, perhaps, was any man more eſteemed by the very perſons, between whoſe practice and his there was the wideſt difference.

The ſuperior talents he diſcover'd, and his readineſs to employ them for the benefit of All who applied to him, engaged alike their admiration and their love.

The obligations conferred by *Him* obtained the height of complaiſance towards his *Son*. Invitations were made the Youth from all quarters; and there was not a young man of any figure near him, who was not introduced to him, and directed to pay him particular civility. They who ſought to attach him cloſeſt to them by *conſulting* his humour, were never without their arguments for *licenſing* it. " True it " was, this or that *purſuit* might not be to " the taſte of his *Father*; but neither did " it ſuit his years——When he was a *Young* " *Man*, he, undoubtedly, acted as *One*; he " took the diverſions, allowed himſelf in " the gratifications, to which Youth in- " clines: No wonder that he ſhould now

" cen-

" cenſure what he could not reliſh—that " he ſhould condemn the draught which " his head could not bear, and be indiffe- " rent to the features which he could not " diſtinguiſh without his ſpectacles."

When this kind of language had abated the reverence due to ſo excellent an inſtructor, the Buffoon interpoſed ſtill further to weaken his influence; gave an air of affectation to his decorum—of hypocriſy to his ſerioufneſs—of timorouſneſs to his prudence—of avarice to his wiſe œconomy—burleſqued the *advice* that he might be ſuppoſed to give, the arguments with which he was likely to ſupport *it*, and the reproof he would naturally uſe, when he did not ſee a diſpoſition to follow *it*.

Soon as the young man had attained the age, at which the Law ſuppoſes us *ſufficiently diſcreet*, he expreſſed a moſt earneſt deſire to have an opportunity of appearing *ſo*. Repeated promiſes were made, that if a proper Allowance was ſettled on him, and leave given him to chuſe a place of abode, there ſhould not be the leaſt miſmanagement; the income aſſigned him ſhould anſwer every article of expence.

The Son's importunity was ſeconded by the fond Mother's, and their joint ſolicitations prevailed. The Youth was now acceſſible, at all times, to the moſt profligate of his acquaintance: And one part of their entertainment, uſually, was, to ſet his excellent Father's maxims and manners in the moſt diſadvantageous light. This failed not to bring on a diſregard to both—ſo entire a diſregard to them, that the whore and the card-table took up all the hours which the bottle relieved not.

Thus fell the heir of one of the worthieſt of our countrymen!—It was to no purpoſe, that ſuch an admirable example had been ſet him by the perſon he was moſt likely to regard—that ſuch particular care had been taken to reaſon him into a diſcharge of his duty—that he had been preſent when the moſt ſubtile Advocates for Irreligion either were ſilenced, or induced to acknowledge their principles to be much leſs defenſible than they had hitherto thought them. None of the impreſſions of what had been done for him, or ſaid to him, or had paſſed before him, could hold out

out againſt Ridicule; it effaced every trace of them, and prepared him to be as bad as his worſt companions could be inclined to make him. How great a neglect of him enſued! They who had laugh'd him out of the reverence due to his parent's worth, rendered him ſoon deſpiſed by All whoſe eſteem could profit or credit him; and he died in the 70th year of his conſtitution, when but in the 25th of his age.

*I am*, &c.

# LETTER IX.

SIR,

MY laſt gave you a melancholy inſtance of the hurt done by *Ridicule* to the heir of a moſt worthy man, not many miles from you. What influence it had towards the condemnation of Him, to whom the Epithet of *Divine* might, perhaps, be more properly applied, than to any one who ever lived under the ſole guidance of Reaſon, has long, you know, been matter of diſpute. I will only obſerve, concerning the Comic Writer's Ridicule of *Socrates*——

1. That, when ſuch a repreſentation could be made of ſo *Excellent* a *perſon*, it demonſtrates, that no degree of *worth* can ſecure *Any perſon* from an attempt to deſtroy his credit; and that they, whoſe capa-

capacities fully enable them to diſcern this *worth*, may be its ſpitefulleſt enemies, and bend their wits to diſparage it——.

2. That, when ſuch a repreſentation could be made by a man of good parts, with any confidence of ſucceſs, it is, further, an evidence of the probability that the higheſt and moſt juſt reputation may ſuffer from Ridicule, and that it may bring into contempt what is entitled to the greateſt eſteem and honour——

3. That if the *Athenians* were ſo well pleaſed [a] with the means uſed to leſſen the character of this Ornament, not only to his country, but his ſpecies, as to render the interpoſition of a powerful party in the State neceſſary, to prevent the Poet's abuſe from meeting with all the ſucceſs he promiſed himſelf in it [b]; we are fully taught, what may be the pernicious effects of ingenious drollery—how much it may weaken

[a] Ακουσμα εδοξεν ηδιστον, &c. Hæ nebulæ viſæ illis acroama ſuaviſſimum; & Poetam plauſu tanto proſequebantur, quanto nunquam antea.

ÆLIAN. Var. Hiſt. Vol. I. p. 102.

[b] Alcibiadis factio obſtitit, quo minus vinceret Ariſtophanes. Scholia in προθ. *Nubium*, apud KUHN.

the

the force of any inſtruction, or of any example.

Where violent methods are purſued in order to withdraw us from any religious *practice* or *opinion*; its oppoſers expreſſing thereby, that *they* look upon *it* as ſomewhat of great importance, teach *us* to do the ſame; and often increaſe our attachment to *it*—render us more earneſt about *it*, than we, otherwiſe, ſhould have been. But where ſuch *practice* or *opinion* is treated as a matter of jeſt—where it meets with all the ſlight that ſcoffing and laughter can expreſs, we ſcarcely know how to preſerve our regard to it as a thing of much conſequence; and from eſteeming it of little moment, we eaſily proceed to judge it of none at all.

The *force* that is offered us, on account of our perſuaſion, either occaſions ſuch an averſion from him who applies to it, as prevents his having any influence upon us; or engages us in ſo careful an attention to the grounds upon which we formed our judgment, as fixes us in the reſolution not to alter it. But when all paſſes under the appearance of good humour—when only mirth

mirth and pleaſantry are exerted againſt us, we neither contract that hatred towards thoſe by whom we are thus treated, which will be our ſecurity from any bad impreſſions they can make upon us, nor are we excited to any examination of our *principles* that can confirm us in *them*. The freedom which our companions uſe, in ſporting with what we have hitherto reverenced, will tempt us to conclude, that its importance is far from being obvious; nor, indeed, can it fail, unleſs our minds have a more than ordinary firmneſs, to raiſe at length ſome doubt in us, whether we have not been too fanciful or too credulous. And as—

"*The woman, who deliberates, is loſt,*"

we may fear the man will be ſo likewiſe, who ſuffers himſelf to queſtion, how well founded his ſerioufneſs is, merely becauſe his aſſociates are continually deriding it.

Would you not, induſtriouſly, keep out of the way of thoſe who had power to torture you, and whom you knew ready to do it, if you would not be guided by them, but was determined to think and act as your own reaſon ſhould direct? Believe me, Sir, the

Scoffer

Scoffer ſhould be as much ſhunned by the friend to virtue, as the Inquiſitor by the friend to truth. Whoever would attain or preſerve a juſt ſenſe of his duty, ſhould have as little intercourſe as poſſible with thoſe who would diſcourage ſincerity—who would oppoſe it, either by the faggot, or the fair,[a] of *Smithfield.* A very uncommon reſolution is required to be ſteady to the principles, from avowing which we muſt expect to be the Heroes in a farce; though we need not apprehend that it will make us Victims to the flames.

What *your* temper may be, I cannot affirm; but I really think that, with great numbers, Drollery is not only a ſpecies of perſecution, but the moſt dangerous kind of it: they would as ſoon be ſcourged, as mocked; be burthened with the croſs, as habited with the purple. You can ſcarcely be enough aware of the riſk you run from being jeſted with as a Viſionary or a Bigot—as one of much whim, or very little penetration.

[a] *Bartholomew* Fair, during which Plays and Farces were formerly, from morning to night, the entertainment of the Populace.

But

But enough of the inducements that vitious companions would be under to corrupt you, and the means they would uſe to do it.

The care you ſhould take in the choice of your company will be the ſubject of but one Letter more from

*Your*, &c.

LETTER

# LETTER X.

SIR,

ALL I have to add, on what has lately been the ſubject of my correſpondence with you, will be contained in this Letter. I will not lengthen it, by apologizing for it.

Might I ſuppoſe you ſo fortified by a right diſpoſition, a wiſe education, good ſenſe, and a thorough knowledge of the reaſonableneſs of the practice enjoined by your Religion, that every attempt to corrupt your morals would miſcarry; this hurt, however, you would be ſure to find from being much in the company of vitious men, that you would be leſs careful to become *eminently virtuous*——you would be leſs careful to fulfil your obligations, than you other-

otherwiſe would be. While you ſaw *others* ſo much worſe than yourſelf, you would not conſider, how much better you ought to be, than you at preſent are — While *their* groſs faults were avoided, you would not conſider, how much there is in *you* that ought to be amended.

We meaſure what is, in any way, commendable, by comparing our ſhare of it with that of our neighbour: we don't regard in what degree, as to itſelf, we poſſeſs the Good, but in how greater a degree it is poſſeſſed by us, than by others.

Among a very ignorant people, a ſcholar of the loweſt form will paſs, both in their and his own judgment, for an adept.

You would, I am ſure, pronounce of any Gentleman who kept mean company, that there was little hope of his ever acting a part which would greatly credit him: While he loved to be chiefly with thoſe, who would own, and do homage to, his ſuperiority, you would think him by no means likely to cultivate much real worth. And were it to be ſaid, that you ſhould make ſuch a judgment of him,

not

not becauſe of any impreſſion he would receive *from his companions*, but becauſe of the diſpoſition he ſhewed in the choice *of them*; I ſhould be glad to know, how that man muſt be thought affected towards Religion and Virtue, who could be willingly preſent, where he was ſure that they would be groſsly depretiated. Whoever could bear a diſparagement of them, muſt have ſo little ſenſe of their worth, that we may juſtly conclude him ill prepared for reſiſting the attempt, to deprive them wholly of their influence upon him. And, therefore, we may as fitly determine, from the diſpoſition evidenced by him who keeps *bad* company, what his morals will at length be; as we can determine from the turn of mind diſcovered by one who keeps *mean* company, what his figure in the world is likely to be.

Thoſe among us, whoſe capacities qualify them for the moſt conſiderable attainments —who might raiſe themſelves to an equality with the heroes in literature of the laſt Century, ſit down contented with the ſuperiority they have over their contemporaries — acquieſce in furniſhing a bare

ſpeci-

ſpecimen of what they could do, if their genius were rouſed, if they were to *exert* their abilities. They regard only the advantage they poſſeſs over the idle and illiterate, by whom they are ſurrounded; and give way to their eaſe when they may take it, and yet appear as conſiderable in *their* times, as the learned men, we moſt admire, did in *their reſpective* ages.

How many could I mention, to whom Nature has been moſt liberal of her endowments, who are barely in the liſt of Authors, who have only writ enough to ſhew how much honour they would have done their country, if their application had been called out, if their names muſt have been no better known than thoſe of their acquaintance, unleſs their diligence had equalled their capacity.

What is thus notoriouſly true of literary deſert, is equally ſo of moral: The perſons to whom we allot a greater ſhare of it, than has long been found in any in their ſtations, how have they their ſenſe of right withheld from exerting itſelf, by the few they meet with diſpoſed to animate them to any

endeavour towards promoting a more general regard to what is right — by the connexions they have with ſuch numbers, whoſe rule is their inclination—by that utter diſregard to duty, which they ſee in moſt of thoſe with whom they have an intercourſe!

Alas! in the very beſt of us, a conviction of what becomes us goes but a little way in exciting us to practiſe it. Solicitations to be leſs obſervant of it are, from ſome or other quarter, perpetually offering themſelves, and are by no means likely to be withſtood, if our reſolutions are not ſtrengthened by the wiſe counſels and correſpondent examples[a] of our aſſociates.

" Behold! Young man——You live in " an age, when it is requiſite to fortify the " mind by examples of conſtancy."

This *Tacitus* mentions as the ſpeech of the admirable *Thraſea* to the Quæſtor, ſent

[a] Longum iter eſt per præcepta, breve & efficax per exempla. Zenonem Cleanthes non expreſſiſſet, ſi eum tantummodo audiſſet. Vitæ ejus interfuit, ſecreta perſpexit; obſervavit illum, an ex formula ſua viveret. Plato & Ariſtoteles, & omnis in diverſum itura ſapientium turba, plus ex moribus quam ex verbis Socratis traxit. SEN. Epiſt.

to

to tell him that he muſt die, and by whom he would have it remarked with what compoſure he died.

Nor is it only when our virtue endangers our life, as was then the caſe, that ſuch examples are wanted. Wherever there is a prevailing corruption of manners, they, who would act throughout the becoming part, muſt be animated to it by what they hear from, and ſee in, others, by the patterns of integrity which they have before them.

We are eaſily induced to judge ſome deviation from our rule very excuſable; and to allow ourſelves in it, when our thoughts are not called off from our own [a] weakneſs

[a] Quid eſt hoc, Lucili, quod nos alio tendentes alio trahit, & eo, unde recedere cupimus, impellit? Quid colluctatur cum animo noſtro, nec permittit nobis quicquam ſemel velle? Fluctuamus inter varia conſilia: nihil libere volumus, nihil abſolute, nihil ſemper. Stultitia, inquis, eſt: cui nihil conſtat, nihil diu placet. Sed quomodo, aut quando, nos ab illa revellemus? Nemo per ſe ſatis valet, ut emergat: oportet manum aliquis porrigat, aliquis educat. SEN. Ep. 52.

Nulla res magis animos honeſta induit, dubioſque & in pravum inclinantes revocat ad rectum, quam bonorum virorum converſatio. Paulatim enim deſcendit in pectora: & vim præceptorum obtinet, frequenter audiri, aſpici frequenter, &c. SEN. Ep. 94.

and the general guilt: But while we are converſant with thoſe whoſe conduct is as unſuitable, as our own, to that of the multitude; we are kept awake to a ſenſe of our obligations—our ſpirits are ſupported—we *feel* the courage that we *behold*—we ſee what can be done by ſuch as ſhare our frail nature, and *we* are aſhamed to *waver*, where *they perſevere*.

*Ariſtotle* [a] conſiders Friendſhip as of three kinds; One ariſing from Virtue, Another from Pleaſure, and Another from Intereſt; but juſtly determines, that there can be no true friendſhip, which is not founded in Virtue.

The friendſhip contracted from pleaſure, or profit, regards only the pleaſure or profit obtained thereby; and ceaſes, when theſe precarious motives to it fail: but that to which Virtue gives birth, not having any accidental cauſe—being without any dependence on humour or intereſt—ariſing wholly from intrinſic worth, from what we are in ourſelves, never fluctuates, operates ſteadily and uniformly, remains firm

[a] Ethic. L. VIII. c. 3.

and

and uninterrupted, is laſting as our lives. That which is the eſſential qualification of a *friend*, ſhould be the chief recommendation in a *companion*. If, indeed, we have any concern for real worth, with whom ſhould we be more deſirous to converſe, than with thoſe who would accompany us, and encourage us, in the purſuit of it?

The ſame Writer, mentioning the uſe that Friends are of to us in every part of life, remarks the benefit which young men find from them to be—"That they keep "them in their Duty."

Had he thought that any thing could have been urged more in behalf of Friendſhip, he, undoubtedly, would have obſerved it. And when ſuch is the language of ſo able an Inſtructer, and of one who guided himſelf in his inſtructions only by the certain, the preſent advantage, that would attend a conformity to them; the leſſon we have here for the choice of company muſt appear worthy the notice even of thoſe, who will have no other Guides but Reaſon and Nature.

If to keep us ſteady to our Duty be the beſt office that can be done us—If they who are our friends will be thus ſerviceable to us—If the virtuous alone can be our friends, our converſation ſhould be chiefly with the virtuous; all familiarity with the vitious ſhould be avoided; we ſhould conſider thoſe, who would deſtroy our virtue, as our enemies—our very worſt enemies, whilſt endeavouring to deprive us of the greateſt Bleſſing that it is in our power to obtain.

*I am*, SIR, *&c.*

ON

# ON INTEMPERANCE IN EATING.

Poſcis opem nervis, corpuſque fidele ſenectæ:
Eſto; age. Sed grandes patinæ tucetaque craſſa
Annuere his Superos vetuere, Jovemque morantur.
PERS. Sat. II.

Ει ανθρωπῳ ολιγα εσθιει και ολιγα πινει, εδεμιαν τοῖσι νουσον επαγει. Si quis pauca edat & pauca bibat, nullum ei morbum adfert. HIPP. *de Morb.* L. IV. Sect. 5.

ON

# Intemperance in Eating.

## SECT. I.

THIS reſpects the quantity of our food, or the kind of it: If, in either of theſe, we have no regard to the hurt it may do us, we are guilty of Intemperance.

From tranſgreſſing in the quantity of our food a ſpeedier miſchief enſues, than from doing ſo in the quality of it[a]: and therein we never can tranſgreſs, without being directly admoniſhed of it by our very conſtitution. Our meal is never too large, but heavineſs comes on — the load on our ſto-

[a] Cibi, licet ſint ſaluberrimi, nimia aſſumti in quantitate, magis ſanitatem affligunt, quam intemperati, quando parciori modo aſſumuntur. HOFFM.

mach

mach is our inſtant tormentor, and every repetition of our fault a caution to us that we do not any more thus offend. A Caution, alas, how unheeded by us! *Cramm'd like an Engliſhman*, was, I find, a proverbial expreſſion in *Eraſmus*'s days[a]—above two hundred years ago.

An error barely in the kind of our aliment gives us, frequently, no preſent alarm, and, perhaps, but a very ſlight one after we have, for ſome years, continued in it. In the vigour of youth ſcarce any thing we eat appears to diſagree with us: we gratify our palate with whatever pleaſes it; feeling no ill conſequence, and therefore fearing none.[b] The inconveniences that we don't yet find, we hope we ſhall always eſcape;

[a] Haud ſcio unde natum ſit hoc vulgatiſſimum apud Gallos proverbium, ut, cum hominem vehementer cibo diſtentum velint intelligi, dicant, Tam ſatur eſt quam Anglus. ERASM. Adag. Chil. 2.

[b] It is a ſafer concluſion to ſay—*I have found hurt by this, therefore I will not continue it*; than this—*I find no offence of this, therefore I may uſe it.* For, Strength of Nature in Youth covers many exceſſes, which are owing a man till his Age. Diſcern the coming on of Years, and venture not to continue the ſame things always: for there is no defying Age. BACON's Eſſ.

or

or we then propoſe to ourſelves a reſtraint upon our appetite, when we experience the bad effects of indulging it.

With reſpect to the quantity of our food; that may be no exceſs in one man, which may be the moſt blameable in another: What would be the height of gluttony in us, if of a weak and tender frame, may be, to perſons of much ſtronger conſtitutions, a quite temperate meal. The ſame proportions of food can, likewiſe, never ſuit ſuch as have in them diſpoſitions to particular diſeaſes, and ſuch as have no evils of that nature to guard againſt: Nor can they, further, ſuit thoſe who are employed in hard labour, and thoſe who live wholly at their eaſe—thoſe who are frequently ſtirring and in action, and thoſe whoſe life is ſedentary and inactive. The ſame man may, alſo, in the very ſame quantity, be free from, or guilty of, Exceſs, as he is young or old [a]—healthy or diſeaſed [b]—as he accuſtoms his body to fatigue, or to repoſe.

[a] Ciborum quantitas ſenibus minor eſſe debet quam aliis ætatibus. RIVER.

[b] Infirmus homo parum alimenti deſiderat. HOFFM.

The

The influence that our food has upon our health, its tendency to preſerve or to impair our Conſtitution, is the meaſure of its temperance or exceſs.

It may, indeed, ſo happen, that our diet ſhall be, generally, very ſparing, without allowing us any claim to the virtue of temperance; as when we are more deſirous to ſave our money, than to pleaſe our palates, and, therefore, deny ourſelves at our own table, what we eat with greedineſs when we feed at the charge of others: as, likewiſe, when our circumſtances not permitting us, ordinarily, to indulge our appetite, we yet ſet no bounds to it, when we have an opportunity of gratifying it.

He is the temperate man, whoſe health directs his appetite — who is beſt pleaſed with what beſt agrees with him—who eats, not to gratify his taſte, but to preſerve his life[a]—who is the ſame at every table as at

[a] Eſſe oportet, ut vivas; non vivere, ut edas.
Cic. ad Her. L. IV.

Ελεγε τες μεν αλλες, &c. Aiebat [Socrates] alios homines vivere ut ederent, ſe ideo edere ut viveret.
Diog. Laert. 95.

*Velleius Paterculus*, ſpeaking of *Julius Cæſar*, ſays—Qui ſemper & ſomno & cibo in vitam, non in voluptatem, uteretur. Lib. II. p. 41.

his

his own — who, when he feaſts, is not cloy'd; and ſees all the delicacies before him that luxury can accumulate, yet preſerves a due abſtinence amidſt them.

The rules of temperance not only oblige us to abſtain from what *now does*, or what we are ſure *ſoon will*, hurt us: we offend againſt them when we avoid not whatever has a *probability* of being hurtful to us. They are, further, tranſgreſſed by too great nicety about our food—by much ſolicitude and eagerneſs to procure what we moſt reliſh—by *frequently* eating to ſatiety.

We have a Letter remaining of an Heathen, who was one of the moſt eminent perſons in an age diſtinguiſhed by the great men it produced, in which he expreſſes how uneaſy it made him, to be among thoſe who placed no ſmall part of their happineſs in an elegant table, and who filled themſelves twice a day.[a]

In thus deſcribing Temperance, let me not be underſtood to cenſure, as a failure therein, all regard to the food that beſt

[a] PLAT. Epiſt. 7.

pleaſes

pleaſes us, when it is equally wholeſome with other kinds—when its price is neither unſuitable to our circumſtances, nor very great—when it may be conveniently procured—when we are not anxious about it—when we do not frequently ſeek after it—when we are always moderate in its uſe.

To *govern* our appetite is neceſſary; but, in order to this, there is no neceſſity that we ſhould always *mortify* it—that we ſhould upon every occaſion conſider what is leaſt agreeable to us.

Life is no more to be paſſed in a conſtant ſelf-denial, than in a round of ſenſual enjoyments. We ſhould endeavour, that it may not be at any time painful to us to deny ourſelves what is improper for us; and, on that as well as other accounts, it is moſt fitting that we ſhould frequently practiſe ſelf-denial—that we ſhould often forego what would delight us.[a] But to do

[a] Εκεινὸ ȣ μικρον, &c. Illud exiguum non eſt, appetitum poſſe inhibere, dum adhuc fruendi adeſt copia: minus enim abſentia concupiſcunt, qui adſueverunt abſtinere præſentibus. PLUT. Sympoſ. 704.

——————— Κρατειν δε εθιζεο των δε·
Γαςρος μεν πρωτιςα.——————— PYTHAG. Aur. Carm.

this

this continually, I cannot ſuppoſe required of us; becauſe it doth not ſeem reaſonable to think, that it ſhould be our duty wholly to debar ourſelves of that food which our palate is *formed* to reliſh, and which we are ſure may be uſed without any prejudice to our virtue, or our health.

Thus much may ſuffice to inform us when we incur the guilt of eating intemperately.

The diſſuaſives from it, that appear of greateſt weight, are theſe:

It is the groſſeſt abuſe of the gifts of Providence.

It is the vileſt debaſement of ourſelves.

Our bodies owe to it the moſt painful diſeaſes, and, generally, a ſpeedy decay.

It frequently interrupts the uſe of our nobler faculties, and is ſure, at length, greatly to enfeeble them.

The ſtraits, to which it often reduces us, occaſion our falling into crimes, which would, otherwiſe, have been our utter abhorrence.

SECT.

## SECT. II.

TO conſider, firſt, exceſs in our food as the groſſeſt abuſe of the gifts of Providence.

The vaſt *variety* of *creatures* with which God has repleniſhed the earth — the abundant proviſion which he has made for many of them---the care which he has taken that each ſpecies of them ſhould be preſerved---the numerous conveniences they adminiſter to us---the pleaſing change of food they afford us---the ſuitable food that we find, among their different kinds, to different climates, to our different ways of life, ages, conſtitutions, diſtempers; are, certainly, the moſt awakening call to the higheſt admiration, and the gratefulleſt *ſenſe*, of the Divine wiſdom and goodneſs. This ſenſe is properly expreſſed, by the due application of what is ſo graciouſly afforded us---by the application of it to thoſe purpoſes

poſes for which it was manifeſtly intended. But how contrary hereto is his practice, who lives as it were but to eat, and conſiders the liberality of Providence only as catering for his Luxury! What miſchief this luxury doth us will be preſently conſidered; and, in whatſoever degree it hurts us, we to ſuch a degree abuſe our Maker's bounty, which *muſt* deſign our good—which, certainly, is directed to our welfare. Were we, by indulging our appetites, only to make ourſelves leſs fit for any of the offices of life, only to become leſs capable of diſcharging any of the duties of our ſtation; it may be made evident, that, in this reſpect likewiſe, our uſe of the Divine beneficence is quite contrary to what it requires. He who has appointed us our buſineſs here---who, by our peculiar capacities, has ſignified to us our proper employments, thereby diſcovers to us how far merely to pleaſe ourſelves[a] is al-

[a] Victus cultuſque corporis ad valetudinem referantur, & ad vires, non ad voluptatem. Atque etiam ſi conſiderare volumus, quæ ſit in Natura excellentia & dignitas; intelligemus, quam ſit turpe diffluere luxuria, & delicate ac molliter vivere; quamque honeſtum, Parce, Continenter, Severe, Sobrie. Cic. de Off. Lib. I.

lowed us; and that, if we do ſo, to the hindrance of a nobler work, it is oppoſing his intention; it is defeating the end of life, by thoſe very gifts which were beſtowed to carry us on more chearfully towards it.

When my palate has a large ſcope for its innocent choice---when I have at hand what may moſt agreeably recruit my ſtrength, and what is moſt effectual to preſerve it; how great ingratitude and baſeneſs ſhew themſelves in the exceſs which perverts the aim of ſo much kindneſs, and makes *that* to be the cauſe of my forgetting with what view I was created, which ought to keep me ever mindful of it! As the bounty of Heaven is one of the ſtrongeſt motives to a *reaſonable life*, how guilty are we if it tempts us to a *ſenſual!*[a] Our crime muſt be highly aggravated, when the more conveniences our Maker has provided

[a] Animus incorruptus, æternus, rector humani generis, agit, atque habet cuncta, neque ipſe habetur. Quo magis pravitas eorum admiranda eſt, qui, dediti corporis gaudiis, per luxum atque ignaviam ætatem agunt; ceterum ingenium, quo neque melius neque amplius aliud in natura mortalium eſt, incultu atque ſocordia torpeſcere ſinunt.

SALLUST. Bell. Jugurth.

for

for us, we are ſo much the more unmindful of the taſk he has enjoined us---when by his granting us what may ſatisfy our appetite, we are induced wholly to conſult it, and make ourſelves ſlaves to it.

Let Intemperance in our food be next conſidered as the ſhamefulleſt debaſement of ourſelves.

*Life*, as we have been wiſely taught to conſider it, *is more than meat.* Man could not be ſent into the world but for quite different purpoſes, than merely to indulge his palate. He has an underſtanding given him, which he may greatly improve; many are the perfections which he is qualified to attain; much good to his fellow creatures he has abilities to do: and all this may be truly ſaid of all mankind; all of us may improve our reaſon, may proceed in virtue, may be uſeful to our fellow creatures. There are none, therefore, to whom it is not the fouleſt reproach, that their belly is their God—that they are more ſolicitous to favour, and thereby to ſtrengthen, the importunity of their appetite, than to weaken and maſter it by frequent reſiſtance and re-

ſtraint. The reaſonable Being is to be always under the influence of Reaſon; it is his excellence, his prerogative, to be ſo: Whatever is an hindrance to this degrades him, reflects on him diſgrace and contempt. And as our reaſon and appetite are in a conſtant oppoſition to each other, there is no indulging the latter without leſſening the power of the former: If our appetite is not governed by, it will govern, our reaſon, and make its moſt prudent ſuggeſtions, its wiſeſt counſels, to be unheeded and ſlighted.

The fewer the wants of any being are, we muſt conſider it as ſo much the more perfect, ſince thereby it is leſs dependent, and has leſs of its happineſs without itſelf. When we raiſe our thoughts to the Beings above us, we cannot but attribute to the higher orders of them ſtill farther removes from our own weakneſs and indigence, 'til we reach God himſelf, and exempt him from wants of every kind.[a]

[a] Εοικας, ω Αντιφων, την ευδαιμονιαν, &c. Videris, O Antipho, felicitatem deliciis & divitiis metiri: ego autem, nul-

Know-

Knowing thus what muſt be aſcribed to natures ſuperior to ours, we cannot be ignorant what is our own beſt recommendation; by what our nature is raiſed; wherein its worth is diſtinguiſhed.

To be without any wants is the Divine prerogative; our praiſe is, that we add not to the number of thoſe to which we were appointed — that we have none we can avoid — that we have none from our own miſconduct. In this we attain the utmoſt degree of perfection within our reach.

On the other hand, when fancy has multiplied our neceſſities --- when we owe I know not how many to ourſelves---when our eaſe is made dependent on delicacies to which our Maker never ſubjected it---when the cravings of our Luxury bear no proportion to thoſe of our natural hunger, what a degenerate race do we become!

lis quidem indigere rebus, divinum; pauciſſimis vero, illorum eſſe duco qui quam proximi Superis ſint.

XENOPH. *de dict. & fact.* Socr.

Απροσδεης απλως ο Θεος, &c. Liber eſt prorſus ab omni egeſtate Deus: ex humana virtute, quæ minime eget, ea demum abſolutiſſima eſt & diviniſſima. PLUT. 354.

M. DACIER, in his Note on this paſſage, ſays, *Ce ſont trois lignes toutes d'or.*

What do we but ſink our rank in the Creation! [a]

He whoſe voraciouſneſs prevents his being ſatisfied till he is loaded to the full of what he is able to bear, who eats to the utmoſt extent of what he can eat, is a mere brute, and one of the loweſt kind of brutes; the generality of them obſerving a juſt moderation in their food—when duly relieved ſeeking no more, and forbearing even what is before them. But below any brute is he, who, by indulging himſelf, has contracted wants from which Nature exempted him; [b] who muſt be made hungry by art,

[a] Miſerrimos mortalium judicet, in quantiſcunque opibus refulgebunt, ventri ac libidini deditos.

SEN. *de Ben.* Lib. VII.

Τες μεν γαστριμαργιας, &c. Eos qui gulositates,——laſcivias cogitarint, nec ab illis rebus caverint, in aſinorum genera, ſimiliumque ferarum formam, indui veriſimile eſt.

PLAT. Phæd. 81.

[b] Τρυφην γε και ηδυπ. &c. Priſcos (Ægyptios) aiunt ita luxuriam——atque deliciarum ſtudium traduxiſſe, ut columnam quoque perhibitum ſit Thebis in templo poſitam fuiſſe, in qua diræ imprecationes inſcriptæ fuerint in Meinin Regem, qui primus Ægyptios a tenui, & opum pecuniæque non indigente, victus ratione deduxiſſet. Dicitur etiam Technatis, qui Bocchorem filium habuit, cum expeditionem in Arabes faceret, & impedimenta morarentur,

muſt

muſt have his food undergo the moſt unwholſom preparations, before he can be inclined to taſte it; only reliſhing what is ruinous to his health; his life ſupported by what neceſſarily ſhortens it. A part this, which, when acted by him who has reaſon, reflection, foreſight given him, wants a name to repreſent it in the full of its deformity. With privileges ſo far beyond thoſe of the creatures below us, how great is our baſeneſs, our guilt, if thoſe endowments are ſo far abuſed, that they ſerve us but to find out the means of more groſsly corrupting ourſelves!

I cannot quit this head, without remarking it to be no ſlight argument of the diſhonour we incur by Gluttony, that nothing is more carefully avoided in all well-bred Company, nothing would be thought by ſuch more brutal and rude, than the diſcovery of any marks of our having eat in-

obvio cibo ſuaviter uſus, ſuper toro ſomnum cepiſſe profundum, eaque re inductum, Meinin fuiſſe exſecratum, ac ——exſecrationem eam in columna inciſam poſuiſſe.

PLUT. *de Iſ. & Oſir.* 354.

temperately [a] — of our having exceeded that proportion of food which is proper for our nouriſhment.

## SECT. III.

TO conſider, further, exceſs in our food as haſtening our death, and bringing on us the moſt painful diſeaſes. [b]

It is evident, that nothing contributes more to the preſervation of life, than Temperance. [c]

[a] Και νυν δε ετι εμμενει μαξλυρια, &c. Quin hoc etiam tempore teſtimonia extant & moderati eorum victus & laborum, quos cibi digerendi cauſa ſuſcipiunt. Turpe enim hac etiam tempeſtate apud Perſas habetur exſpuere,—& flatus videri plenos. XENOPH. *de Cyri Inſtit.* Lib. I.

[b] Διογενης ελεγεν των οικων, &c. Diogenes dicebat, earum domorum, in quibus copia alimenti, multos eſſe mures:—ſic etiam corpora, quæ multum cibi capiant, morbos quoque multos aſciſcere. STOB.

Impotentia Gulæ non inepte generis humani Carnifex nuncupatur. HOFFM.

[c] Ασκησις υγιης, &c. Valetudinem excolunt citra ſatietatem cibis veſci, & impigrum eſſe ad laborem.

HIPP. *de Morb. Vulg.* L. VI.

Ex-

Experience proves it to be actually ſo; and the ſtructure of the human body ſhews that it muſt be ſo.

They who deſcribe the Golden Age, or the Age of Innocence, and near a thouſand years of life, repreſent the cuſtomary food of it as the plaineſt and moſt ſimple.

Whether animal food was at all uſed before the Flood, is queſtioned: we certainly find, long after it, that *Lot*'s making a feaſt is deſcribed by his baking unleavened bread.

*Abraham* entertained thoſe whom he conſidered of ſuch eminence, as that, to uſe the words of Scripture, *he ran to meet them from the tent-door, and bowed himſelf to the ground*; *Abraham*'s entertainment, I ſay, of perſons thus honoured by him, was only with a calf, with cakes of meal, with butter and milk.

*Gideon*'s hoſpitality towards the moſt illuſtrious of gueſts ſhewed itſelf in killing a kid of the goats; and we read that *Jeſſe* looked upon this to be a preſent which his Prince would not diſdain.

Per-

Perhaps my Reader would rather take a meal with ſome of the worthies of Profane Hiſtory, than with thoſe whom the Sacred has recorded.

I will be his Introducer. He ſhall be a gueſt at an entertainment, which was, certainly, deſigned to be a ſplendid one, ſince it was made by *Achilles* for three ſuch conſiderable Perſons, as *Phœnix*, *Ajax*, and *Ulyſſes*; Perſons, whom he himſelf repreſents as being, of all the *Grecian* chiefs, thoſe whom he moſt honours.

He will eaſily be believed herein; for this declaration is ſcarce ſooner out of his mouth, than He and his friends *Patroclus* and *Automedon* ſeverally employ themſelves in making up the fire—chopping the meat, and putting it into the pot——Or, if Mr. *Pope* be allowed to deſcribe their Taſks on this occaſion,

——*Patroclus* o'er the blazing fire
Heaps in a brazen vaſe three *chines* entire:
The brazen vaſe *Automedon* ſuſtains,
Which *fleſh of porket*, *ſheep* and *goat* contains:

*Achilles*

*Achilles* at the genial feaſt preſides,
The parts transfixes, and with ſkill divides.
Mean while *Patroclus* ſweats the fire to raiſe;
The tent is brighten'd with the riſing blaze."

But who is dreſſing the fiſh and fowls? This feaſt, alas! furniſhes neither. The Poet is ſo very bad a Caterer, that he provides nothing of that kind for his Heroes on this occaſion; or on another even for the luxurious *Phæacians*. Such Samples theſe of *Homer*'s entertainments, as will gain entire credit to what is ſaid of them in *Plutarch*, "that we muſt riſe almoſt hungry from "them." *Symp.* Lib. II. Qu. 10.

Should the blind Bard be conſidered as a Stroller—keeping low company, and therefore, in the Feaſts he makes for the Great, likely more to regard the quantity of the food which he provides for them, than the kind of it: Would you rather be one of *Virgil*'s Gueſts, as he lived in an age when good eating was underſtood—converſed with people of rank——knew what diſhes they

they liked, and would therefore not fail to place ſuch before them?

You ſhall then be the Gueſt of the *Roman* Poet.——Do you chuſe beef, or mutton—— would you be helped to Pork, or do you prefer Goat's-fleſh? You have no ſtomach for ſuch ſort of diet. He has nothing elſe for you, unleſs *Polyphemus* will ſpare you a leg or an arm of one of the poor *Greeks* he is eating; or unleſs you will join the half-drowned Crew, and take a bit of the Stags which are dreſſed as ſoon as killed; or unleſs you are a great lover of bread and apples, and in order to ſatisfy your hunger, will, in the language of *Aſcanius*, eat your table.

*Dido*, indeed, gives *Æneas* and his companions a moſt ſplendid entertainment, as far as numerous attendants conſtitute one; but the Poet mentions nothing that the Heroes had to eat except bread; whatever elſe was got for them he includes in the general term *Dapes*, which, in other parts of the *Æneid*, is applied to all the coarſe fare already mentioned.

As the Luxury of mankind increaſed, their lives ſhortened: The half of *Abraham*'s

*ham*'s age became regarded as a ſtretch far beyond the cuſtomary period. So in profane hiſtory we find, that when the arts of Luxury were unknown in *Rome*, its ſeven Kings reigned a longer term, than, afterwards, upon the prevalency of thoſe arts, was compleated by its firſt twenty Emperors.

Such perſons, indeed, among the antients whoſe precepts and practice moſt recommended Temperance in diet, were eminent inſtances of the benefit accruing from it, in the health preſerved and long life attained by it.

[a] *Gorgias* lived 107 years.

[b] *Hippocrates* reached, according to ſome writers, his 104th year, according to others his 109th.

*Pythagoras*, of whom it was obſerved, that he was never known to eat to ſatiety, lived to near 100 years; if *Jamblichus* may be credited. *D. Laertius* ſays, that accord-

[a] See the Note [a] towards the end of this Section.

[b] See p. 87, and the quotations from his piece *de Vict. Rat.* in the next Section, and the Note [c] at the beginning of Sect. 3.

ing

ing to moſt writers he was, when he loſt his life, in his 90th year. Out of his ſchool came *Empedocles*, who lived, as ſome ſay, to 109; and *Xenophilus*, who lived to above 105.

[a] *Zeno* lived to 98: His diſciple and ſucceſſor *Cleanthes* to 99.

[b] *Diogenes*, when he died, was about 90.

[c] *Plato* reached his 81ſt year; and his follower [d] *Xenocrates* his eighty-fourth.

*Lycurgus*, the Lawgiver of the *Lacedæmonians*, who, when they obeyed his Laws, were not leſs diſtinguiſhed by their [e] abſtemiouſneſs than by their fortitude,

[a] See the Note * towards the end of Sect. 5.

[b] Among other inſtances, mentioned by *Diog. Laertius*, of the wiſdom this Sage ſhewed in educating the children of *Xeniades*, one is—Εν οικω τε, &c. Domi quoque miniſtrare illos debere docebat, cibo tenui ac vili contentos, ac aquæ potu. P. 330.

Εβοα πολλακις, &c. Clamabat ſæpius, facilem hominum vitam a Diis datam eſſe, verum occultari illam a quærentibus mellita—— & his ſimilia. P. 337. Την γαστερα, &c. Ventrem vitæ Charybdim appellabat. P. 340.

[c] See Sect. 1.

[d] See Note † towards the end of Sect. 5.

[e] *Plutarch* ſays of their Youth, Εις τα συσσιτια, &c. Ad convivia ficut ad ludum temperantiæ ventitabant. See likewiſe the Note ‡ towards the end of Sect. 5.

lived

lived to 85; and their King [a] *Agesilaus* took pay of *Tachos* at 80; afterwards assisted *Nectanebos*; and, having established him in his Kingdom, died, in his return to *Sparta*, at 84.

*Cato* the Censor is introduced by *Tully* [b] representing himself as, when in his 84th year, able to assist in the Senate——to speak in the assembly of the people, and to give his friends and dependents the assistance which they might want from him.

*Lucian* introduces his Account of long-lived persons, with the observation, that it might be of use, as shewing that they, who took the most care of their Bodies and Minds, lived the longest, and enjoyed the best health.

[a] Ηχθη την λεγομενην αγωγην εν Λακεδαιμονι, σκληραν μεν ουσαν τη διαιτη. PLUT. Vol. I. 596. He afterwards says of *Agesilaus*, that, at his return from *Asia*, In oculis fuit civium, ex vitaque & victu suspiciendus.——Non cœnam variavit, &c. 606. His contempt of delicate fare may be further seen, 616.

[b] De Senectute, S. 10. *Plutarch* says of him, Την του σωματος εξιν αυτουργια και διαιτη σωφρονι——πανυ χρηστικην ειχε, και προς ισχυν και προς υγειαν ομαλως συνεστωσαν——υδωρ επινεν επι της στρατειας, πλην ειποτε διψησας περιφλεγως, οξος ητησεν.

To

To come nearer to our own times: the diſcovery of a new world has confirmed the obſervations furniſhed by the old; that in thoſe countries, where the greateſt ſimplicity of diet has been uſed, the greateſt length of life has been attained.

Of the ancient Inhabitants of *Virginia* we are told, "That their chief diſh was Maiz, and that they drank only water: That their diſeaſes were few, and chiefly proceeded from exceſſive heats or colds." *Atl. Geog.* Vol. V. p. 711. Some of them lived to upwards of 200 years." PURCHAS, Vol. V. p. 946. "The Sobriety of the ancient Inhabitants of *Florida* lengthen'd their lives in ſuch ſort, that one of their Kings, ſays *Morgues*, told me, He was three hundred years old; and his father, whom he then ſhewed me alive, was fifty years older than himſelf." PURCHAS, Vol. V. 961.

And if we now ſearch after particular inſtances of perſons reaching to extreme old age; it is certain, that we muſt not reſort for them to courts and palaces; to the dwellings of the great or the wealthy; but to

to the cells of the [a] Religious, or to cottages; to the habitations of ſuch whoſe hunger is their ſauce, and to whom a wholſom meal is a ſufficiently delicate one.

*Martha Waterhouſe*, of the Townſhip of *North Bierley* in *Yorkſhire*, died about the year 1711, in the 104th year of her age: Her maiden ſiſter, *Heſter Jager*, of the ſame place, died in 1713, in the 107th year of her age. They had both of them *relief* from the Townſhip of *Bierley* nigh fifty years. *Abridgment of Phil. Tranſ.* by JONES, Vol. II. P. 2. p. 115.

Dr. *Harvey*, in his Anatomical Account of *T. Parr*, who died in the 153d year of his age, ſays—that, if he had not changed his diet and air, he might, perhaps, have lived a good while longer. His diet was

[a] *Sozomen*, having mentioned ſome particulars of ſeveral religious perſons who had retired from the world, and then taking notice of the advanced age of *Paul* the Hermit, who lived an hundred and thirteen years, adds, Των αλλων δι των ανωθεν——Reliqui, quos ſupra memoravimus, Monachi fere omnes diu ſuperſtites vixere. *Hiſt. Eccl.* L. VI. c. 34. Monachi & Eremitæ, qui parce & ſicco alimento paſcebantur, fuerunt ut plurimum longævi. BACON. *Hiſt. Vitæ & Mortis.*

old cheeſe, milk, coarſe bread, ſmall beer and whey.

Dr. *T. Robinſon* ſays of *H. Jenkins* the fiſherman, who lived 169 years, that his diet was coarſe and ſour.

Dr. *M. Liſter*, having mentioned ſeveral old perſons of *Craven* in *Yorkſhire*, ſays—The food of all this mountainous country is exceeding coarſe. *Abr. of Phil. Tranſ.* by LOWTHORP, Vol. III. p. 307, *&c.*

*Buchanan* [a] ſpeaks of a fiſherman in his own time who married at 100, went out in his little fiſhing-boat in the rougheſt weather at 140, and at laſt did not die of any painful diſtemper, but merely worn out by age. *Rer. Scot. Hiſt.* Lib. I. ad fin.

[a] He ſays of the Inhabitants of the *Orcades*—In victu quotidiano multum è vetuſta parſimonia adhuc vulgus retinet. Itaque perpetua corporis & animi ſanitate fere omnes fruuntur. Rari morbis, plerique omnes ſenio ſolvuntur: pluſque apud eos deliciarum ignorantia, quam apud alios medicorum ars & diligentia, ad ſalutem tuendam prodeſt. And a little after, ſpeaking of the Inhabitants of the *Shetland Iſlands*, of one of which the long-lived fiſherman was a native, he ſays—Victus ratio Hethlandicis eadem quæ Orcadenſibus, niſi quod juxta copias domeſticas paulo aſperior.

*Plutarch*

*Plutarch* mentions our Countrymen as, in his time, growing old at 120. To account for this, as he does, from their Climate, ſeems leſs rational, than to aſcribe it to their way of living as related by *Diodorus Siculus*, who tells us——That their diet was ſimple, and that they were utter ſtrangers to the delicate fare of the wealthy.

In our ſeveral neighbourhoods we all of us ſee, that they who leaſt conſult their appetite, who leaſt give way to its wantonneſs or voraciouſneſs, attain, generally, to years far exceeding theirs who deny themſelves nothing they can reliſh, and conveniently procure.

Human life, indeed, being expoſed to ſo many thouſand accidents, its end being haſtened by ſuch a prodigious diverſity of means, there is no care we can take of ourſelves, in any one reſpect, that will be our effectual preſervative; but, allowing for caſualties and difference in conſtitutions, we every where perceive, that the age of thoſe, who neglect the rules of temperance, is

of a much ſhorter date than theirs, by whom theſe rules are carefully followed. [a]

And if we attend to our ſtructure, it muſt thence be evident that it cannot be otherwiſe.

## SECT. IV.

THE human body may be conſidered as compoſed of a great variety of tubes, in which their proper fluid is in a perpetual motion. Our health is according to the condition in which theſe veſſels and this fluid are.

The ruptured, or too relaxed, or too rigid ſtate of the one; and the redundancy or deficiency, the reſolved or viſcid, the aceſcent or the putreſcent ſtate of the other, is a diſorder in our frame. Whether our

[a] Γοργιας ερωτηθεις, ποια διαιτη, &c. Gorgias interrogatus, quonam uſus genere *victus* in tantam ſenectutem progreſſus eſſet: Nihil unquam voluptatis gratia ſe aut *comediſſe* aut feciſſe dixit. STOB. 548.

exceſs

exceſs be in the quantity or quality of aliment, we muſt ſuffer by it, *in ſome or other of theſe ways.*

By the ſtomach being frequently loaded, that fulneſs of the veſſels enſues, by which the fibres are weakened---the circulation becomes languid---perſpiration is leſſened---obſtructions are formed---the humours become viſcid and ſoon putrid.

In the progreſs to this laſt ſtate, different diſeaſes take place, according to the general ſtrength or weakneſs of the ſolids, or according to the debility of ſome particular organ; according to the conſtitution of the air; according to our reſt or motion; according to the warmth in which we keep, or the cold to which we expoſe ourſelves, *&c.*

Exceſs may be in the quantity of our food, not only when we eat ſo as to burthen the ſtomach; but, likewiſe, when our meals bear not a juſt proportion to our labour or exerciſe. [a]

[a] Εϛι προδιαγνωσις μεν, *&c.* Eſt autem & præcognitio antequam ægrotent, & affectus corporum cognitio, utrum cibi labores, an cibos labores ſuperent, an moderate inter

We are tempted to exceed in the quantity of our food, by the ſeaſoning of it, or by the variety of it.

The ſtimulus of ſauce ſerves but to excite a falſe appetite—to make us eat much more than we ſhould do, if our diet were quite ſimple.

The effect is the ſame, when our meal is compoſed of ſeveral kinds of food: their different taſtes are ſo many inducements to exceſs, as they are ſo many provocations to eat beyond what will ſatisfy our natural wants. [a]

ſe habeant. Quodcunque enim ſuperetur, ex eo morbi contingunt; ex mutua vero inter ſe æquabilitate, ſanitas adeſt. HIPPOCR. *de Vict. Rat.* Lib. III.

[a] Multos morbos multa fercula fecerunt. SEN. Ep. 95.

Homini cibus utiliſſimus ſimplex. Acervatio ciborum peſtifera, & condimento pernicioſior. PLIN. Nat. Hiſt. L. XI.

Tria mala eveniunt ob ciborum varietatem; nimium comeditur, minus coquitur, & minus perſpiratur. SANCT, Sect. 3.

Plerique ſtatuunt, victum ſimpliciſſimum eſſe optimum; & vix aliud magis ad morborum generationem facere, quam varietatem ciborum in una menſa. SENNERT. T. I.

Ciborum varietas ſanitati noxioſiſſima eſt. RIVER.

Cibus cenſetur optimus ille qui ſimpliciſſimus. BOER. *Inſt. Med.*

And

And thus, tho' we were never to touch a diſh which had its reliſh from any the leaſt unwholſom ingredient, tho' our diet were the plaineſt, and nothing came ever before us, that had any other elegance than from the ſeaſon in which it was brought to our table, or the place in which it appeared there, we yet might greatly hurt ourſelves; we might be as intemperate, and as ſpeedily deſtroy ourſelves by our intemperance, with roaſt and boiled meat, as with fricaſſees and ragouts.

The quality of our aliment may be miſchievous to us, either as univerſally prejudicial to the human *conſtitution*, or as unſuitable to our own;—unſuitable to the weakneſs of our whole frame, or to ſome

Ciborum varietas nimiæ aviditati apprime lenocinatur, & ad majorem ſatietatem invitat; eamque ob cauſam omni ſtudio ac ratione vitanda eſt. HOFFMAN.

To theſe authorities let me add that of our Countryman SYDENHAM: His advice here is, indeed, to perſons ſubject to the Gout; but the reaſons he aſſigns for ſuch advice may induce us to conſider it as of general uſe. Unica ciborum ſpecie ſingulis paſtibus veſcendum arbitror, cum varia ciborum genera ſimul ingeſta plus ventriculo moleſtiæ faceſſunt, quam unicum quod omnia iſta quantitate exæquet. SYD. *de Pod.* 215.

defect in the formation of a part of it, or to that taint we have in us from the diſeaſes or vices of our Parents.

We may be greatly prejudiced by the kind of our food in many other ways; and we, ordinarily, are ſo, by not regarding what agrees with the climate in which we are---what with the country we inhabit---what with the manner of life we lead.

From the great heat that ſpices occaſion, and from the length of time they continue it, we may truly ſay, that their copious and daily uſe in food muſt be injurious to *all* conſtitutions.

So for ſalted meats, the hurt that may be feared from them, when they are our conſtant meals, is eaſily collected, from the irritation they muſt cauſe in their paſſage thro' the body---from the injury that muſt hence enſue to its finer membranes——from the numerous acrid particles that muſt hereby be lodged in the pores of the ſkin, the obſtructions which this muſt produce, and the large quantity of perſpirable matter which will, therefore, be detained in, and, conſequently, greatly foul, the blood——

from

from the dreadful ſymptoms that attend a high degree of the ſcurvy; the relief of which by vegetables, by freſh meat, by liquids fitteſt to remove the effects of a muriatic cauſe, plainly ſhews them to be owing to ſuch a cauſe.

Whatever has the haut-gout may be looked upon as conſiſting of ſuch active particles, as cannot but make our frequent eating of it very dangerous —— as muſt render it much fitter to be uſed as Phyſic, than as food.

From a mixture of meats, each of them wholſom in its kind, a bad chyle may be formed: and the rule in Phyſic is, That an error in the firſt digeſtion will not be mended in the ſecond.

A delicate conſtitution is, ſpeedily, either quite deſtroyed, or irrecoverably diſordered, when the diet is not exactly adapted to it —— is not ſuch as leaſt irritates, as leaſt heats, as is eaſieſt concocted, as ſooneſt paſſes out of the body, and leaves the feweſt impurities behind it there.

The

The weakneſs, or the wrong formation of a part of our frame is, generally, a call to the utmoſt care about our food; and as our obſerving this may extend our life, even under either of thoſe circumſtances, as far as we could have hoped it would have been prolonged, if we had been without any ſuch defect; ſo our failure therein may, in a very ſhort time, be fatal to us.

The moſt ſimple aliment will, perhaps, be unable to hinder our feeling, in ſome degree, the bad conſequences of the diſeaſes or irregularities of our parents: but how far they ſhall affect us, depends, very often, in a great meaſure, upon ourſelves.

They may neither much contract the term, nor much interrupt the comfort, of life, if we will make hunger our ſauce, and, in every meal we eat, regard the diſtempers we inherit: but early, alas! and heavy will our ſufferings be, our years few and full of uneaſineſs, when, without any ſuch regard, our taſte is directed by that of the ſound and athletic---when the ſolicitations of

of *appetite* lead us to forget the reaſons we have to reſtrain *it*.

In this climate and country, where, for ſo many months in the year, the cuticular diſcharges are ſo ſmall --- where the air ſo often, ſo ſuddenly, and to ſo great a degree, varies its equilibrium, and where our veſſels, therefore, are as frequently, as ſuddenly, and as greatly contracted or expanded——where fogs ſo much abound, and ſo much contribute to impair the elaſticity of our fibres---to hinder the proper both ſecretions and excretions---to deſtroy the due texture of the blood, and vitiate our whole habit; it muſt be obvious, what we have to fear, when our aliment hurts us in the ſame way with our air—when the one heightens the diſorder, to which we are expoſed by the other.

An inattention to the nutriment fit for us, when we, ſeldom, uſe any exerciſe, or, always, very gentle—when our life is ſedentary, either from the buſineſs by which we maintain ourſelves, or from our love of eaſe, or from our literary purſuits, is perhaps, as fatal to us, as almoſt any inſtance of

of wrong conduct, with which we can be chargeable. [a] By high feeding and little or no exerciſe, we are not only expoſed to the moſt dangerous diſeaſes, but we make all diſeaſes dangerous, we make thoſe ſo, which would, otherwiſe, be ſlight and eaſily removed—we do not only ſubject ourſelves to the particular maladies which have their riſe wholly from luxury, but we render ourſelves more liable to thoſe, which have no connexion with it. We, then, are among the firſt who are ſeized with the diſtempers which the conſtitution of the air occaſions — We are moſt apt to receive all thoſe of the infectious kind — We take cold whence we might leaſt fear it, and find its immediate conſequence, a malignant or an inflammatory fever, or ſome other diſeaſe equally to be dreaded.

A writer in Phyſic of the firſt rank aſſerts, that our diet is the chief cauſe of all our diſeaſes, that other cauſes only take effect from the diſpoſition of our body and the ſtate of its humours.

[a] Ου δυναται τις των ανθρωπων υγιαινειν, ην μη και πονη.
HIPP. *de Vict. Rat.* L. I.

There

There is, I am perſuaded, much truth in this aſſertion. For, as in countries where the inhabitants greatly indulge themſelves [a], few die of old age; ſo where a ſtrict temperance is obſerv'd, few die but of old age. We find, likewiſe, perſons, as *Socrates* for inſtance [b], who, by their regular living, have preſerved themſelves from the infection of a diſeaſe that has made the cruelleſt havock around them. We perceive, alſo, the reſtorers of health uſually attempting its recovery by ſome or other diſcharge, by draining the body in ſome way or other. And if evacuation is the cure of our diſorders, we may juſtly think that repletion is their moſt general cauſe [c]. But if this may admit of a diſpute, which, I think, it hardly can do; yet is it on all hands agreed —— that there are ſeveral diſtempers, to which few are ſubject but for want of ſelf-denial in

[a] Quid referam innumerabiles morbos, ſupplicia Luxuriæ? Immunes erant ab iſtis malis, qui nondum ſe deliciis ſolverant, qui ſibi imperabant. SEN.

[b] Ευλακτος τε ην την διαιταν, &c. Adeo parce ac temperate vixit (Socrates) ut cum Athenas peſtis ſæpenumero vaſtaret, ſolus ipſe nunquam ægrotaverit. DIOG. LAERT.

[c] Πλησμονην ιηται κενωσις——τα εναντια των εναντιων εςιν ιηματα. HIPP. *de Flatibus*, & *Aph.* Sect. 2. 22.

them-

themſelves, or their anceſtors —— that moſt of theſe diſtempers are of the painfulleſt ſort, and that ſome of them are ſuch as we for years lament, without the leaſt hope of recovery; and under an abſolute certainty, that the longer they continue upon us, the more grievouſly they will diſtreſs us; the acuteneſs of our ſufferings from them will be conſtantly increaſing.

## SECT. V.

LET me, alſo, conſider intemperance in what we eat, as frequently interrupting the uſe of our nobler faculties, and ſure, at length, greatly to enfeeble them [a]. How long is it, before we are really ourſelves, after our ſtomach has receiv'd its *full load!* [b]

[a] Οινος και σαρκων εμφορησεις σωμα μεν ισχυρον ποιουσι—ψυχην δι ασθενια. PLUT. *de Eſu Carn.*

[b] Confer ſudantes, ructantes, refertos epulis, tanquam opimos boves: tum intelliges, qui voluptatem maxime ſequantur, eos minime conſequi, jucunditatemque victus eſſe in deſiderio, non in ſatietate. *Tuſc. Quæſt.* L. V.

Under

Under it our ſenſes are dull'd, our memory clouded, heavineſs and ſtupidity poſſeſs us[a]: Some *hours* muſt paſs before our vivacity returns, before reaſon can again act with its full vigour. The man is not ſeen to advantage, his real abilities are not to be diſcover'd, 'til the effects of his gluttony are remov'd, 'til his conſtitution has thrown off the weight that oppreſs'd it.

The hours preceding a plentiful meal, or thoſe which ſucceed its entire digeſtion, are, we all find, ſuch, in which we are fitteſt to tranſact our affairs, in which all the acts of the underſtanding are beſt exerted.

How ſmall a part of his time is, therefore, the luxurious man himſelf! What between the length of his repaſts — the ſpace during which he is, as it were, ſtupified by his exceſs in them — the many hours of *ſleep* that he wants to refreſh, and of *exerciſe* to ſtrengthen him; within how ſmall a compaſs is that portion of his life brought, in which his rational powers are fitly diſplay'd!

[a] Ne mente quidem recte uti poſſumus, multo cibo & potione completi. *Tuſc. Quæſt.* L. V.

In

In the vigour of youth, in the full ſtrength of manhood, an uncontrouled gratification of appetite allows us only ſhort intervals of clear apprehenſion, of cloſe attention, and the free uſe of our judgment: but if, either through an uncommonly firm conſtitution, or by ſpending all thoſe hours in exerciſe which are not paſſed at our tables or in our beds, we are enabled to reach a more advanced age, what a melancholy ſpectacle do we then frequently afford! our memory, our wit, our ſenſe almoſt wholly deſtroyed—their remains ſcarce allowing a conjecture to be formed thence, what they have been — the ruins of the man hardly furniſhing a trace of his former ornaments.

Moſt of thoſe diſeaſes which luxury brings upon our bodies are, indeed, a gradual impairing of our intellectual faculties: the mind ſhares the diſorder of its companion, acts as that permits, diſcovers a greater or leſs capacity, according to the other's more or leſs perfect ſtate. And as the body when dead is totally unfit to be acted upon by the ſoul, ſo the nearer it is brought

to

to death by our gluttony, the more we increaſe its unfitneſs to diſplay by how noble a principle it is actuated — what the extent of thoſe abilities is, which the bounty of our infinitely good and powerful Creator has afforded us.[a]

It only remains that I conſider how ruinous the exceſs I am cenſuring is to our fortune, and to what a mean dependence, to what vile diſhoneſt practices, it often reduces us.

There are few eſtates that can bear the expence, into which what is called an elegant table will draw us. It is not only the price of what is ſet before us that we are here to regard, but the waſte that the *miniſters* to our *luxury* occaſion — their rapine —the example they ſet to all who are concerned in our affairs, and the diſqualification under which we put ourſelves to look into them.

He who is determined to pleaſe his palate at any price, infects not only thoſe

[a] Τυς Βοιωτες ημας, &c. Bœotos nos Attici craſſos, ſtupidos, ſtolidos maxime ob voracitatem appellaverunt.

PLUT. *de Eſu Carn.*

about him with his extravagant turn; but gives them opportunities of defrauding him, which are ſeldom neglected. His houſe is the reſort of the worſt of mankind; for ſuch they always are whom a well-ſpread table aſſembles, and who, by applauding the profuſeneſs that feeds them, by extolling as proofs of a refined underſtanding, what are the ſureſt marks of a weak one, or rather of the total want of one, hurry on the ruin that was, otherwiſe, with too much ſpeed advancing.

But ſmall is their number whom it concerns to be told, how a *large fortune* may be reduced: how the making *any* muſt be hindered, is the argument in which the generality are intereſted. This hindrance is the ſure, the undeniable conſequence of giving way to our appetite. I have already obſerved, what hurt our very capacity often receives from it—to what a degree our intellect is at length impaired by it: I may, further, truly repreſent it as always indiſpoſing us to that diligence, to that application, without which no ſcience is to be maſter'd, no art learn'd, no buſineſs well con-

conducted, no valuable accompliſhment, of any kind, obtained.

Let us have our ſupport, and ſeek the increaſe of our ſtore, from our traffick, or from our labour; it is plain, that he who indulges himſelf leſs than we do, as he needs leſs to maintain him than we do, ſo he can ſell, or can work, cheaper, and muſt, therefore, make thoſe advantages which we are not to expect; muſt by his leſſer gains be, at length, enriched, while we, with our larger, ſhall be in a conſtant poverty.

A ſtill worſe effect of our luxurious turn I reckon thoſe mean and baſe practices to which it tempts us. When the plain meal, that our ſcanty circumſtances, after a liberal and expenſive education, furniſh, cannot content us; and we muſt either live at another's table, or provide a chargeable entertainment at our own; we deſcend to the vileſt flattery, the moſt ſervile complaiſance; every generous ſentiment is extinguiſhed in us; we ſoon become fully convinced, that he who will often eat at another's coſt, muſt be ſubject to another's hu-

mours, muſt countenance him in his follies, and comply with him in his vices.[a]

Let his favour at length exempt us from ſo diſhonourable an attendance, by furniſhing us with the means of having plenty at home: Yet what is plenty to the luxurious? His wantonneſs increaſes with his income; and, always needy, he is always dependent. Hence no ſenſe of his birth or education, of honour or conſcience, is any check upon him; he is the mean drudge,

[a] The appellation of Paraſite was at firſt honourable.—Το τυ Παραſιτυ ονομα, &c. Paraſiti appellatio fuit olim & ſancta & venerabilis. Polemon—tradidit, nomen illud, nunc ſordidum & infame, apud antiquos inveniri ſanctum, & perinde ac ſi dixiſſent συνθοινην, id eſt, *coepulonem*. ATH. L. VI. c. 6.

Εκαλειτο δαιτυμονες οι Παραſιτοι τοτε. LUC. *de Par.* 848. Et poſtea, Των αλλων, &c. Aliarum artium prava quædam ac vilia ſunt initia: Paraſiticæ vero origo plane generoſa. 849.

But when it was found, that, either, the conſtant gueſt was only ſo far welcome as he was throughout complaiſant, or that they who loved to eat at another's coſt were always diſpoſed to feed his vanity—would at any time purchaſe a meal by paying the moſt ſervile homage to the moſt worthleſs wretch who would provide him one: A Paraſite then ceaſed to denote the Friend who graced your table, and only expreſſed the Man whoſe vile flattery gained him admiſſion to it.

the

the abandon'd tool of his feeder, of whoever will be at the charge of gratifying his palate.

So if our trade be our maintenance, as no fair gains can anſwer the expence which what is called good eating occaſions, we are ſoon led to indirect artifices, to fraudulent dealing, to the moſt tricking and knaviſh practices.

In a word, neither our health nor life, neither our credit nor fortune, neither our virtue nor underſtanding, have any ſecurity but from our temperance. ‡ The greateſt bleſſings, which are here enjoyed by us, have it for their ſource.

Hence it is, that we have the *fulleſt* uſe of our faculties, and the *longeſt*.

Hence it is, that we fear not to be poor, and are ſure to be independent.

Hence diſeaſe and pain are removed from us, * our decay advances inſenſibly, and the

‡ Λακωσι και Ρωμαιοις νομος ην, &c. Lacedæmoniis & Romanis Lex erat, ne cui licitum eſſet obſonare quicquid, vel quantum, ipſi liberet: Nam civibus quum in aliis rebus temperantiam præceperunt, tum non minime in Menſa.

ÆLIAN. *Var. Hiſt.* L. III.

* Πειναν διδασκει και μαθητας λαμβανει· ſaid of *Zeno*, who died in his 98th year, ανοσος και υγιης διατελισας, cum ſine morbo ſanuſque ſemper vixiſſet. DIOG. LAERT.

approaches of death are as gentle as thoſe of ſleep.

Hence it is we free ourſelves from all temptations to a baſe or ungenerous action.†

Hence it is that our paſſions are calm'd, our luſts ſubdued, the purity of our hearts preſerved, and a virtuous conduct throughout made eaſy to us. [b]

When it is made ſo—when by the eaſe which we find in the practice of virtue we become confirmed therein—render it habitual to us; we have then that qualification for happineſs in a future ſtate, which, as the beſt title to it, affords us the beſt grounds to expect it.

† Xenocrates, cum Legati ab Alexandro quinquaginta ei talenta attuliſſent——— abduxit Legatos ad cenam in Academiam: iis appoſuit tantum quod ſatis eſſet, nullo apparatu. Cum poſtridie rogarent eum, cui numerari juberet: Quid! vos heſterna, inquit, cenula non intellexiſtis me pecunia non indigere? *Tuſc. Quæſt.* L. V.

[b] Κακον ουδεν φυεται, &c. Nihil innaſci malum poteſt in homine qui ſapientiæ fundamenta jecerit temperantiam & continentiam. STOB. Serm. 5.

ON

# ON INTEMPERANCE IN DRINKING.

Ερωτω γαρ το τοιονδι, Αρα σφοδροΐερας τας ηδονας και λυπας και θυμες και ερωΐας η των οινων ποσις επΐειναι; ΚΛ. Πολυγε. ΑΘΗ. Τι δ' αυΐας αισθησεις και μνημας, και δοξας, και φρονησεις, πΟΐερον ωσαυΐως σφοδροΐερας; η παμπαν απολειπει ταυΐα αυΐον, αν καΐακορης τις τη μεθη γιγνηΐαι; ΚΛ. Ναι παμπαν απολειπει. ΑΘΗ. Ουκουν εις ταυΐον αφικνεΐαι την της ψυχης εξιν τη τοτε οτε νεΘ· ην παις. ΚΛ. Τι μην; ΑΘΗ. Ηκιϛα δη τοτ αν αυΐΘ· αυΐε γιγνοΐο ενκρατης. ΚΛ. Ηκιϛα. ΑΘΗ. Αρ ουν πονηροταΐΘ· φαμεν ο τοιοΐΘ·; ΚΛ. Πολυγε.

PLAT. de Leg. L. I.

ON

# Intemperance in Drinking.

## SECT. I.

THE arguments againſt Drunkenneſs, which the common reaſon of Mankind ſuggeſts, are theſe—

The contemptible figure which it gives us:

The hindrance it is to any confidence being repoſed in us, ſo far as our ſecrecy is concerned:

The dangerous advantage which it affords the crafty and the knaviſh over us:

The bad effects which it hath on our health:

The

The prejudice which our minds receive from it:

Its *diſpoſing* us to *many crimes*, and *preparing* us for the *greateſt*.

The contemptible figure, which Drunkenneſs gives us, is no weak argument for avoiding it.

Every Reader has found the *Spartans* mentioned, as inculcating Sobriety on their *Children*, by expoſing to their notice the behaviour of their Slaves in a drunken fit. They thought, that were they to apply wholly to the Reaſon of the *Youths*, it might be to little purpoſe; as the force of the arguments which they uſed might not be ſufficiently apprehended, or the impreſſion thereof might be ſoon effaced: but when they made them frequently eye-witneſſes of all the madneſs and abſurdities, and at length the perfect ſenſeleſſneſs, which the immoderate draught occaſioned; the Idea of the *vile change* would be ſo fix'd in the minds of its beholders, as to render them utterly averſe from its cauſe.

And

And may we not juſtly conclude it to be from hence, that the offspring of the perſons, who are accuſtomed thus to diſguiſe themſelves, often prove remarkably ſober? They avoid, in their *riper years*, their parent's crime, from the deteſtation of it which they contracted in their *earlier*. As to moſt other vices, their debaſing circumſtances are not fully known to us, 'til we have attained a maturity of age; nor can be then, 'til they have been duly attended to: but in our very childhood, at our firſt beholding the effects of drunkenneſs, we are ſtruck with aſtoniſhment, that a reaſonable Being ſhould be thus changed—ſhould be induced to make himſelf ſuch an object of contempt and ſcorn. And, indeed, we muſt have the man in the *utmoſt* contempt, whom we hear and ſee in his progreſs to exceſs; at firſt, teazing you with his contentiouſneſs or impertinence—miſtaking your meaning, and hardly knowing his own—then, faultering in his ſpeech—unable to get through an entire ſentence—his hand trembling—his eyes ſwimming—his legs too feeble to ſupport him; 'til, at length,

length, you only know the human creature by his ſhape.

I cannot but add, that were one of any ſenſe to have a juſt notion of all the ſilly things he ſays or does, of the wretched appearance which he makes in a *drunken fit*, he could not want a more powerful argument againſt repeating his crime.

But, as none of us are inclined to think ill of ourſelves, we none of us will know how far our vices expoſe us; we allow them excuſes, which they meet not with from any but ourſelves.

This is the caſe of All; it is particularly ſo with the drunken; many of whom their ſhame would undoubtedly reform, could they be brought to conceive how much they did to be aſhamed of.

Nor is it improbable, that it is this very conſideration, how much drunkenneſs contributes to make a man the contempt of his wife—his children—his ſervants—of all his ſober beholders, which has been the cauſe that it has never been the reigning vice among a people of any refinement of manners:

manners: No, *it* has only prevailed among the rude and ſavage, among thoſe of groſſer underſtandings, and leſs delicacy of ſentiment. Crimes, as there are in all *men*, there muſt be in all *nations*; but the more *civilized* have perceived Drunkenneſs to be ſuch an offence againſt common decency, ſuch an abandoning one's ſelf to the ridicule and ſcoffs of the meaneſt, that, in whatever elſe they might tranſgreſs, they would not do it in this particular; but leave a vice of ſuch a nature to the wild and uncultivated—to the ſtupid and undiſtinguiſhing part of mankind—to thoſe who had no notion of propriety of character and decency of conduct.[a] How late this vice became the reproach of our countrymen, we find in Mr. *Camden*'s Annals. Under the year 1581, he has this obſervation—"The *Engliſh*, who hitherto had, of all the "northern nations, ſhewn themſelves the "leaſt addicted to immoderate drinking, and

[a] Drunkenneſs, ſays *Montaigne*, ſeems to me to be a groſs and brutiſh vice. Some vices there are wherein there is a mixture of knowledge, diligence, valour, prudence, dexterity and cunning: This is totally corporeal and earthly: ———Other vices diſcompoſe the underſtanding, this totally overthrows it, and renders the body ſtupid.

"been

" been commended for their ſobriety, firſt " learn'd, in theſe *Netherland* wars, to ſwal- " low a large quantity of intoxicating li- " quor, and to deſtroy their own health, by " drinking that of others."

Some trace of our antient regard to ſobriety, we may ſeem ſtill to retain in our uſe of the term, *Sot!* which carries with it as great reproach among us, as οινοβαρης did among the *Greeks.*

There is a ſhort ſtory, in *Rereſby's* Memoirs, very proper to be mentioned under this head.

The Lord Chancellor *(Jefferies)* had now like to have died of a Fit of the Stone; which he virtuouſly brought upon himſelf, by a furious Debauch of Wine, at Mr. Alderman *Duncomb's*; where he, the Lord Treaſurer, and others drank themſelves into that Height of Frenzy, that, among Friends, it was whiſper'd, They had ſtripped into their Shirts; and that, had not an Accident prevented them, they had got upon a Sign-poſt, to drink the King's health; which was the ſubject of much Deriſion, to ſay no worſe.

SECT.

## SECT. II.

A Second Objection to Drunkenneſs is, that it hinders any confidence being repos'd in us, ſo far as our Secrecy is concern'd.

Who can truſt the man, that is not maſter of himſelf? Wine, as it leſſens our caution, ſo it prompts us to ſpeak our thoughts without reſerve [a]: When it has ſufficiently inflam'd us, all the ſuggeſtions of prudence paſs for the apprehenſions of Cowardice; we are regardleſs of conſequences; our foreſight is gone, and our fear with it. Here then the artful perſon properly introducing the

[a] Ος δ' αν υπερβαλλη ποτον, &c.
Quicunque autem tranſilierit potus modum, non amplius ille
Suæ ipſius linguæ potens eſt aut mentis.
Loquitur res vanas, quæ viris ſobriis turpes videntur,
Nihilque non audet perpeti, quum inebrietur.
Ante qui fuerat ſapiens, tunc ſtultus eſt.
THEOGN.

ſubject

ſubject —urging us to enter upon it — and, after that, praiſing, or blaming, or contradicting, or queſtioning us, is ſoon able to draw from us whatever information he deſires to obtain [a].

Our diſcretion never outlaſts our ſobriety. Failings, which it moſt concerns us to conceal, and which, when we are ourſelves, we do moſt induſtriouſly conceal, we uſually publiſh when we have drank to exceſs. The man is then clearly ſeen [b] with all the ill nature and bad qualities, from which his behaviour in his cooler hours had induced

[a] Quemadmodum muſto dolia ipſa rumpuntur, & omne quod in imo jacet, in ſummam partem vis caloris ejectat: ſic vino exæſtuante, quicquid in imo jacet abditum effertur, & prodit in medium. Onerati mero quemadmodum non continent cibum vino redundante, ita ne ſecretum quidem: quod ſuum alienumque eſt, pariter effundunt. SEN.

Ωστε μη φαυλως, &c. Ut non inepte Æſopum ille increpaverit: Quid quæris, ridiculum caput, illas feneſtras, per quas in alterius cogitationes alter poteſt inſpicere? Vinum enim nos aperit ac oſtentat, non ſinens latere.

PLUT. *Symp.* L. II.

Το εν καρδια τε νηφοντος, &c. Quod eſt in corde Sobrii, id eſt in lingua Ebrii, ut proverbio fertur.

PLUT. *de Garrulitate.*

[b] Omne vitium Ebrietas & intendit & detegit.——Ubi poſſedit animum nimia vis vini, quicquid mali latebat emergit. Non facit ebrietas vitia, ſed prodit. SEN.

his

his moſt intimate friends to believe him wholly free. We muſt be loſt to reflection, to thought, when we can thus far throw off our diſguiſe. And what is it, but our thought and reflection, that can engage our ſecrecy in any inſtance—that can ever be a proper check upon our diſcourſe—that enables us to diſtinguiſh what we may ſpeak, and on what we ought to be ſilent? Do we ceaſe to be in a condition to hide the deformities in ourſelves, which we moſt wiſh to have concealed? On what point, then, is it likely that we ſhould be reſerv'd? Whoſe ſecrets can he keep, who ſo foully betrays his own?

It may, *thirdly*, be alledged againſt Drunkenneſs, that it gives the crafty and knaviſh the moſt dangerous advantage over us.

This vice puts us into the very circumſtances, in which every one would wiſh us to be, who had a view to impoſe upon us, to over-reach us, or in any way to gain his ends of us.[a] When the repeated draught

[a] Of *Boneſus*, that reproach to our country, (for he was *origine Britannus)* of whom it was ſaid, *Non ut vivat natus*

has diſordered us, it is then, that only by complying with our humour, and joining, to appearance, in our madneſs, we may be deluded into meaſures the moſt prejudicial to us, into ſuch as are our own and our families utter undoing.[a] It is then that our purſe is wholly at the mercy of our company; we ſpend—we give—we lend—we loſe. What unhappy marriages have been then concluded! What ruinous conveyances have been then made! How ſecure ſoever we may apprehend ourſelves from impoſitions of ſo very pernicious a nature, yet more or fewer we muſt have to fear from drunkenneſs, as the opportunities which it gives will conſtantly be watch'd by all who have any deſign upon us: And if we are known frequently to diſorder ourſelves, all

*eſt, ſed ut bibat*, the Hiſtorian obſerves—Si quando legati Barbarorum undecunque gentium veniſſent, ipſis propinabat, ut eos inebriaret, atque ab his per vinum cuncta cognoſceret. Ipſe quantumlibet bibiſſet, ſemper ſecurus & ſobrius. VOPISC.

[a] Tunc avidi matronam oculi licentur, graves produnt marito: tunc animi ſecreta proferuntur. Alii teſtamenta ſua nuncupant: alii mortifera loquuntur, redituraſque per jugulum voces non continent, quam multis ita interemptis. PLIN. Lib. XIV.

in

in our neighbourhood, or among our acquaintance, who are of any ſerioufneſs and decency, will be ſure to avoid us, and leave us wholly to thoſe who find their account in aſſociating with us; who, while they can make us their property, will be, as often as we pleaſe, our companions.

A *fourth* argument againſt Drunkenneſs is its bad effects upon our health.[a] Every act of it is a *fever* for a time: and whence have we more reaſon to apprehend *one* of a longer continuance, and of the worſt con-

[a] Quamvis calorem aliqualem *vinum* in tranſitu impertiat, certiſſimum eſt tamen fermenta corporis ab eo ſubjugari, & avocari ſpiritus naturales atque fugari: unde eſt, ſi bene conjicio, quod Bibaces Podagra, Paralyſi, Hydrope, aliiſque morbis frigidis perimuntur. Adde quod jugis & immodica vini ingurgitatio corpus, ad inſtar corporum fœminarum, emollit laxatque. SYDEN.

Omnis generis liquida ſpirituoſa copioſius ſumta partibus ſulphureis inflammabilibus non modo inteſtinam, calidam, & expanſivam in ſanguine commotionem efficiunt, ſed & ſyſtolen cordis & omnium impellentium vaſorum augendo fluidorum progreſſum per univerſum corpus accelerant.—— Auctiori ſic facto ſanguinis circulo, & increſcente æſtu, humida & ſubtilior ſanguinis portio, quæ ſecundum naturam triplo major quam ſolidi eſſe debet, plus juſto conſumitur; nutritio hinc perditur, partes elangueſcunt, & ſanguis intemperatus, imo ad coagulum valde pronus, evadit.

HOFFMAN.

ſequence? Our blood thus fired, none can be ſure, when the diſorder raiſed in it will be quieted, whether its inflammatory ſtate will admit of a remedy: In ſeveral thouſands it has been found incapable of any; and what has ſo frequently happened to *others*, may juſtly be conſidered as likely to befal *us*. By the ſame abſurd reliance on a good conſtitution, thro' which *they* were deceived, *we* may be ſo likewiſe.

But ſuppoſing the mere fever fit wearing off with the drunken one; how fatal would it prove to be then ſeized with a diſtemper of the infectious kind, that was at all malignant! This has often been the caſe; and when it has been ſo, the applications of the moſt ſkilful have been intirely vain.

Let our intemperance have nothing inſtantly to dread; for how ſhort a ſpace can it be in ſuch ſecurity? The young debauchee ſoon experiences the iſſue of his miſconduct---ſoon finds his food diſreliſhed, his ſtomach weakened, his ſtrength decayed, his body waſted. In the flower of his youth he often feels all the infirmities of extreme old age; and when not yet in the middle

middle of human life, is got to the end of his own.

If we have attained to manhood, to our full vigour, before we run into the exceſs from which I am diſſuading; we may, indeed, poſſibly be many years in breaking a good conſtitution: but then, if a ſudden ſtroke diſpatch us not; if we are not cut off without the leaſt leiſure given us to implore the mercy of heaven; to how much uneaſineſs are we, generally, reſerved—what a variety of painful diſtempers threaten us! All of them there is very little probability we ſhould eſcape; and under which ſoever of them we may labour, we ſhall experience its cure hopeleſs, and its ſeverity the ſaddeſt leſſon, how dear the purchaſe was of our former mirth.

There are, I grant, inſtances, where a long-continued Intemperance has not prevented the attainment of a very advanced age, free from diſorders of every kind. But then it is to be conſidered how rare theſe inſtances are; that it is not, perhaps, one in a thouſand, who eſcapes thus; that of thoſe, who do thus eſcape, the far

greater part owe their preſervation to hard working, or to an exerciſe as fatiguing as any of the more laborious employments. So that if either our frame be not of an unuſual firmneſs, or we do not labour for our bread, and will not for our health; we cannot be of their number, who have ſo much as a chance, that they will not ſhorten their lives by their exceſs. And when we have this chance, we are to remember, how very little we can promiſe ourſelves from it. We are liable to all the diſeaſes, which, in the ordinary courſe of things, are connected with Intemperance; and we are liable to all thoſe, from which even Sobriety exempts not; but in this latter caſe, we have, by no means, the ſame to hope with the ſober, who are eaſily recovered of what proves mortal to the intemperate.

SECT.

## SECT. III.

TO conſider, *fifthly*, the unhappy effects of Drunkenneſs upon our minds. Every time we offend in it, we are firſt Madmen and then Idiots: we firſt ſay, and do, a thouſand the moſt ridiculous and extravagant things, and then appear quite void of ſenſe. By annexing theſe conſtant inconveniences to drinking immoderately, it ſeems the deſign of a wiſe Providence to teach us what we may fear from a habit of it---to give us a foretaſte of the miſeries which it will at length bring upon us, not for a few hours alone, but for the whole remainder of our lives. What numbers have, by hard drinking, fallen into an incurable diſtraction! And who was ever for many years a ſot, without deſtroying the quickneſs of his apprehenſion, and the ſtrength of his memory? What mere dri-

vellers have ſome of the beſt capacities become, after a long courſe of exceſs!

As we drink to raiſe our ſpirits, but, by thus raiſing, we weaken them; ſo whatever freſh vigour our parts may ſeem to derive from our wine, it is a vigour which waſtes them; which, by being often thus called out, deſtroys its ſource, our natural fancy and underſtanding. 'Tis like a man's ſpending upon his principal: he may, for a ſeaſon, make a figure much ſuperior to *his* who ſupports himſelf upon the intereſt of his fortune; but is ſure to be undone, when the other is unhurt.

We meet with, as I have already obſerved, inſtances, where an extraordinary happineſs of conſtitution has prevented its entire ruin, even from a courſe of drunkenneſs of many years continuance: but I much queſtion, whether there are any inſtances, that ſuch a courſe has not been remarkably prejudicial to a good capacity. From all the obſervations which we can make on the human frame, it may be fairly ſuppoſed, that there are no ſuch inſtances---that it is not reaſonable to think we

we can be, for many years, inflaming our brains, without injuring them — be continually diſordering the moſt delicate parts of our machine, without impairing them. A lively imagination, a quick apprehenſion, a retentive memory, depend upon parts in our ſtructure, which are much more eaſily hurt, than ſuch whoſe ſound ſtate is neceſſary for the preſervation of mere life: and therefore we perceive thoſe ſeveral faculties often entirely loſt, long before the body drops. The Man is very frequently ſeen to ſurvive himſelf—to continue a living creature, after he has, for ſome years, ceaſed to be a rational one. And to this deplorable ſtate nothing is more likely to bring us, than a habit of Drunkenneſs; as there is no vice that more immediately affects thoſe organs, by the help of which we apprehend, reaſon, remember, and perform the like acts.

What, *ſixthly*, ought to raiſe in us the utmoſt abhorrence of Drunkenneſs is, the conſideration of the many crimes to which it diſpoſes us. He, through whoſe veins the inflaming potion has ſpread itſelf, muſt be

be under a greater temptation to lewdneſs, than you can think him in any other circumſtances: and from the little reaſoning of which he is then capable, as to the difference of the two crimes, would heſitate no more at Adultery than Fornication.

Thus, alſo, for immoderate anger, contention, ſcurrility and abuſe, acts of violence, and the moſt injurious treatment of others; they are all offences, into which Drunkenneſs is moſt apt to betray us; ſo apt to do it, that you will ſcarcely find a company drinking to exceſs, without many provoking ſpeeches and actions paſſing in it —without more or leſs ſtrife before it ſeparates.[a] We even perceive the moſt gentle and peaceable, the moſt humane and civilized when they are ſober, no ſooner intoxicated, than they put off all thoſe commendable qualities, and aſſume, as it were, a new nature — a nature as different from their former, as the moſt untractable and fierceſt of the brute kind are, from the

[a] Crebræ ut inter vinolentos rixæ, raro conviciis, ſæpius cæde & vulneribus tranſiguntur. TACIT. *de Mor.* &c. *Germ.* c. 22.

moſt

moſt accompliſhed and amiable of our own.[a]

To ſome vices drunkenneſs *diſpoſes* us; and,

*Laſtly*, lays us open to more, and certainly to the greateſt. It lays us, indeed, open to *moſt vices* — by the power which it gives all ſorts of *temptations* over us, and by putting us into a *condition*, in which the *raſh* and *pernicious ſuggeſtions* of others have an eſpecial influence upon us--- in which a profligate companion is enabled to direct us, almoſt as he pleaſes.

It gives all ſorts of *temptations* power over us, by diſqualifying us for conſideration; and by extinguiſhing in us all regard to the motives of prudence and caution.

[a] Obſtantem malis conatibus verecundiam Ebrietas removet. ——— Tunc libidinoſus ne cubiculum quidem expectat, ſed cupiditatibus ſuis, quantum petierint, ſine dilatione permittit —— tunc petulans non linguam, non manum continet. Creſcit inſolenti Superbia, Crudelitas ſævo, Malignitas livido. ——— Fere vinolentiam Crudelitas ſequitur; violatur enim exaſperaturque ſanitas mentis. Quemadmodum difficiles faciunt oculos diutini morbi, etiam ad minimam radii ſolis offenſionem; ita ebrietates continuæ efferant animos. SEN. Ep. 83.

It makes us ready to follow the *raſheſt counſels* of our companions; becauſe, not allowing us to reaſon upon them, and incapacitating us for the government of ourſelves, it, of courſe, leaves us to the guidance of thoſe, with whom we are moſt pleaſed---of thoſe, who give into our humour, and countenance us in our exceſſes.

It, certainly, lays us open to the *greateſt* crimes, becauſe, when we are throughly heated by the ſpirituous draught, we then like what is daring and extravagant [a] --- we are then turned to bold and deſperate undertakings; and that which is moſt licentious carries then with it the appearance of an attempt ſuiting a courageous and undaunted mind. Hence rapes, murthers, acts of the utmoſt inhumanity and barbarity have been *their acts*, who, when ſober, would have

[a] Nox, & Amor, Vinumque nihil moderabile ſuadent:
Illa pudore vacat; Liber Amorque metu.
OVID.

Ne quis modici tranſiliat munera Liberi,
Centaurea monet cum Lapithis rixa ſuper mero
Debellata; monet Sithoniis non levis Evius:
Cum fas atque nefas exiguo fine libidinum
Diſcernunt avidi. ——— HOR. Lib. I. Od. 18.

deteſted

deteſted themſelves, if ſuch crimes could have entered their *thoughts*.

It may, perhaps, be of uſe to obſerve here, what cenſure has been paſſed on drunkenneſs by thoſe who had only the light of reaſon for their guide.

It was the ſaying of one of the wiſer Heathen, That a wiſe man would *drink* wine, but would be ſure never to be made *drunk* by it.[a] Another of them condemns wine, as betraying even the prudent into imprudence.[b] The advice of a third is, Avoid drinking company: if you accidentally come into it, leave it before you ceaſe to be ſober; for, when that happens, the mind is like a *chariot* whoſe driver is thrown off: As *it* is then ſure to be hurried away at random, ſo are *we*, when our reaſon is gone, ſure to be drawn into much

[a] Οινωθησεσθαι μεν, ου μεθυσθησεσθαι δε.
ZEN. apud LAERT. 439.

[b] Οινος και φρονησεις εις αφροσυνας αναβαλλει.
STHEN. apud ATHEN. Lib. X.

——— ——— Οινος γαρ ανωγει
Ηλεκτον, ος τ' εφεηκε πολυφρονα περ μαλ' αεισαι
Και θ' απαλον γελασαι, και τ' ορχησασθαι ανηκειν
Και τι επος προεηκειν οπερ τ' αρρητον αμεινον. OD. ξ.

guilt.

guilt.[a] We have one calling Drunkenneſs the *ſtudy of madneſs*[b]; another, a *voluntary madneſs*.[c] He who was aſked, how a perſon might be brought to a diſlike of wine? anſwered, By beholding the indecencies of the drunken.[d]

[a] Isocrat. ad Nicoc.

[b] Πυθαγορας ελεγε την μεθην μανιας ειναι μελετην. Stob. 165.

[c] Nihil aliud eſt Ebrietas quam voluntaria inſania. Sen.

[d] Αναχαρσις ερωτηθεις, &c. Diog. Laert. 66.

I have, in the former Tract, taken notice of the coarſe fare which *Homer* provides for his Heroes: It may not be amiſs to remark here, from *Athenæus*, what leſſons of ſobriety he furniſhes — what his care is to diſſuade from drinking to exceſs. This, indeed, may appear deſerving to be more particularly inſiſted upon, ſince from the praiſes which he gives wine he was thought not to have been ſparing in the uſe of it.

The boaſt that *Æneas*, heated by liquor, had made of his willingneſs to fight with *Achilles*, was urged to engage him in a combat which would have been fatal to him, but that—

> The King of Ocean to the fight deſcends,
> Thro' all the whiſtling darts his courſe he bends;
> Swift interpos'd between the warriors flies,
> And caſts thick darkneſs o'er *Achilles'* eyes.
>
> Iliad, Book XX.

In the Third Book of the *Odyſſey*, the diſcord of the *Greeks*, at a Council called to deliberate about their return, the Poet aſcribes to their drunkenneſs.

> Sour with debauch a reeling tribe they came,
> . . . . . .

The

The diſcountenance which Drunkenneſs received among the *Romans* will be hereafter taken notice of.

With ireful taunts each other they oppoſe,
'Til in loud tumult all the *Greeks* aroſe.
Now diff'rent counſels ev'ry breaſt divide,
Each burns with rancour to the adverſe ſide.

In Book the Ninth of the ODYSS. *Polyphemus* is repreſented as having his ſight deſtroyed, when he was drunk, by a few of thoſe, whoſe joint force was not, with reſpect to his, that of a Child.

——— He greedy graſp'd the heavy bowl,
Thrice drain'd, and pour'd the deluge on his ſoul.
. . . . . .
———Then nodding with the fumes of wine
Dropt his huge head, and ſnoring lay ſupine.
. . . . . .
Then forth the vengeful inſtrument I bring;
Urg'd by ſome preſent God, they ſwift let fall
The pointed torment on the viſual ball.

In Book the Tenth, The ſelf-denial of *Eurylochus* preſerved him from the vile transformation, to which the Intemperance of his companions ſubjected them.

Soon in the luſcious feaſt themſelves they loſt,
And drank oblivion of their native coaſt.
Inſtant her circling wand the Goddeſs waves,
To Hogs transforms them, and the Sty receives.

In the ſame Book the tragical end of *Elpenor* is thus deſcribed:

——— ——— ——— A vulgar Soul,
Born but to banquet, and to drain the bowl.

Among

Among the *Greeks*, by a Law of *Solon*,[a] if a chief Magiſtrate made himſelf drunk, he was to be put to death. By a Law of *Pittacus*,[b] a double puniſhment was inflicted upon ſuch who, when drunk, had committed any other crime. There were

> He, hot and careleſs, on a turret's height
> With ſleep repair'd the long debauch of night:
> The ſudden tumult ſtirr'd him where he lay,
> And down he haſten'd, but forgot his way;
> Full headlong from the roof the ſleeper fell,
> And ſnapp'd the ſpinal joint, and wak'd in Hell.

The drunkenneſs of *Eurytion*, one of the *Centaurs*, is fatal to him, and to the whole race. Od. B. XXI.

> The great *Eurytion* when this frenzy ſtung,
> *Pirithous'* roofs with frantic riot rung:
> His noſe they ſhorten'd, and his ears they ſlit,
> And ſent him ſober'd home, with better wit.
> Hence with long war the double race was curs'd,
> Fatal to All, but to th'Aggreſſor firſt.

*Antinous*, who had reproached *Ulyſſes* as made inſolent by wine, dies himſelf with the intoxicating bowl in his hands. Od. Book XXII.

> . . . . . .
> High in his hands he rear'd the golden bowl.
> Ev'n then to drain it lengthen'd out his breath;
> Chang'd to the deep, the bitter draught of death.
> Full thro' his throat *Ulyſſes'* weapon paſt,
> And pierc'd the neck. He falls, and breathes his laſt.

[a] Diog. Laert. 35.
[b] Diog. Laert. 48.

thoſe,

thoſe, by whoſe Laws he who drank any greater quantity of wine than was really neceſſary for his health, ſuffer'd death.

Thus much as to *their* ſentiments on drinking to exceſs, who had only the light of Nature to ſhew them its guilt.

## SECT. IV.

LET me, in the next place, ſuggeſt ſuch cautions as ought to be obſerved by him whoſe deſire it is to avoid Drunkenneſs.

Carefully ſhun the company that is addicted to it.

Do not ſit long among thoſe who are in the progreſs towards exceſs.

If you have often loſt the command of yourſelf when a certain quantity of liquor has been exceeded, you ſhould be ſure to keep yourſelf always much within that quantity.

Make not ſtrong liquor neceſſary to your refreſhment.

Never apply to it for eaſe under cares and troubles of any kind.

Know always how to employ yourſelf uſefully, or innocently to amuſe yourſelf, that your time may never be a burden upon you.

In the firſt place, Do not aſſociate with thoſe who are addicted to Drunkenneſs. This I lay down as a rule, from which it is ſcarce poſſible to depart, and keep our ſobriety. No man, not the ſteadieſt and wiſeſt of men, is proof againſt a bad example continually before him. By frequently *ſeeing* what is wrong, we, firſt, loſe our abhorrence of it, and, then, are eaſily prevailed with to do it. Where we like our company, we are inſenſibly led into their manners. It is natural to think we ſhould endeavour to make ourſelves agreeable to the perſons with whom we much converſe; and you can never make yourſelf more agreeable to any, at leaſt as a companion, than when you countenance their conduct by imitating it. He who aſſo-

aſſociates with the Intemperate, and yet refuſes to join in their exceſſes, will ſoon find, that he is look'd upon as condemning their practice; and, therefore, that he has no way of continuing them his friends, but by going into the ſame irregularity, in which they allow themſelves. If his chearfulneſs, his facetiouſneſs, or wit, endear him to them, and render them unwilling to quit an intercourſe with one ſo qualified to amuſe them; all their arts will be tried to corrupt his ſobriety: Where he lies moſt open to temptation will be carefully watch'd, and no method left unattempted, that can appear likely to make him regardleſs of his duty. But who can reckon himſelf ſafe, when ſo much pains will be uſed to enſnare him? Whoſe virtue is ſecure, amidſt the earneſt endeavours of his conſtant companions to undermine it?

Another caution which I have laid down is, Never ſit long among thoſe who are in the progreſs towards exceſs. The expediency of this advice will be acknowledged, if we conſider how difficult it is to be long upon our guard—how apt we are to forget

ourſelves, and then to be betrayed into the guilt, againſt which we had moſt firmly reſolved.

In the eagerneſs of our own diſcourſe, or in our attention to that of others, or in the pleaſure we receive from the good humour of our companions, or in the ſhare we take of their mirth, we may very naturally be ſuppoſed unobſerving how much we have drank—how near we are got to the utmoſt *bounds* of ſobriety: Theſe, under the circumſtances I have mentioned, may eaſily be paſſed by us, without the leaſt ſuſpicion of it—before we are under any apprehenſion of our danger.

As in diſputes one unadviſed expreſſion brings on another, and after a few arguments both ſides grow warm, from warmth advance to anger, are by anger ſpurr'd on to abuſe, and thence, often, go to thoſe extremities to which they would have thought themſelves incapable of proceeding: ſo is it when we ſit long, where what gives the moſt frequent occaſion to diſputes is before us—where the *intoxicating draught* is circulating; one invites us to more—our ſpirits

rits riſe—our warineſs declines—from chearfulneſs we paſs to noiſy mirth—our mirth ſtops not long ſhort of folly—our folly hurries us to a madneſs, that we never could have imagined likely to have been our reproach.

If you have often loſt the command of yourſelf where a certain quantity of liquor hath been exceeded, you ſhould be ſure never to approach that quantity — you ſhould confine yourſelf to what is much ſhort of it. Where we find that a reliance upon our warineſs, upon the ſteadineſs and firmneſs of our *general reſolutions*, has deceived us, we ſhould truſt *them* no more; we ſhould confide no more in *thoſe precautions*, which have already proved an inſufficient check upon us. When I cannot reſiſt a temptation, I have nothing left for my ſecurity but to fly it. If I know that I am apt to yield when I am tempted, the part I have then to act is, to take care that I may not be tempted. Thus only I ſhew myſelf in earneſt; hereby alone I evidence, that my duty is really my care.

We have experienced, that we cannot withdraw from the company we like, exactly at ſuch a point of time—we have experienced, that we ſometimes do not perceive when we have got to the utmoſt bounds of temperance—we have unhappily experienced, that when it has been known to us, how ſmall an addition of liquor would diſorder us, we then have ſo far loſt the power over ourſelves, as not to be able to refrain from what we thus fully knew would be prejudicial to us. In theſe circumſtances no way remains of ſecuring our ſobriety, if we will reſort to any place where it is at all hazarded, but either having our ſtint at once before us, or confining ourſelves to that certain number of meaſured draughts, from whence we are ſure we can have nothing to fear. And he who will not take this method—he who will reſt in a general intention of ſobriety, when he has ſeen how often that intention has been in vain, how often he has miſcarried notwithſtanding it; can never be conſidered as truly concerned for his paſt failings, as having ſeriouſly reſolved not to repeat them. So far as I omit any due precaution againſt

a crime,

a crime, into which I know myſelf apt to be drawn, ſo far I may juſtly be regarded as indifferent towards it; and ſo far all my declarations, of being ſorry for and determined to leave it, muſt be conſidered as inſincere.

## SECT. V.

NEVER make any quantity of ſtrong liquor *neceſſary* to your refreſhment. What occaſions this to be a fit caution is, That if the quantity we cannot be without is, in the beginning, a very moderate one, it will, probably, ſoon increaſe, and become, at length, ſo great as muſt give us the worſt to fear. The reaſon, why it is thus likely to be increaſed, is, that a ſmall draught, by the habitual uſe of it, will ceaſe to raiſe our ſpirits; and therefore, when the deſign of our drinking is in order to raiſe them, we ſhall at length ſeek to do it by

a much larger quantity of liquor, than what was wanted for that purpoſe at firſt.

It ſeems to be, further, proper advice on this ſubject, That we ſhould never apply to ſtrong liquor for eaſe under cares, or troubles, of any kind. From fears, from diſappointments, and a variety of uneaſineſſes, none are exempt. The inconſiderate are impatient for a ſpeedy relief; which as the ſpirituous draught affords, they are tempted to ſeek it from thence.

But how very imprudent they muſt be, who would by ſuch means quiet their minds, is moſt evident. For, is any real ground of trouble removed, by not attending to it—by diverting our thoughts from it? In *many caſes*, the evil we would remedy by not thinking upon it is, by that very courſe, made much more diſtreſſing, than it otherwiſe would have been; nay, ſometimes, quite remedileſs. In *all caſes*, the leſs heated our brain is, and the greater calmneſs we preſerve, the fitter we are to help ourſelves; the fitter we are to encounter difficulties, to prevent our being involved

volved in them; or, if that cannot be, to extricate ourſelves ſpeedily from them.

The eaſe, which liquor gives, is but that of a dream: when we awake, we are again ourſelves; we are in the ſame ſituation as before; or, perhaps, in a worſe. What then is to be the next ſtep? Soon as the ſtupifying effects of one draught are gone off, another muſt be taken; the ſure conſequence of which is, that ſuch a habit of drinking will be contracted, as we ſhall vainly endeavour to conquer, though the original inducement to it ſhould no longer ſubſiſt. To guard againſt this, as it is of the utmoſt importance to all of us, ſo the only certain way is, by ſtopping in the very firſt inſtance; by never ſeeking, either under care or pain, relief from what we drink, but from thoſe helps which reaſon and religion furniſh; the only ones, indeed, to which we can wiſely reſort in any ſtraits; and which are often found capable of extricating us, when our condition ſeems the moſt deſperate.

A prudent man ſhould never deſert himſelf. Where his own efforts avail him not, the

the care of an over-ruling Providence may interpoſe, and deliver him. But to borrow ſupport againſt our troubles from liquor, is an entire deſertion of ourſelves; it is giving up our ſtate, as an undone one—it is abandoning our own diſcretion, and relinquiſhing all hopes of the DEITY's aſſiſtance.

*Laſtly*, Know always, how you may uſefully employ, or innocently amuſe, yourſelf. When Time is a burden upon us, when we are at a loſs how to paſs it, our chearfulneſs of courſe abates, our ſpirits flag, we are reſtleſs and uneaſy: Here then we are in the fitteſt diſpoſition, and under the ſtrongeſt inducements, to reſort to what we know will enliven us, and make our hours glide away inſenſibly. Beſides, when we cannot tell what to do with ourſelves, it is natural we ſhould ſeek for thoſe who are as idle as ourſelves; and when ſuch company meet, it is eaſy to ſee what will keep them together; that drinking muſt be their entertainment, ſince they are ſo ill qualified for any other.

Idleneſs has been not unfitly term'd, the Parent of all vices: but none it more frequently

quently produces than Drunkenneſs; as no vice can make a greater waſte of our time, the chief thing about which the idle are ſolicitous. On the other hand, he who can profitably buſy, or innocently divert, himſelf, has a ſure reſort in all humours—he has his ſpirits ſeldom depreſſed; or, when they are ſo, he can, without any hazard, recruit them—he is ſo far from ſeeking a correſpondence with ſuch as are always in a readineſs to engage in ſchemes of intemperance and riot, that he ſhuns them; his amuſements, quite different from theirs, occaſion him to be ſeldom with them, and ſecure him from being corrupted by them.

This we may lay down as a moſt certain truth, That our virtue is never ſafe, but when we have *proper diverſions*. Unbent we ſometimes muſt be; and when we know not how to be ſo in an innocent way, we ſoon ſhall be in a guilty. But if we can find full entertainment in what is free from all reproach, in what neither has any thing criminal in it, nor can lead us into what is criminal; then, indeed, and only then, can we be thought in little danger, and not likely to yield to the bad examples ſurrounding us.

SECT.

## SECT. VI.

BUT let me conſider what the Intemperate ſay in their excuſe.

That any ſhould frequently put themſelves into a condition, in which they are incapable of taking the leaſt care of themſelves—in which they are quite ſtupid and helpleſs—in which, whatever danger threatens them, they can contribute nothing towards its removal—in which they may be drawn into the moſt ſhocking crimes—in which all they hold dear is at the mercy of their companions; the exceſs, I ſay, which cauſes us to be in ſuch a ſituation, none ſeem diſpoſed to defend: but what leads to it, you find numbers thus vindicating, or excuſing.

They muſt converſe—They muſt have their hours of chearfulneſs and mirth—When they are diſorder'd, it happens before

fore they are aware of it—A ſmall quantity of liquor has this unhappy effect upon them—If they will keep up their intereſt, it muſt be by complying with the intemperate humour of their neighbours---Their way of life, their buſineſs, obliges them to drink with ſuch numbers, that it is ſcarcely poſſible they ſhould not be ſometimes guilty of exceſs.

To all which it may be ſaid, That, bad as the world is, we may every where, if we ſeek after them, find thoſe whoſe company will rather confirm us in our ſobriety, than endanger it. Whatever our rank, ſtation, profeſſion or employment may be, ſuitable companions for us there are; with whom we may be perfectly ſafe, and free from every temptation to exceſs. If theſe are not in all reſpects to our minds, we muſt bear with *them*, as we do with *our condition* in this world; which every prudent perſon makes the beſt of; ſince, let what will be the change in it, ſtill it will be liable to ſome objection, and never, entirely, as he would wiſh it. In both caſes we are to conſider, not how we ſhall rid

our-

ourſelves of all inconveniences, but where are likely to be the feweſt: and we ſhould judge *that ſet of acquaintance*, as well as *that ſtate of life*, the moſt eligible, in which we have the leaſt to fear, from which our eaſe and innocence are likely to meet with the feweſt interruptions.

*But mirth*, you ſay, *muſt ſometimes be conſulted.* Let it be ſo. I would no more diſſuade you from it, than I would from ſerioufneſs. Each ſhould have its ſeaſon, and its meaſure: and as it would be thought by all very proper advice, with reſpect to ſerioufneſs, "Let it not proceed to melan-"choly, to moroſeneſs, or to cenſoriouſ-"neſs;" it is equally fit advice, with regard to mirth, "Let wiſdom accompany "it: Let it not tranſport you to riot or in-"temperance: Do not think you can be "called merry, when you are ceaſing to "be reaſonable."

Good humour, chearfulneſs, facetiouſneſs, which are the proper ingredients of mirth, do not want to be called out by the repeated draught: it will rather damp them, from the apprehenſion of the diſorder

der it may ſoon produce. Whenever we depart from, or endanger, our innocence, we are laying a foundation for uneaſineſs and grief; nor can we, in ſuch circumſtances, be *merry*, if we are not void of all *thought* and *reflection:* and this is, undoubtedly, the moſt *melancholy* ſituation in which we can be conceived, except when we are undergoing the puniſhment of our folly. The joy, the elevation of ſpirits proper to be ſought after by us, is that alone which can never be a ſubject of remorſe, or which never will embitter more of our hours than it relieves. And when this may be obtain'd in ſuch a variety of ways, we muſt be loſt to all common prudence, if we will apply to none of them; if we can only find *mirth* in a departure from *ſobriety*.

*You are*, it ſeems, *overtaken before you are aware of it*. This may be an allowable excuſe for three or four times in a man's life; oftener, I think, it cannot be. What you are ſenſible may eaſily happen, and muſt be extremely prejudicial to you when it does happen, you ſhould be *always aware of*. No one's virtue is any farther his praiſe, than

than from the care he takes to preſerve it. If he is at no trouble and pains on that account, his innocence has nothing in it that can entitle him to a reward. If you are truly concerned for a fault, you will neceſſarily keep out of the way of repeating it; and the more frequent your repetitions of it have been, ſo much the greater caution you will uſe for the future.

*Many we hear excuſing their drunkenneſs, by the ſmall quantity which occaſions it.* A more trifling excuſe for it could not be made. For if you know *how ſmall a quantity* of liquor will have that unhappy effect, you ſhould forbear *that quantity.* It is as much your duty to do ſo, as it is his duty to forbear a greater quantity, who ſuffers the ſame from it which you do from a leſſer. When you know that it is a crime to be drunk, and know likewiſe what will make you ſo; the more or leſs, which will do this, is nothing to the purpoſe—alters not your guilt. If you will not refrain from two or three draughts, when you are ſure that drunkenneſs will be the conſequence of them; it cannot be thought that any mere

regard

regard to ſobriety keeps you from drinking the largeſt quantity whatſoever. Had ſuch a regard an influence upon you, it would have an equal one; it would keep you from every ſtep, by which your ſobriety could ſuffer.

*As to ſupporting an intereſt, promoting a trade, advantageouſly bargaining for ourſelves, by drinking more than is convenient for us*; they are, for the moſt part, only the poor evaſions of the inſincere, of thoſe who are willing to lay the blame of their miſconduct on any thing, rather than on what alone deſerves it—rather than on their bad inclinations.

Civility and courteſy, kind offices, acts of charity and liberality will both raiſe us more friends, and keep thoſe we have firmer to us, than any quantities of liquor, which we can either diſtribute or drink: and as for mens trade or their bargains, let them always act fairly—let them, whether they buy or ſell, ſhew that they abhor all tricking and impoſition—all little and mean artifices; and I'll ſtake my life, they ſhall never have reaſon to object, that, if they

will *always* preſerve their *ſobriety*, they muſt leſſen their *gains*.

But were it true, that, if we will reſolve never to hazard intoxicating ourſelves, we muſt loſe our friends, and forego our preſent advantage; they are inconveniences, which, in ſuch a caſe, we ſhould chearfully ſubmit to. Some pains muſt be taken, ſome difficulties muſt be here encountered; if we will have any reaſonable ground to expect happineſs in a future ſtate. Of this even common ſenſe muſt ſatisfy us.

Credulous as we are, I think it impoſſible, that any man in his wits would believe me, if I were to tell him, That he might miſs no opportunity of bettering his fortune—that he might remove any evil he had to fear, by whatſoever method he thought proper—that he might throughout follow his inclinations, and gratify his appetites; and yet reſt aſſured, that his death would be but the paſſage to great and endleſs joys. I know not to whom ſuch an aſſertion would not appear extremely abſurd: notwithſtanding which, we, certainly, do not act, as if there were any abſurdity

ſurdity in it, when we make what is evidently our duty give way to our convenience; and rather conſider how profitable this or that practice is, than how right. That, therefore, Sobriety, added to other parts of a virtuous conduct, may entitle us to the ſo much hoped for reward, we muſt be ſober under all ſorts of diſcouragements. It rarely, indeed, happens, that we meet with *any*; but to reſiſt the *greateſt* muſt be our reſolution, if we will recommend ourſelves to the Governor of the Univerſe—if we will hope for his favour.

## SECT. VII.

THUS much with regard to drunkenneſs, ſo far as it is committed by intoxicating ourſelves—by drinking, 'til our reaſon is gone; but as there is yet another way, in which we may offend in it, *viz.* by drinking more than is proper for our

refreſhment; I muſt on this, likewiſe, beſtow a few obſervations[a].

When we drink more than ſuffices to recruit our ſpirits, our paſſions are heightened, and we ceaſe to be under the influence of that calm temper, which is our only ſafe counſellor. The next advance beyond refreſhment is to that mirth, which both draws many unguarded ſpeeches from us, and carries us to many indiſcreet actions --which waſtes our time, not barely while we are in the act of drinking, but as it unſettles our heads, and indiſpoſes us to attention, to buſineſs,---to a cloſe application in any way. Soon as our ſpirits are raiſed beyond their juſt pitch, we are for ſchemes of diverſion and pleaſure; we are unfit for ſerious affairs, and therefore cannot entertain a thought of being employed in them.

Beſides, as according to the riſe of our ſpirits, their fall will, afterward, be; it is moſt probable, that when we find them thus ſunk, we ſhall again reſort to what

[a] Απας πονηρος οινος, &c. Semper malum eſt vinum, quod multum eſt. PHILEM. Frag.

we

we have experienced the remedy of ſuch a complaint; and thereby be betrayed, if not into the exceſſes, which deprive us of our reaſon, yet into ſuch a habit of drinking, as occaſions the loſs of many precious hours ---impairs our health---is a great miſapplication of our fortune, and a moſt ruinous example to our obſervers. But, indeed, whence is it to be feared, that we ſhall become downright ſots---that we ſhall contract a habit of drinking to the moſt diſguiſing exceſs; whence, I ſay, is this to be feared, if not from accuſtoming ourſelves to the frequent draughts, which neither our thirſt---nor fatigue---nor conſtitution requires: by frequently uſing them, our inclination to them is ſtrengthened;[a] 'til at length we cannot prevail upon ourſelves to leave our cup, while we are in a condition to lift it.

Theſe are objections, in which all are concern'd, whoſe refreſhment, from what they drink, is not their rule in it; but to men of moderate fortunes, or who are to

[a] Hæc neceſſitas vitium comitatur, ut bibendi conſuetudo augeat aviditatem. PLIN. l. 14.

make their fortunes, other arguments are to be uſed: theſe perſons are to conſider, that even the leſſer degree of intemperance, now cenſured, is generally their utter undoing, thro' that neglect of their affairs, which is its neceſſary conſequence. When we mind not our own buſineſs, whom can we think likely to mind it for us? Very few, certainly, will be met with, *diſpoſed* and *able* to do it; and not to be both, is much the ſame, as to be neither. While we are paſſing our time with our chearful companions, we are not only loſing the advantages, which care and induſtry, either in inſpecting our affairs, or purſuing our employment, would have afforded us; but we are actually conſuming our fortune — we are habituating ourſelves to a moſt expenſive idleneſs — we are contracting a diſinclination to *fatigue* and *confinement*, even when we muſt become ſenſible of their neceſſity, when our affairs muſt run into the utmoſt confuſion without them. And we, in fact, perceive that, as ſoon as as the ſcholar, or trader, or artificer, or whoever it is, that has the whole of his maintenance to gain, or has not much to ſpend, addicts himſelf only to this lower degree of intem-

intemperance — accuſtoms himſelf to ſit long at his wine, and to exceed that quantity of it which his relief demands, he becomes worthleſs in a double ſenſe, as deſerving nothing, and, if a care greater than his own ſave him not, as having nothing.

Add to all this, that the very ſame diſeaſes, which may be apprehended from often intoxicating ourſelves, are the uſual attendants not ónly *of frequently drinking* to the full of what we can conveniently bear, but even of doing it in a large quantity. The only difference is, that ſuch diſeaſes come more ſpeedily on us from the former, than the latter cauſe; and, perhaps, deſtroy us ſooner. But how deſireable it is to be long ſtruggling with any of the diſtempers, which our exceſſes occaſion, they can beſt determine, who labour under them.

The inconveniences of but the freer uſe of the very leaſt hurtful of any ſpirituous liquors have ſo evidently appear'd — have ſhewn themſelves ſo many and ſo great, as even to call for a remedy from the law itſelf; which, therefore, puniſhes both thoſe,

who loiter away their time at their cups, and thoſe who ſuffer it to be done in their houſes.

A great part of the world, a much greater than all the parts added together, in which the Chriſtian religion is profeſſed, are forbidden all manner of *liquors* which can cauſe *drunkenneſs*; they are not allowed *the ſmalleſt quantity of them*; and it would be an offence which would receive the moſt rigorous chaſtiſement, if they were *known* to uſe *any*; their Lawgiver has, in this particular, been thought to have acted according to the rules of good policy; and the Governors of thoſe countries, in which this law is in force, have, from its firſt reception amongſt them, found it of ſuch benefit, as to allow no relaxation of it. I do not mention ſuch a practice as any rule for us: Difference of climates makes quite different ways of living neceſſary: I only mention it as a leſſon to us, that, if ſo great a part of mankind ſubmit to a total abſtinence from *wine and ſtrong drink*, we ſhould uſe them ſparingly, with caution and moderation; which is, certainly, neceſſary to *our* welfare, whatever may be the effect of entirely forbearing them on theirs.

In

In the moſt admired of all the weſtern Governments, a ſtrict ſobriety was required of their women [a] under the very ſevereſt penalties: the puniſhment of a departure from it was nothing leſs than capital: and the cuſtom of ſaluting women, we are told [b], was introduced in order to diſcover whether any ſpirituous liquor had been drank by them.

In this commonwealth the men were prohibited to drink wine 'til they had attained thirty years [c].

The whole body of ſoldiery, among this people, had no other draught to enable them

[a] Si vinum bibit, ſi cum alieno viro probri quid fecit, condemnatur. CATO apud A. Gel. l. 10.

[b] Non licebat id (vinum) feminis Romæ bibere.——Cato ſcripſit ideo propinquos feminis oſculum dare, ut ſcirent an temetum olerent. PLIN. l. 14. To the ſame purpoſe, *Athenæus* cites *Polybius*, l. 10.

[c] Παρα Ρωμαιοις ουτε οικετης, &c. Apud Romanos nec famuli nec ingenuæ mulieres vinum bibunt, atque adeo nec adoleſcentes ingenui ante trigeſimum annum. ATHEN. l. 10. 429.

*Ælian* ſays that men of Rank did not drink wine 'til their 35th year. L. 2.

to

to bear the greateſt fatigue — to raiſe their courage, and animate them to encounter the moſt terrifying difficulties and dangers, but water ſharpen'd with vinegar [a]. And what was the conſequence of ſuch ſtrict ſobriety, obſerv'd by both ſexes? What was the conſequence of being born of parents ſo exactly temperate, and of being train'd up in a habit of the utmoſt abſtemiouſneſs — What, I ſay, followed upon this, but the attainment of ſuch a firmneſs of body and mind — of ſuch an indifference to all the emaſculating pleaſures—of ſuch vigour and fearleſneſs, that the people, thus born and educated, ſoon made all oppoſition fall before them, experienc'd no enemy a match for them, were conquerors, wherever they carried their arms.

By theſe *remarks* on the temperance of the antient *Romans*, I am not for recalling

[a] Adrianus cibis caſtrenſibus in propatulo utebatur, hoc eſt, Lardo, Caſeo, Poſca. SPARTIAN.

*Plutarch* ſays of *Cato* the elder, — ὕδωρ ἔπινεν ἐπὶ τῆς στρατιᾶς, &c. Potabat in expeditionibus aquam, extra quam, ſi immenſo æſtu ſitiret, tum potabat acetum, aut fatiſcentibus viribus poſtremo loco parum vini ſumebat. PLUT. in Cat. maj.

Caſſius tota vita aquam bibit. SEN.

cuſtoms

cuſtoms ſo quite the reverſe of thoſe, in which we were brought up; but ſome change in our manners I could heartily wiſh they might effect: and if not induce us to the ſame ſobriety, which was practiſed by theſe heathens, yet to a much greater than is practiſed by the generality of Chriſtians.

ON

# ON

# PLEASURE.

Accipite—veterem orationem Architæ Tarentini, magni in primis, & præclari viri: quæ mihi tradita eſt, cum eſſem adoleſcens Tarenti cum Q. Maximo. Nullam capitaliorem peſtem, quam Corporis voluptatem hominibus dicebat à natura datam: cujus voluptatis avidæ libidines, temerè, & effrenatè ad potiundum incitarentur. Hinc patriæ proditiones, hinc rerum publicarum everſiones, hinc cum hoſtibus clandeſtina colloquia naſci: nullum denique ſcelus, nullum malum facinus eſſe, ad quod ſuſcipiendum non libido voluptatis impelleret: ſtupra vero, & adulteria, & omne tale flagitium, nullis aliis illecebris excitari, niſi voluptatis. Cumque homini ſive natura, ſive quis Deus nihil mente præſtabilius dediſſet; huic divino muneri ac dono nihil eſſe tam inimicum, quam voluptatem. TUL. de Senect.

# ON

# PLEASURE.

Accipite—veterem orationem Architæ Tarentini, magni in primis, & præclari viri: quæ mihi tradita est, cum essem adolescens Tarenti cum Q. Maximo. Nullam capitaliorem pestem, quam Corporis voluptatem hominibus dicebat à natura datam: cujus voluptatis avidæ libidines, temerè, & effrenatè ad potiendum incitarentur. Hinc patriæ proditiones, hinc rerum publicarum eversiones, hinc cum hostibus clandestina colloquia nasci: nullum denique scelus, nullum malum facinus esse, ad quod suscipiendum non libido voluptatis impelleret: stupra vero, & adulteria, & omne tale flagitium, mortis aliis illecebris excitari, nisi voluptatis. Cumque homini sive natura, sive quis Deus nihil mente præstabilius dedisset; huic divino muneri ac dono nihil esse tam inimicum, quam voluptatem. Tusc. de Senect.

# ON PLEASURE.

## SECT. I.

To the Honourable ——

WHILE you are laid out on the purſuit of knowledge, or in making what you have acquired of uſe to your fellow-creatures — while information is *your* amuſement, and to become wiſer is as much your aim in all the company you keep, as in all the books you read; May I not juſtly think it matter of aſtoniſhment to you, that ſuch numbers of your ſpecies ſhould be quite unmindful of all rational improvement — ſolely intent on ſchemes of mirth and diverſion—paſſing their lives in a round of ſporting and trifling.

If

If every age has its madneſs, and one is diſtinguiſhed by its warlike humour, a ſecond by its Enthuſiaſm, a third by its party and political rage; the diſtraction of the preſent may truly be pronounced, its turn to pleaſure, ſo ſadly poſſeſſing thoſe of each ſex and of all ages — thoſe of every profeſſion and employment—the ſeveral ranks and orders of men, that they who are ſtrangers to the ſudden changes in human diſpoſitions are apt to think, that all ſerioufneſs and application — all the valuable attainments, which are the reward only of our pains, muſt, inevitably, be ſoon loſt among us.

I am not out of hopes that what thus threatens, in the opinion of ſome, our ſpeedy ruin, and has its very great miſchief denied by none, who give it the leaſt attention, will one day receive as remarkable an oppoſition from your *pen*, as it now does a diſcouragement from your *example*.

Let, in the mean time, a ſincere well-wiſher to his countrymen interpoſe his mean endeavours to ſerve them — offer to their conſideration ſome, perhaps, not wholly contemptible, arguments againſt the purſuit to which

which they are ſo blameably attached — ſhew them pleaſure in that true light in which they are unwilling to ſee it --- teach them, not that it ſhould be always declin'd, but that they ſhould never be enſlaved to it--- repreſent the dangers to which it expoſes them, yet point out how far it may be enjoy'd with innocence and ſafety.

Every man ſeems to be ſo far free as he can diſpoſe of himſelf --- as he can maintain a due ſubordination in the parts of his frame, uſe the deliberation proper to acquaint him with what is moſt for his advantage, and according to the reſult thereof proceed to action. I conſider each hindrance to the knowledge of our true happineſs, or to its purſuit, as, according to its degree, an abridgment of our liberty; and I think that he may be truly ſtiled a ſlave to pleaſure, who follows it, whereſoever directed to it by appetite, paſſion, or fancy. When we liſten to their ſuggeſtions in the choice of Good, we allow them an authority that our Creator never intended they ſhould have; and when their directions in that choice are actually complied with, a

lawleſs ſway enſues—the uſe of our nobler faculties becomes obſtructed—our ability to deliberate, as we ought, on our conduct gradually fails, and to alter it, at length, wholly ceaſes.

Our ſenſual and rational parts are almoſt in continual oppoſition: we add to the power of the former by a thoughtleſs, idle, voluptuous life, and to the latter by reflection, induſtry, continence.

As you cannot give way to appetite, but you increaſe its reſtleſsneſs, you multiply its demands, and become leſs able to reſiſt them; ſo the very ſame holds true of every principle that oppoſes reaſon: if capable to influence you in one inſtance, it will more eaſily do it in a ſecond, gaining ground 'til its dominion over you becomes abſolute.

When the queſtion concerns our angry paſſions, all are ready to acknowledge the danger of not reſtraining them, the terrible ſubjection to which ſuch remiſſneſs expoſes us. Theſe falling more under the general notice, from the apparency of the diſorder, and extent of the miſchief which they occaſion, a better judgment is ordinarily

narily made of them, than of affections leſs tumultuous, leſs dangerous to our aſſociates: but there can be no reaſon imaginable why Anger, if leſs carefully watched and reſiſted, ſhould exerciſe, at length, the moſt unhappy tyranny over us, which will not hold as to any paſſion or luſt whatſoever. And as with reſpect to violent reſentment, we are ready to gratify it whatever it coſts us; ſo let what will be the paſſion or luſt that governs us, no prudential conſiderations are a counterpoiſe for it.

With regard to Pleaſure, the fallacy of our reaſoning upon it lies here; we always look upon the enjoyment of it as a ſingle act, as a compliance with our liking in this or that inſtance: the repetition of that indulgence is not ſeen under a dependence on any former, or under the leaſt connexion with any future. That ſuch a purſuit ſhould engage us ſeems to be wholly from our choice; and this choice is thought to be as free at the ſecond time of our making it as at the firſt, and at the twentieth as at the ſecond. Inclination is never beheld as poſſible to become conſtraint—is, I mean, never regarded as capable of being indulged

'til it cannot be reſiſted.[a] No man ever took the road of Pleaſure, but he apprehended that he could eaſily leave it: had he conſidered his whole life likely to be paſſed in its windings, the preference of the ways of Virtue would have been indiſputable.

But as ſenſual purſuits could not engage ſo many, if ſomething very delightful were not expected in them; it will be proper to ſhew how unlikely they are to anſwer ſuch an expectation—what there is to diſcourage us from attaching ourſelves to them.

Conſider ſenſual pleaſure under the higheſt poſſible advantages, it will yet be found liable to theſe objections.

*Firſt*, That its *Enjoyment* is fleeting, expires ſoon, extends not beyond a few moments:[b] Our ſpirits ſink inſtantly un-

[a] Voluptatibus ſe immergunt, quibus in conſuetudinem adductis carere non poſſunt: & ob hoc miſerrimi ſunt, quod eo perveniunt, ut illis quæ ſupervacanea fuerant, facta ſint neceſſaria. Serviunt itaque voluptatibus ſuis, non fruuntur: & mala ſua, quod malorum ultimum eſt, amant. SEN. Ep. 39.

[b] Ομολογουσι αυτοι, &c. Fatentur ultro (Epicurei) voluptatem corporis exiguam eſſe atque momentaneam. PLUT.

der

der it, if in a higher degree; nor are they long without being depreſſed, when it leſs powerfully affects them. A review here affords me no comfort: I have here nothing delightful to expect from Reflection. The gratifications in which I have allowed myſelf have made me neither wiſer nor better. The fruit reliſh'd while upon my tongue, but when paſſed thence I ſcarcely retain the idea of its flavour. [a]

How tranſitory our pleaſures are, we cannot but acknowledge, when we conſider, how many we, in different parts of our lives, eagerly purſue, and then wholly decline.

That which is the high *entertainment* of our Infancy, doth not afford us the leaſt when this ſtate is paſſed: What then delights us much in our Youth, is quite taſteleſs to us as we approach Manhood; and our engagements at this period give way to ſome others as we advance in age.

Nor do our pleaſures thus paſs only with our years, but, really, thoſe which beſt ſuit

[a] Ουδὲ τοις εκπεπληγμενοις, &c. Iſtis, qui attoniti corporeas mirantur magnique faciunt voluptates, his finitis, non remanet delectatio. PLUT.

our time of life, and on the pursuit of which we are most intent, must be interrupted in order to be enjoyed.

We can no more long bear pleasure, than we can long endure fatigue; or, rather, what we call pleasure, after some continuance becomes fatigue.

We want relief in our diversions, as well as in our most serious employments.

When *Socrates* had observed, " of how " unaccountable a nature that thing is " which men call Pleasure, since, though " it may appear to be contrary to Pain, as " never being with it in the same Person, " yet they so closely follow each other, " that they may seem linked, as it were, " together:" He then adds—" If *Esop* had " attended to this, he would, I think, have " given us a fable, in which the Divinity, " willing to reconcile these two enemies, " but yet unable to do it, had, neverthe- " less, so connected them in their extre- " mities, that where the one comes, the " other shall be sure to succeed it." [a]

[a] Αναμεμικται πανταχου, &c. Ubique voluptati mœror adhæret, alterumque extemplo imbutum est altero; ut necesse

From

From the excess of Joy, how usual is the transition to that of Dejection! Laughter, as well as grief, calls for tears to ease us under it; and it may be even more dangerous to my life to be immoderately delighted, than to be severely afflicted. [a]

Our pleasures then soon pass; and, *secondly*, their repetition certainly cloys.

As the easiness of posture and agreeableness of place wear off by a very short contiuance in either; it is the same with any sensual gratifications which we can pursue, and with every enjoyment of that kind to which we can apply. [b] What so delights our palate, that we should relish it, if it were our constant food? What juice has

sit, alterum si eligas, alterum extemplo quoque contingat tibi. MAXIM. TYR.

[a] Τους πονους υπομενει μαλλον, &c. Magis perfert (corpus) dolores quam voluptates: præditumque adversus illos robore ac viribus, in his imbecillum est. PLUT.

[b] Gustatus, qui est sensus ex omnibus maxime voluptarius, quique dulcitudine præter ceteros sensus commovetur, quam cito id, quod valde dulce est, aspernatur & respuit? Quis potione uti, aut cibo dulci, diutius potest?——Omnibus in rebus voluptatibus maximis fastidium finitimum est. CIC. de Orat.

Nature furniſhed, that, after being a frequent, continues to be a pleaſing, draught? Sounds, how artfully ſoever blended or ſucceſſive, tire at length the ear; and odours, at firſt the moſt grateful, ſoon either ceaſe to recreate us, or become offenſive to us. The fineſt proſpect gives no entertainment to the eye that has been long accuſtomed to it. The pile, that ſtrikes with admiration each caſual beholder, affords its royal inhabitant no comfort, but what the peaſant has in his cottage.

That love of variety and change, to which none of our kind are ſtrangers, might be a leſſon to us where our expectations are ill grounded, where they muſt neceſſarily be diſappointed;[a] for if no man ever yet lived

[a] Circumſpice tot millia hominum inquieta; qui, ut aliquid peſtiferi conſequantur, per mala nituntur in malum, petuntque mox fugienda, aut etiam faſtidienda: Cui enim aſſecuto ſatis fuit, quod optanti nimium videbatur?

SEN. Ep. 118.

Ουδεν τουτων περιλαβοι, &c. Nihil horum eſt, cui fines ſuos aſſignarit Deus aut limites, non Divitiæ, non Voluptas, &c. ——ſed infinita eſt eorum poſſeſſio, ut qui ea ſequuntur maxime, voti ſi fiant compotes, ſitiant maxime; minus enim eſt quicquid conſecuti ſunt, eo quod expectant.

MAX. TYR. Diſſ. 7.

who

who could ſay of any of the pleaſures of ſenſe — On this I repoſe myſelf — it quite anſwers my hopes from it — my wiſhes rove not beyond it: if none could ever affirm this, it is moſt evident, that we in vain ſearch after permanent delight from any of the objects with which we are now converſant — that the only difference between the ſatisfactions we purſue, and thoſe we quit, is, that we are already tired of the one, and ſhall ſoon be of the other.

Hear the language of him who had tried the extent of every ſenſual pleaſure, and muſt have found the uncloying, had any ſuch exiſted. "I ſaid in my heart, Go to "now, I will prove thee with mirth. I "gave myſelf to wine, I made me great "works, I builded me houſes, I planted "me vineyards, I made me gardens, I "planted trees in them of all kinds of "fruit. I made me pools of water, I "amaſſed gold and ſilver, I had poſſeſſions "above all that were in *Jeruſalem* before "me. I tried what love, what muſic, "what all the delights of the ſons of men "could effect: Whatſoever mine eyes de-"ſired I kept not from them, I with-held

"not

" not my heart from any joy. Then I " looked on all my works, on all my pur- " ſuits, and behold all was vanity and vex- " ation of ſpirit."[a]

*Tully* mentions *Xerxes* as having propoſed a reward to the man who could make known to him ſome new pleaſure.[b] The Monarch of the Eaſt, it ſeems, met with nothing within the bounds of his mighty Empire that could fix his inclinations. The moſt voluptuous people on earth had diſcovered no delight that their Sovereign could acknowledge otherwiſe than ſuperficial. Happy! had it been a leſſon to their Prince, or could it be one to us, where our good ſhould be ſought, what purſuits were likely to bring us bleſſings certain to improve, as well as endure.

[a] See Eccleſ. ii.

[b] Tuſc. Quæſt. L. V. *Plutarch*, in his *Sympoſiacs*, L. I. mentions this as done by an *Aſſyrian* King, but doth not name him. *Lampridius* ſays of *Heliogabalus*, *Nec erat ei ulla vita niſi exquirere novas voluptates:* and afterwards—*Proponebat his quaſi themata, ut jura nova dapibus condiendis invenirent: cujus placuiſſet inventum, ei dabat maximum præmium.*

SECT.

## SECT. II.

A *Third* diſadvantage enſuing to us from our attachment to the delights which appetite and fancy purvey, is, that it indiſpoſes us for uſeful enquiries,[a] for every endeavour worthy of our nature, and ſuiting the relations in which we are placed.[b]

The diſappointment which the *Perſian* Emperor met with in all his ſchemes of the voluptuous kind, did not put him on applying to thoſe of a different one. Experience ſhew'd him his folly, but could not

[a] Εμποδιον τω φρονειν αι ηδοναι, &c. Impedimento eſt voluptas quo minus ſapias; eoque magis, quo major eſt, ut Veneris. ARISTOT. Ethic. Lib. VII.

Impedit conſilium voluptas, rationi inimica; ac mentis, ut dicam, præſtringit oculos. CIC. de Senect.

[b] Εκ των Επικουρου λογων, &c. Ex Epicuri decretis non dicam quis tyrannicida, quis eximiam rebus agendis laudem meritus, quis Legumlator exſtitit——ſed, quiſnam ſapientum iſtorum propter patriam navigavit—ſumptus fecit? PLUT. adv. Colot.

teach

teach him wiſdom — It could not, when it had convinced him of the vanity of his purſuits, induce him to relinquiſh them.

We find a *Solomon*, indeed, diſcovering his error, acknowledging that he had erred, and bearing teſtimony to religion and virtue as alone productive of true happineſs; but where are we to look for another among the votaries to ſenſuality, thus affected, thus changed?

As ſome have obſerved of *Courts*, that ſuch who live in them are always uneaſy there, yet always unwilling to retreat; the very ſame holds true of the licentious practice which they too generally countenance: fully convinced of its vanity and folly, we continue to our laſt moments attached to it — averſe from altering the conduct which we cannot but diſapprove. Our faculties are, indeed, ſo conſtituted, that our capacity for many enjoyments extends not beyond ſuch a period in our being: if we will not quit them, they will us — will depart, whatever our eagerneſs may be for their continuance. But let us not deceive ourſelves: when they are gone as to their

ſenſe,

ſenſe, they are not as to their power. He who ſays to his youth, Eat, drink, and be merry—who thinks of nothing elſe at that ſeaſon, will hanker after delicacies when he has neither teeth to chew, nor palate to diſtinguiſh them; will want the cup which he cannot lift, and ſeek for mirth when he will thereby become the object of it. The habit operates, when none of the inducements for our contracting it remain; and when the days of pleaſure are paſt, thoſe of wiſdom and virtue are not the nearer. Our diſpoſitions do not decay with our ſtrength. The prudence, which ſhould attend grey hairs, doth not neceſſarily come to us with them. The young rake is a laſcivious obſcene wretch when he owes his warmth to his flannel; delights in the filthy tale when his hearers are almoſt poiſoned by the breath with which he utters it; and when leaſt able to offend in act, he does it in deſire.

That the humour for fighting or racing, or whatever inclination governed us in this world, accompanies us to the other, is not an

an entire fiction of the Poet, * but, aſſuredly, has thus much truth in it, that whatever humour we indulge, it accompanies us to the cloſe of life. There is a time when our manners are pliant, when the counſels of the ſober operate upon us as ſucceſsfully as the inſinuations of the corrupt; but when that time is paſſed, our cuſtoms are, daily, working themſelves into our *conſtitution*, and want not many years to become ſcarce diſtinguiſhable from it. God, I am perſuaded, has formed us all with ſuch apprehenſions of what is right, as, if a proper care were taken to preſerve and improve them, would have the happieſt influence upon our practice; but when the ſeaſon for extending this care to them has been neglected, they are in moſt of us greatly impaired, and in ſome appear almoſt wholly loſt.

Let the *underſtanding* remain uninformed 'til half the age of man is paſt, and what

* ——— ——— ——— Quæ gratia currûm
Armorumque fuit vivis, quæ cura nitentes
Paſcere equos, eadem ſequitur tellure repoſtos.
ÆNEID. L. VI.

*improve-*

*improvement* is the beſt then likely to make? how irkſom would it ſeem to be put upon any? It is with our will the very ſame; turned for half or three parts of our life to ſloth and wantonneſs, to riot and exceſs, any correction of it, any alteration to the purſuits becoming us, may ſeem quite hopeleſs. While we are devoting ourſelves to pleaſure, we are weakening every principle whereby virtue can engage us, we are extinguiſhing within us all ſenſe of true deſert —ſubduing conſcience—diveſting ourſelves of ſhame—corrupting our natural notions of good and evil; and ſo indiſpoſing ourſelves for conſideration, that our conſtant endeavour will be to decline it. Thus when our *follies* are a *burden* to us, their correction ſeems a greater; and we try what eaſe may be found by varying, rather than ſeek any from quitting, them.

*Fourthly*, The larger our ſhare is of outward enjoyments, and the dearer they are to us; ſo much the more afflicting our concern will be to *leave* this *Scene* of them — ſo much the greater terror and torment ſhall we

we receive from the apprehenſion how ſoon we may be obliged to do it.

Let the man of pleaſure colour it the moſt agreeably, place it in the faireſt point of view, this objection will remain in its full ſtrength againſt him: "You are not maſter "of the continuance of the good of which "you boaſt, and can you avoid thinking of "its removal, or bear the thoughts thereof "with any calmneſs and compoſure?" But what kind of happineſs is that, which we are in hourly fears of loſing, and which when loſt is gone for ever?

If I am here only for a few days, the part I ought to act is, certainly, that of a traveller on his journey, taking up with ſuch conveniences as the road offers him, but ſtill regarding himſelf as upon his road —never ſo incumbring himſelf that he ſhall be unwilling to advance, when he knows he muſt do it—never ſo diverting himſelf at any reſting place, that it ſhall be painful to him to depart thence.

When we are accuſtomed to derive all our comforts from ſenſe, we come to want the very idea of any other: this momentary

part

part of our exiſtence is the full extent we give to our joys; and we have the mortifying reflection continually before us, that their concluſion is nearer every hour we are here, and may poſſibly take place the very next. Thus each acceſſion of delight will really be but a new ſource of affliction, become an additional motive for complaint of the ſhort ſpace allowed for its enjoyment.

The mind of man is ſo diſpoſed to look forward, ſo fitted to extend its views, that, as much as it is contracted by ſenſuality, it cannot be fixed thereby to the inſtant moment: We can never, like the beaſts, be ſo far engroſſed by the ſatisfaction before us, but the thoughts will occur, how often may we hope to repeat it—how many diſtant hours is it likely to relieve---how much of our duration can it advantage? and the ſcanty continuance which our moſt ſanguine hopes can aſſign it, muſt, therefore, be in ſome degree its abatement—muſt be an ingredient in our draught ſure to embitter the many pleaſing ones which compound it. And what a wiſe part are we then acting, when we are taking the

brutes portion for ours, and cannot have all the benefits even of that! cannot remove the inconveniences of reaſon, when we forego its comforts!

Theſe are ſome of the many diſadvantages inſeparable from pleaſure, and from the expectation of which none of its votaries are exempt. We cannot attach ourſelves to any of the delights which appetite or fancy provides, but we ſhall be ſure to find them quickly paſſing — when repeated, cloying — indiſpoſing us for worthy purſuits — rendering us averſe to quit the world, and uneaſy as often as it occurs to our thoughts, how ſoon our ſummons may be to depart.

SECT.

## SECT. III.

BUT what, you'll ſay, muſt all then commence Philoſophers? Muſt every gay amuſement be baniſh'd the world? Muſt thoſe of each ſex and of all ages have their looks ever in form, and their manners under the regulation of the ſevereſt wiſdom? Has nature given us propenſities only to be reſiſted? Have we ears to diſtinguiſh harmony, and are we never to delight them with it? Is the food, which our palate beſt reliſhes, to be therefore denied it? Can odours recreate our brain, beauty pleaſe our eye, and the deſign of their ſtructure be, that we ſhould exclude all agreeable ſenſation from either? Are not natural inclinations nature's commands; are they not its declarations whence we may obtain our good, and its injunctions to ſeek it thence? Is any thing more evi-

dent, than that ſerious applications cannot long be ſuſtained—that we muſt ſink under their weight—that they ſoon ſtupify or diſtract us? The exerciſe of our intellectual part is the fatigue of our corporeal, and cannot be carried on but by allowing us intervals of relaxation and mirth. Deny us pleaſure, and you unfit us for buſineſs; and deſtroy the man, while you thus ſeek to perfect him.

A full anſwer might, I ſhould think, be given to whatever is here alledged, by enlarging on the following obſervations.

1. Pleaſure is only ſo far cenſured, as it coſts us more than it is worth—as it brings on a degree of uneaſineſs, for which it doth not compenſate.

2. It is granted, that we are licenſed to take all that pleaſure which there is no reaſon for our declining. So much *true Pleaſure*, or ſo much Pleaſure as is not counterbalanced by any inconveniences attending it, is ſo much happineſs accruing to him who takes it, and a part of that general good which our Creator deſign'd us.

3. As

3. As the inclinations, with which Mankind were originally formed, were, certainly, very different from thoſe which Guilt has ſince propagated; *many Reſtraints* muſt, therefore, be neceſſary, which would not have been ſo, had our primitive Rectitude been preſerved.

4. Bad education, bad example, increaſe greatly our natural depravity, before we come to reaſon at all upon it; and give the appearance of good to many things which would be ſeen in a quite different light under a different education and intercourſe.

Theſe particulars let it ſuffice barely to mention; ſince, as it is here admitted, that when there is no Reaſon for our declining any pleaſure, there is one for our taking it, I am more eſpecially concerned to ſhew, when there is a Reaſon why pleaſure ſhould be declined—what thoſe limits are which ought to be preſcribed to our pleaſures, and which when any, in themſelves the moſt innocent, paſs, they neceſſarily become immoral and culpable. A minute diſcuſſion of this point is not here propoſed: ſuch obſervations

ſervations only will be made upon it, as appear to be of more general uſe, and of greateſt importance.

What I would, firſt, conſider as rendering any pleaſure blameable is,

When it raiſes our Paſſions.

As our greateſt danger is from them, their regulation claims our conſtant attention and care. *Human Laws* conſider them in their effects, but the *Divine Law* in their aim and intention. To render me obnoxious to men, it is neceſſary that my impure luſt be gratified, or an attempt be made to gratify it; that my anger operate by violence, my covetouſneſs by knavery: but my duty is violated when my heart is impure, when my rage extends not beyond my looks and my wiſhes, when I invade my neighbour's property but in deſire. The man is guilty the moment his affections become ſo, the inſtant that any diſhoneſt thought finds him approving and indulging it.

The enquiry, therefore, what is a fit amuſement, ſhould always be preceded by the

the conſideration of what is our diſpoſition. For, it is not greater madneſs to ſuppoſe, that equal quantities of food or liquor may be taken by all with equal temperance, than to aſſert, that the ſame pleaſure may be uſed by all with the ſame innocence. As, in the former caſe, what barely ſatisfies the ſtomach of one, would be a load inſupportable to that of another; and the draught, that intoxicates me, may ſcarcely refreſh my companion: ſo in the latter, an amuſement perfectly warrantable to this ſort of conſtitution, will to a different become the moſt criminal. What liberties are allowable to the calm, that muſt not be thought of by the choleric! How ſecurely may the cold and phlegmatic roam, where he who has greater warmth and ſenſibility ſhould not approach! What ſafety attends the contemner of gain, where the moſt fatal ſnares await the avaritious! Some *leſs governable paſſion* is to be found in them whoſe reſolution is ſteadieſt, and virtue firmeſt: upon *that* a conſtant guard muſt be kept; any relaxation, any indulgence here, is often an advantage given it, which is never to be retrieved. While all is quiet and com-

poſed within us, the diſcharge of our duty puts us to little trouble, the performance thereof is not the heavy taſk that ſo many are willing to repreſent it: but to reſtore order and peace is a work very different from preſerving them, and is often with the utmoſt difficulty effected. It is with the natural body, as with the politic; rebellion in the members is much eaſier prevented than quell'd; confuſion once enter'd, none can foreſee to what lengths it may proceed, or of how wide a ruin it may be productive.

What, likewiſe, renders any pleaſure culpable is its making a large, or an unſeaſonable demand upon our Time.

No one is to live to himſelf, and much leſs to confine his care to but one, and that the worſt, part of himſelf. Man's proper employment is to cultivate right diſpoſitions in his own breaſt, and to benefit his ſpecies — to perfect himſelf, and to be of as much uſe in the world, as his faculties and opportunities, will permit. The ſatisfactions of ſenſe are never to be purſued for their own ſake: their enjoyment is none of our

end

end [a], is not the purpoſe for which God has created us; amuſe, refreſh us it may, but when it buſies, when it chiefly engages us, we act directly contrary to the deſign for which we were formed, making that our *care*, which was only intended to be our *relief*.

Some, deſtitute of the neceſſaries, others, of the conveniences of life, are called to labour, to commerce, to literary application in order to obtain them; and any remiſſneſs of theſe perſons in their reſpective employments or profeſſions, any purſuit inconſiſtent with a due regard to their maintenance, meets ever with the harſheſt cenſure, is univerſally branded as a failure in common prudence and diſcretion: But what is this animal life in compariſon with that to which we are raiſed by following the dictates of reaſon and conſcience? How deſpicable may the man continue, when all the affluence to which his wiſhes aſpire is obtained!

[a] Voluptatem beſtiis concedamus, aliud aliquid hominis ſummum bonum reperiendum eſt. TUL. de fin.

Voluptas humilis res & puſilla eſt, & in nullo habenda pretio, communis cum mutis animantibus, ad quam minima & contemptiſſima advolat. SEN. Ep. 123.

Can

Can it then be ſo indiſcreet a part, to follow *pleaſure* when we ſhould mind our *fortune?* do all ſo clearly ſee the blame of this? And may we doubt how guilty that attachment to it is, which lays waſte our underſtanding --- which entails on us ignorance and error --- which renders us even more uſeleſs than the beings whom inſtinct alone directs? All capacity for improvement is evidently a call to it. The neglect of our powers is their abuſe; and the ſlight of *them* is that of their giver. Whatever talents we have received we are to account for: And it is not from revelation alone that we learn this: No moral truth commands more ſtrongly our aſſent, than, that the qualifications beſtowed upon us, are afforded us in order to our cultivating them--- to our obtaining from them the advantages they can yield us; and that foregoing ſuch advantages, we become obnoxious to him who deſigned us them, as we miſapply his gift, and knowingly oppoſe his will. For, the fureſt token we can have, that any perfections ought to be purſued, is, that they may

may be attained: our ability to acquire them is the voice of God within us to endeavour after them. And would we but aſk ourſelves the queſtion, Did the Creator raiſe us above the herd, and doth he allow us to have no aims nobler than thoſe of the herd---to make its engagements the whole of ours? We could not poſſibly miſtake in the anſwer. All who have reaſon given them, know that they may and ought to improve it, ought to cultivate it at ſome ſeaſons, and ever to conform to it.

Greater privileges call us but to more important cares. You are not placed above your fellow-creatures, you have not the leiſure which they want, that you may be more idle and worthleſs, may devote more of your time to vanity and folly, but that you may become more eminent in the perfections you acquire, and the good you do. He who has all his hours at command, is to conſider himſelf as favoured with thoſe opportunities to increaſe in wiſdom and virtue, which are vouchſafed to few; if no good effect follows; if he has them, but to miſapply

miſapply them; his guilt is, according to what his advantage might have been.

The diſpenſations of heaven are not ſo unequal, as that ſome are appointed to the heavieſt toil for their ſupport, and others left to the free, unconſtrained enjoyment of whatever gratifications their fancy ſuggeſts. The diſtinction between us is not that of much buſineſs and none at all; it is not, that I may live as I can, and you as you pleaſe; a different employment conſtitutes it. The mechanic has his part aſſigned him, the ſcholar his, the wealthy and powerful theirs; each has his taſk to perform, his talent to improve,—has barely ſo much time for his pleaſure as is neceſſary for recruiting himſelf — as is conſiſtent with habitual ſerioufneſs, and may rather qualify than interrupt it.

We are furniſhed with numerous arguments why the graver occupations ſhould be remitted — why the humour for gaiety and mirth ſhould be allowed its place; and no man in his right mind ever taught the contrary.

contrary [a]. Let the delights of ſenſe have their ſeaſon, but let them ſtand confined to it; the ſame abſurdity follows the exceſs on either ſide, our never uſing, and our never quitting them.

Be not *over wiſe*, is an excellent Rule; but it is a Rule full as good, and much more wanted,—That *ſome wiſdom* ſhould be ſought — That dreſs and diverſion ſhould not take up all our hours—That more time ſhould not be ſpent in adorning our perſons, than in improving our minds — That the beautified Sepulchre ſhould not be our exact reſemblance, much ſhew and ornament without, and within nothing but ſtench and rottenneſs — That barely to paſs our time ſhould not be all the account we make of

[a] Παιζειν οπως σπευδζη κατ' Αναχ. &c. Ludere, ut res ſerias gerere poſſis, Anacharſidis ſententia æquum eſt. Quoniam enim ludus requieti & ceſſationi ſimilis eſt, quoniamque laborem continenter ferre minime poſſumus, ceſſatione & requiete opus eſt.——Sed beata vita ea eſt quæ ex virtute degitur, quæ eadem profecto ſeria eſt, non in ludo poſita. ARISTOT. Eth. l. 10.

Mihi liber non eſſe videtur, qui non aliquando nihil agit. TUL. de Orat. l. 2.

it,

it, but that ſome profit ſhould be conſulted, as well as ſome delight [a].

## SECT. IV.

AGAIN, no pleaſure can be innocent from which our health is a ſufferer. You are no more to ſhorten your days, than *with one ſtroke to end them*; and we are ſuicides but in a different way, if wantonneſs and luxury be our gradual deſtruction, or deſpair our inſtant. It is ſelf-murder, to take from our continuance here any part of that term to which the due care of ourſelves would have extended it; and our life, probably, falls a more criminal ſacrifice to our voluptuouſneſs, than to our impatience.

[a] Παρατηρητεον τι επιζητει, &c. Obſerva quid natura tua, qua es animal, expoſcat; & hoc, quicquid eſt, concede tibi, niſi natura tua, qua es animal rationale, deterius inde ſe habitura ſit. M. ANTON. de rebus ſuis, l. 10. ſect. 2.

When

When we throw off the load which providence has thought fit to lay upon us, we fail greatly in a proper deference to its wiſdom, in a due ſubmiſſion to its will; but then we have to plead, ſufferings too grievous to be ſuſtained—a diſtreſs too mighty to be contended with; a plea, which can by no means juſtify us; yet how preferable to any that he can alledge, who, in the midſt of all things that can give a reliſh to his being, neglects the preſervation of it—who abuſes the conveniences of life to its waſte, and turns its very comforts to its ruin! Or, could we ſuppoſe our pleaſures diſordering our conſtitution after a manner not likely to contribute to its decay, they would not even then be exempted from guilt: To preſerve yourſelf ſhould not ſolely be your concern, but to maintain your moſt perfect ſtate: Every part and every power of your frame claims your regard; and it is great ingratitude towards him who gave us our faculties, when we *in any wiſe* obſtruct their free uſe. The proper thankfulneſs to God for our life is to be expreſſed by our care about it; both by keeping it, 'til he pleaſes to require it; and by

ſo

ſo preſerving it, that it may be fit for all thoſe purpoſes to which he has appointed it.

Further, the Pleaſure is, undoubtedly, criminal, which is not adapted to our fortune, which either impairs it, or hinders an application of *it* to what has the principal claim upon it.

If actions, otherwiſe the moſt commendable, loſe their merit, when they diſqualify us for continuing them — if generoſity changes its name, when it ſuits not our circumſtances; and even alms are culpable, when by beſtowing them we come to want them—if the very beſt uſes to which we can put our wealth are not ſo to draw off, as to dry the ſtream; we can by no means ſuppoſe, that our amuſements are not to be limited, as by other conſiderations, ſo by this in particular--the Expence which they create: We cannot imagine, that the reſtraints ſhould not lie upon our wantonneſs, which lie upon our beneficence.

Be our poſſeſſions the largeſt, it is but a very ſmall part of them that we have to diſpoſe of as we think fit, on what conduces ſolely to our mirth and diverſion. Great af-

fluence,

fluence, whatever we may account it, is really but a greater truſt; the means committed to us of a more extenſive proviſion for the neceſſities of our fellow-creatures; and when our maintenance — our convenience — an appearance ſuitable to our rank have been conſulted, all that remains is the claim of others, of our family, our friends, our neighbours, of thoſe who are moſt in need of us, and whom we are moſt obliged to aſſiſt.

In the figure we make, in our attendants, table, habit, there may be a very culpable parſimony; but in the expence which has nothing but ſelf-gratification in view, our thrift can never tranſgreſs: Here our abſtinence is the moſt generous and commendable, as it at once qualifies us to relieve the wants of others, and leſſens our own—as it ſets us above the world, at the time that it enables us to be a bleſſing to it.

There is not a nobler quality to diſtinguiſh us, than that of an indifference to ourſelves — a readineſs to forego our own liking for the eaſe and advantage of our

fellow-creatures. And it is but juſtice, indeed, that the conveniences of many ſhould preſcribe to thoſe of one: Whatever his fortune may be, as he owes all the ſervice he has from it to the concurrence of numbers, he ought to make it of benefit to them, and by no means conclude, that what they are not to take from him, they are not to ſhare.

Nor ſhould it be unremarked, that the gratifications beſt ſuited to Nature are of all the cheapeſt: She, like a wiſe parent, has not made thoſe things needful to the well-being of any of us, which are prejudicial to the intereſts of the reſt. We have a large field for enjoyment at little or no charge, and may very allowably exceed the bounds of this; but we ſhould always remember, that the verge of right is the entrance upon wrong—that the indulgence, which goes to the full extent of a lawful expence, approaches too near a criminal one, wholly to avoid it.

Again, Care ſhould be taken that our pleaſures be in Character.

The

The *ſtation* of ſome, the *profeſſion* of others, and an *advanced age* in all, require that we ſhould decline many pleaſures allowable to thoſe of an inferior rank—of a different profeſſion — of much younger years.

Do your *Deciſions* conſtitute the *Law*—does your *Honour* balance the plebeian's *Oath?* how very fitting is it that you ſhould never be ſeen eager on trifles — intent on boyiſh ſports—unbent to the loweſt amuſements of the populace ---- ſolicitous after gratifications which may ſhew that neither your ſagacity is greater, nor your ſcruples fewer than what are found in the very meaneſt of the community![a]

Am I ſet apart to recommend a reaſonable and uſeful life---to repreſent the world as a ſcene of vanity and folly, and propoſe

[a] Ut pulcritudo corporis apta compoſitione membrorum movet oculos, & delectat hoc ipſo, quod inter ſe omnes partes cum quodam lepore conſentiunt: ſic hoc Decorum, quod elucet in vita, movet approbationem eorum quibuſcum vivitur, ordine, & conſtantia, & moderatione dictorum omnium atque factorum.———Pertinet ad omnem honeſtatem hoc, quod dico, Decorum.

TUL. de Off. Lib. I.

the things above as only proper to engage our affections? how ungraceful a figure do I then make, when I join in all the common amuſements---when the world ſeems to delight *me* full as much as my hearers, and the only difference between us is, that their words and actions correſpond, and mine are utterly inconſiſtent!

Have you attained the years which extinguiſh the reliſh of many enjoyments---which bid you expect the ſpeedy concluſion of the few remaining, and ought to inſtruct you in the emptineſs of all thoſe of the ſenſual kind? we expect you ſhould leave them to ſuch who can taſte them better, and who know them leſs. The maſſy veſtment ill becomes you, when you ſink under its weight: the gay Aſſembly, when your dim eyes cannot diſtinguiſh the perſons compoſing it: Your feet ſcarcely ſupport you; attend not, therefore, where the conteſt is, whoſe motions are the gracefulleſt: Fly the repreſentation deſigned to raiſe the mirth of the ſpectators, when you can only remind them of their coffins.

Laſtly,

Laſtly, Every pleaſure ſhould be avoided that is an offence to the ſcrupulous, or a ſnare to the indiſcreet. I ought to have nothing more at heart than my brother's innocence, except my own; and when there are ſo many ways of entertaining ourſelves which admit of no miſconſtruction, why ſhould I chuſe ſuch as afford occaſion for any?

To be able greatly to benefit our fellow-creatures is the happineſs of few, but not to hurt them is in the power of all; and when we cannot do the world much good, we muſt be very unthinking indeed, if we endeavour not to do it the leaſt poſſible miſchief.

How this action will appear, to what interpretation it is liable, ought to be our conſideration in whatever we engage. We are here ſo much intereſted in each other's morals, that, if we looked not beyond our preſent Being, it ſhould never be a point indifferent to us, what notions our conduct may propagate, and for what corruptions it may be made the plea: But profeſſing the doctrine of *Chriſt* as our rule, we can

in nothing more directly oppoſe it, than in taking thoſe liberties by which the virtue of any is endangered. Which of our pleaſures have this pernicious tendency, it will be more proper for my readers to recollect, than for me to deſcribe. To thoſe who are in earneſt I have ſaid enough; to the inſincere more would be fruitleſs. What has been ſaid deſerves, I think, ſome conſideration, and that it may have a ſerious one, is the moſt earneſt wiſh of,

Dear SIR,

*Your*, &c.

ON

# ON

# PUBLIC WORSHIP.

Ουχ ορας οτι τα πολυχρονιωτατα και σοφωτατα, &c. Nonne vides quod illæ civitates ac gentes maxime Deos colunt, quæ vetuſtiſſimæ ſapientiſſimæque ſunt? Ætatum quoque illa piiſſima, quæ prudentiſſima etiam eſt.

XENOPH. de dict. & fact. Socr. L. I.

Haud ſcio, an pietate erga Deos ſublata, fides etiam, & ſocietas humani generis, & una excellentiſſima virtus juſtitia tollatur. CIC. de Nat. Deor. Lib. I.

Virum bonum concedas neceſſe eſt ſummæ pietatis erga Deos eſſe. SEN. Ep. 76.

ON

# PUBLIC WORSHIP.

SIR,

IT was with much concern, that I lately heard what an alteration your gay companions had made in you, and what your neglect now was of all public worſhip.

This neglect is, really, ſo *Indecent*,

Is ſo very *Imprudent*,

Is ſo *Contrary* to the *maxims* of the *wiſeſt Heathen*,

Is ſo expreſſive of direct *Atheiſm*,

Is ſo extenſively and greatly *miſchievous*; that, I ſhould think, if you duly conſidered it, you could not ſuffer it to be any longer your reproach.

I. I may

I. I may well be allow'd to call it--*Indecent*,

As it is by no means conſiſtent with *good manners*;

As it is an open breach of the *Laws* of your Country;

As it is an avowed contempt of the *Religion* of your Country.

1. According to the Rules of *good manners*, we ſhould comply with the cuſtomary practice, in whatever it is juſtifiable.

Singularity is mere Perverſeneſs, or fooliſh Affectation, where it is not founded on what is fitting and right. Every man of ſenſe is willing to *act* with his neighbour, whereever it is not of importance to ſhew that he *thinks* for himſelf. Faſhion ſhould always direct us, where it is not contrary to Reaſon.

In all caſes in which Duty doth not require us to oppoſe *common Uſage*, it ſhould be as much a rule to us for our conduct, as for our language. And if you may not believe, that, to attend the public worſhip, is

the

the performance of a duty, you, ſurely, cannot judge any duty to be violated by your attending it: You cannot judge it to be blameable to act herein with the generality, and, therefore, you, in civility, ought to do it.

According to good manners we ſhould, likewiſe, expreſs a proper deference to that which appears to be the ſenſe of the Community.

In things, with which, from our profeſſion or trade, we cannot but be ſuppoſed better acquainted, than they are whoſe application has been of a different kind, we have juſt ground to treat a popular opinion, as no rule for ours: but, when in matters of common life, in points to which the diſcernment of every man may fitly be thought to extend, we ſhew an utter diſregard to the well-adviſed determinations of our fellow-citizens, there is plainly an offence againſt that Decorum, which a liberal education directs us to obſerve [a].

[a] Adhibenda eſt quædam reverentia adverſus homines, & optimi cujuſque & reliquorum. TUL. de Off. L. I.

We

We very fitly, indeed, endeavour to be *wiſer* and *better* than others; but it is, by no means, *Wiſdom*, to behave as if we were the only wiſe —— as if we conſidered the eſtabliſhed regulations of a ſtate, to be checks proper enough for others, but not at all neceſſary to be ſubmitted to by us. Err we often do, as to the proportion of diſcernment we aſſign ourſelves, but *their* ſhare of diſcernment the *Generality* may, in *many points*, juſtly claim; and can in *none* be more unfitly oppoſed, than in thoſe which reſpect public order and peace. Not to join in the meaſures agreed on by them for theſe purpoſes, may juſtly expoſe us to the reproach of but ill underſtanding what is decent, or not at all conſulting it.

Further, we ſhould, in good manners, carefully avoid whatever would give offence to thoſe among whom we are converſant [a]. It is this *care* which diſtinguiſhes the civiliſed, from the ſavage — the well-educated, from the undiſciplined and uninformed part

[a] Juſtitiæ partes ſunt, non violare homines; Verecundiæ, non offendere: in quo maxime peſpicitur vis Decori. Tul. de Off. L. I.

of

of our ſpecies. The more this care appears, ſo much the more humanity, the better breeding, the more politeneſs we always aſcribe to the perſon in whom we ſee it.

He who neglects to join with the reſt of his Diſtrict in a homage of the Deity, may well be ſuppoſed to regard them as people, who do but ill know how to employ their leiſure, and whoſe *Devotion* doth little credit to their *Capacity*.

A cenſure, which how it muſt be taken by the diſcerning part of thoſe who fall under it, you cannot be at a loſs to determine.

And, is it unworthy your Conſideration, that, by ſuch an avowed contempt of all public worſhip, you give the greateſt offence to thoſe, whom no one, who has a proper ſenſe of Decorum, would willingly offend? You, hereby, chiefly offend the ſerious, the well diſpoſed, thoſe who are moſt averſe from diſguſting any, thoſe who have at heart the cauſe of Virtue, who, as they are ſolicitous for the *general Good*, cannot but be much grieved when they ſee *that irreligion* countenanced, the ſpreading of which will neceſſarily obſtruct it.

2. How

2. How unbecoming it is to perſiſt in an open breach of the Laws of our Country, cannot be queſtioned by him who will not call in queſtion the expediency of having any Laws.

If I will make convenience the Rule of my obedience to the Law, another may as juſtly take the ſame Rule for his: and thus, while each pays ſubjection only in the way he likes, univerſal diſorder muſt be the neceſſary conſequence.

The plain language of our Statutes is—— *All perſons*, inhabiting within the King's Dominions, ſhall, having no lawful excuſe, endeavour to reſort to their Pariſh-church, or to ſome uſual place where Common-prayer ſhall be uſed, every *Sunday*, &c.[a] —— All perſons ſhall, on every Lord's day, apply themſelves to the obſervation of the ſame, by exerciſing themſelves in Piety and true Religion, *publicly* and privately, *&c.*[b]

3. Your abſence from all public worſhip I cannot, likewiſe, but ſtyle *Indecent*, as it is an avowed contempt of the Religion of

[a] 1 ELIZ. Ch. 2. Sect. 4.
[b] 29 CHARL. II. Ch. 7. Sect. 1.

your

your Country. This, whatever your private opinion may be of it, claims from you an outward reſpect, ſince nothing is held more ſacred by, nothing is dearer to, All, who are in earneſt in the Profeſſion of it; which may well induce you to forbear ſo rude an attack upon it, as is made by that part of your conduct, to which I am now objecting.

If an endeavour to introduce a ſyſtem of Faith and Morals, more perfective of human nature, and more productive of happineſs to mankind, than that which is at preſent eſtabliſhed among us, was your motive to ſuch an inſult on what is thus eſtabliſhed, I could not deſire that Conſcience ſhould give place to Civility — it would not be right to expect you ſhould ſhew any complaiſance towards opinions, which your very deſire of the welfare of thoſe who received them prompted you to extirpate.

But when you ſeek to pull down, without the leaſt thought of rebuilding—when you are active in removing the reſtraints that our Depravity is under, without a view of ſubſtituting any in their ſtead — when you

you alike diſcountenance Communion with the National Church and with every other, what ſofter Epithet can I give this way of acting, than that of Indecent? And how properly may I recommend to your Conſideration, That,

*Want of Decency is want of Senſe?*
POPE.

II. *Imprudence* is what I have next charged you with.

A degree of it there is in every departure from good manners — in all actions out of character --- in whatever is improperly done by us, and ſhews us to be leſs attentive to what the ſociety in which we live may juſtly expect from us. But our *Imprudence* is great in thoſe omiſſions, which can ſcarcely be otherwiſe than the ſource of much *inconvenience and uneaſineſs to us.* And, I believe, it will be difficult to name what is the cauſe of more to the head of a family, than the irreligion of its members. The bad principles of the huſband, the father, the maſter, where his capacity is not extremely low, too eaſily inſinuate themſelves into his wife,

wife, children, ſervants; and there cannot be a plainer diſcovery of his principles, than his practice; nor of his having very bad principles, than ſuch a practice as makes it evident that he is indifferent how far he contributes to efface, in thoſe who obſerve him, all reverence of a Deity.

I know you will ſay, that you are not unwilling your family ſhould go to Church, and that you even frequently order them to do it. But which will weigh moſt with them, your orders or your example? Can they ſuppoſe you to think it of any moment that mankind ſhould be influenced by the fear of God, when they ſee you utterly negligent of what alone will preſerve in them the fear of him? Will they ſee a reaſon for *their* joining in the public worſhip, which is not one for *your* doing it?

Your *Children* may obey your *orders*, whilſt they dare not do otherwiſe; but they will be ſure not to forget your *unſuitable example:* and when moved by it to ſlight all the reſtraints of Religion, they will, probably, when they ceaſe to be under your controul, go all thoſe lengths of guilt to which their inclinations lead them.

Nor is it to be believed, that the pattern you ſet your *Servants* will weigh leſs with them, than your giving them leave, or even enjoining them, not to follow it: You may juſtly fear, that they will rather mind what you *do*, than what you *ſay*—that from the irreligion to which your *Conduct* leads them, they will not be with-held by your *Injunctions*—that they will adopt *principles* ſuitable to that diſregard of the Deity which you expreſs, and be induced, by thoſe *principles*, to conſult their pleaſure or profit in ſuch ways, as cannot but be very prejudicial to you.

The Parent and Maſter, who have much ſerioufneſs, have not always an equal diſcretion; and the depravity of ſome under their care may be ſuch, as the beſt both advice and example cannot correct. It is not, therefore, to be imagined, but that great regularity in the heads of a family may ſometimes fail in influencing thoſe under their government: But I am perſuaded, that as you will often ſee the uniform piety of the One producing the happieſt effects on the Other, ſo it will rarely be found,

that

that a neglect of the duties of Religion in the former, is not the cauſe of great hurt to the Morals of the latter, and of ſuch hurt as deeply affects the preſent intereſt of the perſons who occaſion'd it.

There is nothing more abſurd than to think that a Son or a Servant will go juſt thoſe lengths of irreligion, which you would connive at in him. When he is advanced as far as your practice will lead him, be aſſured that he will not ſtop there, but proceed to all thoſe crimes which ſuit his depraved affections, and from which he is not with-held by ſenſe of Shame, or dread of the Law.

As the extenſive and great *miſchief* which may enſue from your conduct cannot be ſhewn, but it muſt, at the ſame time, evidence the *Imprudence* of it; I ſhall *here* inſiſt no longer on *this point*, but refer the additional proofs of it to what will be ſaid on the *other*.

III. That in a neglect of all common worſhip you act contrary to the maxims of the wiſeſt Heathen, may be made appear—

From the eſtabliſhments of their Lawgivers—

From the accounts we have of their practice—

From the ſentiments which their writings expreſs.

Did you ever read of the Commonwealth that was founded without any proviſion for public worſhip? What hiſtory mentions a civiliſed people, which had not their temples, their altars, their places where the Deity was publicly adored?

Many whimſical things have been enacted by the ſeveral *Lawgivers*; but I know not of Any, who have ſuppoſed that a *Society* could be kept in order, unleſs the *members* of it joined in ſome ſolemn rites, which might contribute to preſerve in them a reverence of the Deity.

When *Lycurgus* was aſked, Why he enjoined oblations of little price? his Anſwer was---That *None* might fail in paying their acknowledgments to the Gods.[a]

[a] Προς τον πυθομενον, &c. De hoſtiis ad illum qui percontabatur, quid tam exiguas & viles præſcripſiſſet, Ne unquam, inquit, Deum intermittamus colere. PLUT.

In

In *Plato*'s tenth Book of *Laws*, the aſſertion of the Exiſtence of a Deity, and of his regard to what is right, having been conſidered as a proper Introduction to all Laws, it follows——That, from the Eaſt to the Weſt, or throughout the extent of the Earth, All men, Barbarians as well as *Greeks*, are ſeen and heard proſtrating themſelves, and ſupplicating the Deity.[a]

The *Athenians* are repreſented, as, in the moſt flouriſhing ſtate of their Commonwealth, taking particular care that the religious rites of their Anceſtors ſhould be conformed to.[b]

As *Tully* ſays in one place[c]—That All men think the Gods they have received

[a] Ανατελλοντα τε ηλιον και σεληνην και προς δυσμας ιοντων, προκυλισεις αμα και προσκυνησεις ακεοντες τε και ορωντες Ελληνων τε και Βαρβαρων παντων, &c. PLAT. de Leg. Lib. X.

[b] Τα περι τους Θεους, &c. Quod ad Deos immortales attinet (hinc enim ordiri mihi jure videor) non inæqualiter, non perturbate vel ipſos colebant, vel eorum feſta celebrabant:——Illud accurate obſervabant, ne a patribus acceptum quicquam abrogarent. ISOCR. Or. Areopag.

[c] OMNES religione moventur: & *Deos* patrios, quos a Majoribus acceperunt, *colendos* ſibi *diligenter*——arbitrantur. TUL. in VER.

Si conferre volumus noſtra cum externis, ceteris rebus aut pares, aut etiam inferiores reperiemur; religione, id eſt,

from their Anceſtors ſhould be diligently worſhipped: ſo he elſewhere remarks, that though the *Romans* might be, in ſome particulars, excelled by other nations, they were not equalled by any in a regard to the duties of Religion.

And *Pliny* [a] conſiders it as an *ancient uſage* among them, *well and wiſely eſtabliſhed*, to begin all their Undertakings with Prayers for their ſucceſs. [b]

The moſt ancient of the Heathen Writers prefaces his account of the firſt battle he deſcribes, with a relation of the ſolemn ſacrifice at which the Chiefs of the *Greeks* attended to implore the bleſſing of Heaven

cultu Deorum, multo ſuperiores. TUL. de Nat. Deor. Lib. II.

* *The following obſervation well deſerves to be here inſerted:* Omnia poſt Religionem ponenda *ſemper* noſtra civitas duxit, etiam in quibus ſummæ majeſtatis conſpici decus voluit. Quapropter non dubitaverunt ſacris imperia ſervire: ita ſe humanarum rerum velut curam gerere exiſtimantia, ſi divinæ potentiæ bene atque conſtanter fuiſſent famulata. VAL. MAX. Lib. I.

[a] Bene ac ſapienter — majores inſtituerunt rerum agendarum initium a precationibus capere. PLIN. Paneg.

[b] *Priſco Inſtituto* rebus divinis opera datur, cum aliquid commendandum eſt, Precatione; cum expoſcendum, Voto; cum ſolvendum, Gratulatione; &c. VAL. MAX. L. I.

on

on their Arms: and, throughout the *Iliad*, Prayer is inculcated, as requiſite to precede all our undertakings,

It was, as *Plutarch* informs us, the daily practice of *Alexander* the Great, when his leiſure admitted of it, the firſt thing he did, to ſacrifice to the Gods.

The ſame Writer obſerves of *Julius Cæſar*, that, when it was told him that *Pompey*'s forces were coming out of their trenches to give him battle, he order'd his ſoldiers to ſtop, and firſt made ſupplication to the Gods, then ranged his troops in order of battle.

A like remark I find in this Hiſtorian, concerning *Dion*'s *firſt* offering up prayer to the Gods, and then advancing with his troops againſt the Enemy.

*Tully*, [a] reaſoning on the propriety of having Temples in Cities, quotes *Pythagoras*, as having aſſerted, that our minds are never in a more pious frame, than when we are employed in the rites of Religion.

[a] Illud bene dictum eſt a Pythagora, doctiſſimo viro, Tum maxime & pietatem & religionem verſari in animis, cum rebus divinis operam daremus. *De Leg.* L. II.

When *Socrates* was accuſed of not worſhipping thoſe Gods which were worſhipped by his fellow-citizens, he doth not ſeek to juſtify himſelf by alledging any worſhip paid by him in private, but he abſolutely denies the fact, [a] and expreſsly declares, that he did ſacrifice on the public Altars, upon the ſeveral Feſtivals.

[b] They who have the leaſt degree of Reaſon, ſays *Plato*, invoke the Deity, whatever they undertake, whether it be an affair of greater or leſs weight.

[a] Τὸ μὲν πρῶτον θαυμάζω, &c. Hoc primum admiror, qua ratione Melitus accuſator dicat, quos civitas Deos putat, me non putare. Nam in communibus quidem ſacris, publiciſque altaribus ſacrificantem me & alii qui fuerunt obvii viderunt, & ipſe Melitus, ſi voluit, videre potuit.

XENOPH. Apol. pro SOCR.

The ſame writer elſewhere ſays, Ητε γαρ Πυθια νομω, &c. Sicut enim Pythius de immolationibus reſpondet, quod recte agat ſi quis conſuetudine civitatis utatur, ſic etiam Socrates & ipſe faciebat, cæteroſque admonebat: eos vero qui aliter agebant, curioſos & vanos arbitrabatur.

XEN. de dict. & fact. Soc. L. I.

[b] Παντες οσοι και κατα βραχυ, &c. Omnes ii qui vel tantillum mentis habent, quum aliquid ſive magnum ſive parvum aggrediuntur, ſemper ſolent Deum invocare.

TIMÆUS.

The

The Rule we have in *Iſocrates* is, [a] Worſhip the Deity, as at other times, ſo particularly with your fellow-citizens: You thus will be ſeen, at once, ſacrificing to the Gods, and obeying the Laws.

[b] It is the part of a wiſe man, according to *Tully*, to ſupport the appointments of his Anceſtors, by retaining their religious rites.

I will worſhip the Gods, ſays the Philoſopher in *Stobæus*, diligently, and according to the uſage of my country.

It becomes men to obſerve the religious rites of their Country, is the aſſertion of *Epictetus*; and *Celſus* tells you, That *All* follow the religious rites of their Country; which it ſeems fit they ſhould do, as what is ratified by common conſent ought to be obſerved. [c]

[a] Τιμα το δαιμονιον, &c. Venerare numen cum aliàs ſemper, tum maxime quum ſacra publica fiunt. Sic enim apparebit, te ſimul & Diis immolare, & legibus obtemperare. Isocr. Orat. ad Demon.

[b] Majorum inſtituta tueri ſacris cæremoniiſque retinendis, ſapientis eſt. *De Divinat.* Lib. II.

[c] Orig. cont. Celſ.

IV. Your

IV. Your practice, in the particular wherein I could wiſh it reformed, I have further conſider'd as expreſſive of direct Atheiſm.

For, what conſtruction can poſſibly be given to a conſtant neglect of the public worſhip of God, but that the perſon, who doth thus neglect it, thinks that there is no need of ſuch worſhip? And to deny the Deity worſhip is, in effect, to deny his exiſtence.

On this ground it is, that *Epicurus* and his followers have always been charged with Atheiſm. They allowed that certain Deities exiſted; but as they aſſerted — that theſe Deities were wholly taken up with the enjoyments which their abode, at a vaſt diſtance from us, furniſh'd—that they were entirely regardleſs of all human affairs, quite unconcerned whether Man ſerved them or not; it has been truly remark'd, that the *Epicureans* in words admitted the being of a God, but in effect denied it. [a]

[a] Epicurus ex animis hominum extraxit radicitus religionem, cum Diis immortalibus & opem & gratiam ſuſtulit: cum enim optimam & præſtantiſſimam naturam Dei

On

On this ground it likewiſe is, That *Ariſtotle* ſays, [a] They who doubt, whether we ought to worſhip the Gods, want puniſhment; as they who doubt, whether the ſnow is white, want ſenſe.

It, certainly, is the ſame thing to mankind, whether there be, or be not, a God, if the ſuppoſed God concerns not himſelf at all with their affairs — leaves them at liberty to act as they pleaſe—is indifferent to any homage, which they may be aſſiduous, or negligent, in paying him.

The plain meaning of my never worſhipping God cannot but *appear* to be — that I judge I have nothing to hope or fear, whether I do, or do not, worſhip him; and ſuch a notion is, by the beſt both ancient and modern Writers, branded as an Atheiſtical one.

dicat eſſe, negat idem eſſe in Deo gratiam. ——— At etiam liber eſt Epicuri, *de Sanctitate*. Ludimur ab homine non tam faceto, quam ad ſcribendi licentiam libero. Quæ enim poteſt eſſe *ſanctitas*, ſi Dii humana non curant? ——— Re tollit, Oratione relinquit Deos. Tul. de Nat. Deor. L. I.

[a] Οι απορουντες ποτερον δει τους θεους τιμαν, η ου, κολασεως δεονται· οι δε, ποτερον ὁ χιων λευκη, η ου, αισθησεως. Topic. L. I.

When

When it is the eſtabliſhed opinion, that every one who believes there is a God will give ſome public teſtimony of that belief—be ſeen aſſociating with ſome of the community to which he belongs, in the worſhip of God; a judgment will be made of me according to that opinion, and I ſhall be ſure to paſs for a man of *no Religion*, if my having any doth not appear from thoſe acts which are the proper evidences of it.

That the neglect of public worſhip doth juſtly bring on us the charge of Atheiſm, may ſeem unqueſtionable to him, who finds that the ableſt writers on *Natural Religion* conſider public worſhip as a part of the *Religion of Nature.*

Our Countryman *Cumberland*, whoſe treatiſe on this ſubject deſerves, perhaps, as high commendations as can properly be beſtowed on any effort of human wit, thus expreſſes himſelf.

[a] " As in the creation and ſupport of this Syſtem, which we inhabit, God willed that

[a] Quoniam in creatione & conſervatione hujus, quod incolimus, Syſtematis, tot voluit eſſe ſuarum perfectionum indicia; homineſque ea voluit eſſe conditione, ut, ſi Intel-

there

there ſhould be ſo many *evidences* of his perfections, and ſo framed men, that if they would exert the force of their underſtanding, they could not but obſerve thoſe evidences, he willed that they ſhould know and acknowledge what he is: And as he willed men to be *rational*, that is, to be conſiſtent with themſelves, and not to run into contradictions, he wills that their words and actions ſhould be conſonant to their thoughts of his perfections; that is, he wills them to worſhip and honour him."

Elſewhere he ſpeaks more particularly to the point in hand:—[a] The neceſſity of the divine Dominion, in order to the com-

lectûs ſui vires exererent, non poſſint non ea obſervare, voluit eos ſcire qualis eſt, & agnoſcere. Quoniam autem voluit homines eſſe rationales, id eſt, ſibi conſtantes, & omnem contradictionem averſari, vult ipſorum dicta ac facta animorum cogitatis de illius perfectionibus conſentire; hoc eſt, vult ipſos eum colere & honorare. *De Lege Nat.* C. v. Sect. 21.

[a] Cognita, ex his naturalibus, atque adeo æternis, Dei perfectionibus, hac neceſſitate Dominii Divini, in ordine ad commune, quod ſummum eſt, Bonum; cognoſcitur Lex naturalis illud ei tribuens, ſecundum ea quæ antehac explicuimus. Manifeſtum eſt enim rationem rectam divinam (quæ Lex quædam eſt ei naturalis) ab æterno illud ſibi in hunc finem aſſumturam eſſe; & rationem rectam humanam,

mon

mon, which is the greateſt, Good, being diſcover'd from the natural, and therefore eternal, perfections of God; the natural Law giving him that Dominion, as we have already explained it, is likewiſe diſcover'd. For it is manifeſt, that the right reaſon of the Deity, which is to him a ſort of natural Law, would from Eternity aſſume the exerciſe of this Dominion, in order to the end aſſigned; and that the right reaſon of Man, as ſoon as it exiſts and perceives this, would neceſſarily approve thereof; ſince it cannot, whilſt it is right, diſſent from the reaſon of God. But a Law being given to acknowledge the Divine Dominion, Laws are given commanding, with reſpect to God, the greateſt love, truſt, hope, gratitude, humility, fear and obedience, and whatever elſe is expreſſed in *invoking him*, *giving him*

cum primum exiſtit & hoc percipit, neceſſario conſenſuram eſſe; quippe, quamdiu recta eſt, a ratione divina nequit diſſentire. Data autem Lege de agnoſcendo hoc Dominio Divino, dantur Leges imperantes ſummum erga illum amorem, fiduciam, ſpem, gratitudinem, humilitatem, timorem & obedientiam, & ſi quid amplius eſt quod exprimitur in invocatione Divini nominis, & actione gratiarum, & auſcultatione verbi Divini, & in devovendo res, loca, tempora & perſonas, illius ſolius honori. Cap. IX. Sect. 2.

*thanks*,

*thanks*, hearing his word, and *conſecrating* things, *places*, *times*, *and perſons*, to the *honour of him*, *and of him only*.

There ought to be, ſays the very judicious writer of the *Religion of Nature delineated*,[a] a public worſhip of the Deity. For a man may be conſidered as a member of a *Society*, and *as ſuch* he ought to worſhip God (if he has opportunity of doing it; if there are proper prayers uſed *publicly*, which he may reſort to, and his health, *&c.* permit). Or, the *ſociety* may be conſidered as *one body*, that has common intereſts and concerns, and *as ſuch* is obliged to worſhip the Deity, and offer one common prayer. Beſide, there are many, who know not of themſelves how to pray; perhaps cannot ſo much as read. Theſe too muſt be taken *as they are*, and conſequently ſome time and place *appointed*, where they may have ſuitable prayers read to them, and be guided in their devotions.

And, further, toward the keeping mankind in order, it is *neceſſary* there ſhould be ſome religion profeſſed, and even eſta-

[a] *Rel. of Nat. delineated*, p. 124.

bliſhed;

bliſhed; which cannot be without ſome public worſhip. And were it not for that ſenſe of virtue, which is *principally* preſerved (ſo far as it is preſerved) by national *forms* and *habits* of religion, men would ſoon loſe it *all*, run wild, prey upon one another, and do what elſe the worſt of ſavages do.

[a] It is a part of Natural Religion, ſays *Puffendorf*, to worſhip God, not only in private, but, likewiſe, openly and publicly. —— Public worſhip both teſtifies our own Piety, and excites that of others.

[b] How can we conceive, as *Barbeyrac* expreſſes himſelf, that there is true Piety in the heart, unleſs it ſhew itſelf by ſome outward acts of Religion? Men are ſo made,

[a] Propoſitiones practicæ Religionis naturalis verſantur partim circa internum, partim circa externum Cultum Dei. —— Externus Dei cultus in hiſce potiſſimum conſiſtit, ut homo Deo gratias agat pro tot bonis ab eo acceptis —— ut homo Deum non ſolum ſecreto, ſed & palam & publice in conſpectu hominum colat. —— Publicus cultus non ſolum de noſtra devotione teſtatur, ſed & alios exemplo incitat.

PUFFEND. *de Offic. Hom. & Civ.* L. I. c. 4.

[b] See *Barbeyrac*'s Note on Sect. 3. Chap. IV. Book II. of *Puffendorf*'s *Law of Nature and Nations*, done into *Engliſh* by *Baſil Kennet*.

that

that they do not think that they ſhew a ſufficient reſpect one to another, if they do not give ſome proofs of it by their ſpeech, or ſome ſignificant action. —— We muſt grant, that an outward worſhip is abſolutely neceſſary.

In *Burlamaqui*'s *Principles of the Law of Nature* we have the following paſſage:

[a] A truly religious man will think it his duty, and find it his pleaſure, to confirm himſelf in ſentiments of piety, and excite them in others. Hence is derived outward worſhip, as well private as public. For, whether we conſider this worſhip as the chief and almoſt only means of exciting, cheriſhing, and perfecting in the heart ſentiments of Religion; or whether we con-

[a] Un homme religieux ſe fera un devoir & un plaiſir de fortifier en lui les ſentiments de pieté, & de les exciter chez les autres. De-là derive le Culte exterieur, tant particulier que public. Car, ſoit que l'on enviſage ce culte comme etant le premier & preſque le ſeul moyen d'exciter, d'entretenir, & de perfectionner dans le cœur les ſentiments de Religion & de Pieté; ſoit qu'on le conſidére comme un hommage que les hommes, réunis par des Societés particuliéres ou publiques, rendent à Dieu en commun; ſoit que l'on joigne ces deux vuës; la Raiſon nous en fait un DEVOIR d'une NECESSITE' INDISPENSABLE.

BURLAMAQ. *Principes du Droit Naturel*, C. IV. p. 2.

ſider it as an homage which men united in Society, in common, pay the Deity; or whether we take theſe two views of it in conjunction, Reaſon makes it a DUTY of INDISPENSABLE NECESSITY.

[a] It is natural for men, according to *Wilkins*, who are joined together in Civil Societies, to join likewiſe in Religious Worſhip. And, in order to this, it is neceſſary that there ſhould be public places, and ſolemn times ſet apart for ſuch Aſſemblies: Which hath accordingly been the practice of *All civilized Nations*. And in the manner of performing their public Worſhip, it was ſtill required to be done with all imaginable ſubmiſſion and reverence. This the *Stoic* commends, and cites *Ariſtotle* for it; —"Men are never more concerned to be "humble and modeſt, than when they "have to do about God. We ſhould en- "ter the Temples with an humble and "compoſed demeanour. When we ap- "proach to ſacrifice, it ſhould be with all "imaginable expreſſions of reverence and "modeſty, in our countenance and car- "riage."

[a] *Principles of Natural Religion*, by *Wilkins*, B. I. Ch. 12.

If

[a] If you will be pleaſed to lay together what is here quoted from the beſt Writers on Natural Religion, and what was before related concerning the Practice and Sentiments of the moſt eminent perſons in the Heathen World; the neglect of all public worſhip muſt, I ſhould think, appear to you not harſhly cenſured, when conſider'd as an evidence of abſolute Atheiſm.

V. I have now only to add, That the great and extenſive miſchief, which may proceed from your abſenting yourſelf from the public worſhip, well merits your moſt ſerious conſideration.

A very little knowledge of mankind may ſuffice for our fulleſt conviction what terrible diſorder muſt enſue, were we, generally, without any apprehenſions of a Superintending Providence.

[a] In a writer, by no means fit to be placed among thoſe above cited, and only taken notice of here, as he was moſt unlikely to have made public worſhip a part of Natural Religion, could he have found any tolerable plea for denying it to be ſo, we meet with this obſervation——

" It is the voice of Nature, that God ſhould be pub-
" licly worſhipped." *Chriſtianity as old as the Creation.*

It is highly honourable to Religion, that the Atheiſtical writers endeavour to account for its introduction, by ſuppoſing it to be a political meaſure to reſtrain man's propenſity to miſchief—to keep him innocent, when he might think his guilt could never come under the cogniſance of any of his ſpecies. How many crimes are there on which human Laws do not at all animadvert! How many of the crimes for which they appoint a puniſhment never receive it, either from the timorouſneſs, or indolence, or corruption of thoſe who ſhould ſee it inflicted! Offenders high in rank defy juſtice—the wealth of others protects them from it—the very pooreſt often eſcape it, by the ſecrecy with which they act; and, uſing more cunning than their Betters, they tranſgreſs with equal impunity.

Let the ſevereſt Laws be enacted and duly executed, what numbers ſhall we find deſpiſing them! How unheeded is the Executioner by a bold neceſſitous villain! In what ſhape can death ſcare us, when inflamed with rage—when intent on revenge? Civil regulations extending thus but to a part

part of our duty, and ſo feebly enforcing the diſcharge even of that part of it, Society muſt neceſſarily want ſome further ſupport. I ſhould add, with reſpect to human Laws, that as they take notice only of the outward act, they leave us at liberty to allow in ourſelves thoſe inclinations, which, if we do not endeavour to ſuppreſs, we ſhall at length be but ill able to reſiſt. The robber, the murderer, the adulterer, do not at once throw off the reſtraints of conſcience: they gradually fall; and, by long offending in deſire, proceed to do it in act.

How far the defects of human Laws are ſupplied by the belief of a God, is obvious —It induces us to forbear treating any other perſon, as we would not have him to treat us —It takes away all hope of ſecret guilt —It aſſures us, that, whatever our rank or fortune may be, our crimes ſhall not fail to receive the puniſhment they deſerve —It prevents not only the birth, but even the conception, of ſin; and ſecures regularity in our actions, by preſerving it in our inclinations.

Theſe are the proper effects of a firm perſuaſion, that we are under the government of an all-knowing and all-powerful, a perfectly wiſe and juſt God. Nor doth there ſeem to be any way ſo likely to fix this perſuaſion on the mind of man, and to make it general, as that of a public worſhip—as the members of the community aſſembling to pay their joint homage to this infinitely perfect Being.

Care for the neceſſities of life is apt to operate ſo ſtrongly on one part of our ſpecies, and the purſuit of pleaſure ſo much engages the other, that were we ſeverally left to our choice, whether we would pay any acknowledgment to our Creator, it is greatly to be feared, that an entire forgetfulneſs of him would be widely ſpread.

Times and places ſet apart for his ſervice are the only calls that many know to a remembrance of his exiſtence: They would never think of him, if they were never required to join in his worſhip; and it is the weekly repetition of this act which alone keeps up in them a ſenſe of him, as ſure

to

to reward every virtuous man, and puniſh every wicked.

When we are accuſtomed, from our childhood, to meet our neighbours one day in ſeven, in order that we may in common beg of our Creator to preſerve and bleſs us, to deliver us from ſin and all other evil, to make us happy here and continue us ſo ever; it is not to be ſuppoſed, but that we ſhall more frequently think of a God, than we ſhould do, were no ſuch religious aſſemblies held; and that we ſhall be under a greater fear of acting wrong, than would otherwiſe influence us.

I do not ſay, that by ſuch outward homage, the moſt punctually paid, any of us are likely to be made as good as we ought to be.

We have ſad experience to the contrary. But this, I think, may truly be ſaid of it, That it is ſome check to the progreſs of Vice, and that our Morals would become much worſe, were this homage wholly neglected. It is a fact which comes under every one's obſervation, that where the lower people abſent themſelves from all

public worſhip, they contract a ſavageneſs and brutality of manners, and are too apt to go the greateſt lengths of guilt.

When a ſeventh part of our time is ſet apart for that employment which will make us more conſiderate — which teaches us to act as reaſonable creatures, great advantages may well be expected from it; and, certainly, as great hurt muſt enſue, when, for ſo large a portion of their time, the generality encounter all the temptations to which abſolute idleneſs can expoſe them.

If, as they think that they have no concern with matters of Religion on their days of *Labour*, they judge the ſame of the day on which they are exempted from it, and paſs this day without any Act which can make a ſerious impreſſion upon them; it is very probable that they will, ordinarily, run into great irregularities upon it — into irregularities, which, exhauſting their own ſmall ſtock of money, will ſtrongly entice them to ſuch violence or fraud, as may afford them the ſupply they want.

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The leiſure of the wealthy too frequently engages them in ruinous pleaſures, notwithſtanding the many innocent ways of amuſing themſelves, which the advantages of their education and fortune afford: But to what licentiouſneſs muſt we, then, think the poor will proceed, when they are to have a whole day in every week for mere diverſions, and are too apt to reliſh thoſe moſt, which are moſt dangerous to their Virtue!

Set aſide all conſiderations of Religion—Are not Churches the only morality-ſchools of conſiderable numbers, the only places where they hear any thing of their obligations to avoid what may be miſchievous to themſelves or others? And when thoſe obligations are not thoroughly underſtood, or when they are very ſeldom reflected upon, or when the motives enforcing a conformity to them are not ſufficiently known, can the conſequence but be, a miſconduct more or leſs hurtful, as our diſpoſitions are better or worſe, as we are under ſtronger or weaker temptations to offend?

It may be, as you do not deſire that the example you ſet in abſenting yourſelf from all public worſhip ſhould be follow'd, ſo you do not ſuppoſe that it will be.——You will, perhaps, tell me, that you are but one, and that there is little to be feared from the omiſſions of one private perſon.——But ſurely, Sir, the practice of a whole Nation is no more than the practice of many particulars; and whoſeſoever plea it is—What ſignifies my behaviour; I am but one? he ought to be reminded that every man may excuſe himſelf in the ſame manner; and thus what each allows only in himſelf, may become the general guilt.

In thoſe parts of duty which ariſe not from our reſpective ſtates and circumſtances, but from conſiderations equally applicable to perſons of all conditions, we ſhould never ſuppoſe that *our failure* will be confined to ourſelves; we ſhould regard *it* as influencing others to a like *failure*, and *this* as capable of very widely extending itſelf.

My

My example, in any departure from duty, is an advice to my neighbour to do the ſame thing; and it is advice which may ſo far appear more weighty than what my tongue can give him, becauſe there is ſeldom reaſon to think that a man's actions belie his heart, but often the greateſt to think ſo of his profeſſions.

If our wrong behaviour being publicly known doth not all the miſchief which might juſtly be feared from it; or if, from the mean opinion entertained of us, it doth very little hurt; this will be but a poor defence of it. We are, certainly, render'd criminal by thoſe actions, the natural conſequences of which are miſchievous; though it ſhould ſo happen, that the evil, which they have a tendency to produce, did not enſue.

I am got to a length, for which I would apologize, were it on a leſs important ſubject.

I am ſure that I have offered you ſome things well deſerving your conſideration, as I have furniſhed you with ſo many extracts, from

from the beſt both antient and modern Writers; and if they can but engage your attention, they will, I ſhould hope, contribute not a little towards producing that change in your conduct, ſo much wiſhed for by

*Your*, &c.

A LET-

A

# LETTER

TO A

# YOUNG NOBLEMAN,

Soon after his leaving SCHOOL.

Majorum Gloria posteris lumen est, neque bona neque mala in occulto patitur. SALLUST.

——— ——— ——— Sanctus haberi,
Justitiæque tenax, factis dictisque mereris?
Agnosco PROCEREM. ——— ——— JUVEN.

A

# LETTER

TO A

YOUNG NOBLEMAN,

Soon after his leaving SCHOOL.

# A LETTER TO A YOUNG NOBLEMAN.

SIR,

THE obligations I have to your family cannot but make me solicitous for the Welfare of every member of it, and for that of yourself in particular, on whom its Honours are to descend.

Such instructions and such examples, as it has been your happiness to find, must, necessarily, raise great expectations of you, and will not allow you any praise for a common degree of merit. You will not be thought to have worth, if you have not a di-

a diſtinguiſhed worth, and what may ſuit the concurrence of ſo many extraordinary advantages.

In low life, our good or bad qualities are known to few — to thoſe only who are related to us, who converſe with, or live near, us. In your ſtation, you are expoſed to the notice of a Kingdom. The excellencies or defects of a Youth of Quality make a part of polite converſation — are a topic agreeable to all who have been liberally educated; to all who are not amongſt the meaneſt of the people.

Should I, in any company, begin a character of my friend with the hard name, whom I hope you left well at —— they would naturally aſk me, What relation he bore to the Emperor's Miniſter? When I anſwer'd, That I had never heard of his bearing any; that all I knew of him was, his being the ſon of a *German* Merchant, ſent into this Kingdom for education; I, probably, ſhould be thought impertinent, for introducing ſuch a ſubject; and I, certainly, ſhould ſoon be obliged to drop it,

or

or be wholly diſregarded, were I unwiſe enough to continue it.

But if, upon a proper occaſion, I mentioned, that I had known the Honourable ——— from his infancy, and that I had made ſuch obſervations on his capacity, his application, his attainments, and his general conduct, as induced me to conclude, he would one day be an eminent ornament, and a very great bleſſing, to his Country, I ſhould have an hundred queſtions aſked me about him—my narrative would appear of conſequence to all who heard it, and would not fail to engage their attention.

I have, I muſt own, often wonder'd, that the conſideration of the numbers, who are continually remarking the behaviour of the perſons of Rank among us, has had ſo little influence upon them—has not produced a quite different effect from what, alas! we every where ſadly experience.

*Negligere quid de ſe quiſque ſentiat, non ſolum arrogantis eſt, ſed etiam omnino diſſoluti.* I need not tell you where the remark is: It has, indeed, ſo much obvious truth, that it wants no ſupport from authority.

Every generous principle muſt be extinct in him, who knows that it is ſaid of him, or that it juſtly may be ſaid of him—How different is this young man from his noble Father! The latter took every courſe that could engage the public eſteem: the former is as induſtrious to forfeit it. The Sire was a pattern of Religion, Virtue, and every commendable quality: his deſcendant is an impious, ignorant, profligate wretch; raiſed above others, but to have his folly more public—high in his rank, only to extend his infamy.

A thirſt after fame may have its inconveniences, but which are by no means equal to thoſe that attend a contempt of it. Our earneſtneſs in its purſuit may poſſibly ſlacken our purſuit of true deſert; but indifferent we cannot be to Reputation, without being ſo to Virtue.

In theſe remarks you, Sir, are no farther concern'd, than as you muſt, ſometimes, converſe with the perſons to whom they may be applied, and your deteſtation of whom one cannot do too much to increaſe. *Bad examples* may juſtly raiſe our fears even for

for him who has been the moſt wiſely educated, and is the moſt happily diſpoſed: No caution againſt them is ſuperfluous: In the place, in which you are at preſent, you will meet with them in all ſhapes.

Under whatever diſadvantages I offer you my advice, I am thus far qualified for giving it, that I have *experienced* ſome of the dangers which will be your trial, and had ſufficient *opportunity* of obſerving others. The obſervations I have made, that are at all likely to be of ſervice to you, either from their own weight, or the hints they may afford for your improving upon them, I cannot conceal from you. What comes from him who wiſhes you ſo well, and ſo much eſteems you, will be ſufficiently recommended by its motives; and may, therefore, poſſibly be read with a partiality in its favour, that ſhall make it of more uſe than it could be of from any intrinſic worth.

But, without farther preface or apology, let me proceed to the points that I think deſerving your more particular conſideration; and begin with what, certainly, ſhould, above all other things, be conſider'd—RE-

LIGION. It is, indeed, what every man ſays he has more or leſs conſider'd; and by this, every man acknowledges its importance: yet, when we enquire into the conſideration that has been given it, we can hardly perſuade ourſelves, that a point of the leaſt conſequence could be ſo treated. To our examination here we uſually ſit down *reſolved*, how far our *conviction* ſhall extend.

In the purſuit of natural or mathematical knowledge we engage, diſpoſed to take things as we find them — to let our aſſent be directed by the evidence we meet with: but the doctrines of Religion each inſpects, not in order to inform himſelf what he ought to believe and practiſe; but to reconcile them with his preſent faith and way of life — with the paſſions he favours — with the habits he has contracted.

And that this is, really, the caſe, is evident, from the little alteration there is in the manners of any, when they know as much of Religion as they ever intend to know. You ſee them the ſame perſons as formerly; they are only furniſh'd with arguments, or excuſes,

excuſes, they had not before thought of; or with objections to any rules of life differing from thoſe by which they guide themſelves; which objections they often judge the only defence their own practice ſtands in need of.

I am ſure, Sir, that to one of your underſtanding the abſurdity of ſuch a way of proceeding can want no proof; and that your bare attention to it is your ſufficient guard againſt it.

Religion is either wholly founded on the fears or fancies of mankind, or it is, of all matters, the moſt ſerious, the weightieſt, the moſt worthy of our regard. There is no mean. Is it a dream, and no more? Let the human race abandon, then, all pretences to Reaſon. What we call ſuch is but the more exquiſite ſenſe of upright, unclad, lwo-legged Brutes; and that is the beſt you can ſay of us. We then are Brutes, and ſo much more wretched than other Brutes, as deſtined to the miſeries they feel not, and deprived of the happineſs they enjoy; by our foreſight anticipating our calamities, by our reflection recalling them. Our Being is without an aim; we can have

no purpoſe, no deſign, but what we ourſelves muſt ſooner or later deſpiſe. We are formed, either to drudge for a life, that, upon ſuch a condition, is not worth our preſerving; or to run a circle of enjoyments, the cenſure of *all* which is, that we cannot long be pleaſed with *any one of them.* Diſintereſtedneſs, Generoſity, Public Spirit, are idle, empty ſounds; terms, which imply no more, than that we ſhould neglect our own happineſs to promote that of others.

What *Tully* has obſerved on the connexion there is between Religion, and the Virtues which are the chief ſupport of Society, is, I am perſuaded, well known to you.

A proper regard to ſocial duties wholly depends on the influence that Religion has upon us. Deſtroy, in mankind, all hopes and fears, reſpecting any future ſtate; you inſtantly let them looſe to all the methods likely to promote their immediate convenience. They, who think they have only the preſent hour to truſt to, will not be be with-held, by any refined conſiderations,

from

from doing what appears to them certain to make it pass with greater satisfaction.

Now, methinks, a calm and impartial enquirer could never determine that to be a visionary scheme, the full persuasion of the truth of which approves our existence a wise design — gives order and regularity to our life — places an end in our view, confessedly the noblest that can engage it — raises our nature — exempts us from a servitude to our passions, equally debasing and tormenting us — affords us the truest enjoyment of ourselves — puts us on the due improvement of our faculties — corrects our selfishness — calls us to be of use to our fellow-creatures, to become public blessings — inspires us with true courage, with sentiments of real honour and generosity — inclines us to be such, in every relation, as suits the peace and prosperity of Society — derives an uniformity to our whole conduct, and makes satisfaction its inseparable attendant — directs us to a course of action pleasing when it employs us, and equally pleasing when we either look back upon it, or attend to the expectations we entertain from it.

If the ſource of ſo many and ſuch vaſt advantages can be ſuppoſed a dream of the ſuperſtitious, or an invention of the crafty, we may take our leave of certainty; we may ſuppoſe every thing, within and without us, conſpiring to deceive us.

That there ſhould be difficulties in any ſcheme of Religion which can be offer'd us, is no more than what a thorough acquaintance with our limited capacities would induce us to expect, were we ſtrangers to the ſeveral religions that prevailed in the world, and propoſed, upon enquiry into their reſpective merits, to embrace that which came beſt recommended to our belief.

But all objections of difficulties muſt be highly abſurd in either of theſe caſes——

When the creed you oppoſe, on account of its difficulties, is attended with fewer than that which you would advance in its ſtead; or——

When the whole of the practical doctrines of a Religion are ſuch, as, undeniably, contribute to the happineſs of mankind, in what-

whatever ſtate, or under whatſoever relations, you can conſider them.

To reject a Religion thus circumſtanced, for ſome points in its ſcheme leſs level to our apprehenſion, appears to me, I confeſs, quite as unreaſonable, as it would be to abſtain from our food, till we could be ſatisfied about the origin, inſertion, and action of the muſcles that enable us to ſwallow it.

I would, in no caſe, have you reſt upon mere authority; yet, as authority will have its weight, allow me to take notice, that Men of the greateſt penetration, the acuteſt reaſoning, and the moſt ſolid judgment, have been on the ſide of Chriſtianity—have expreſſed the firmeſt perſuaſion of its truth.

I cannot forgive myſelf, for having ſo long overlook'd Lord *Bacon*'s Philoſophical Works. It was but lately I began to read them; and one part of them I laid down, when I took my pen to write this. The more I know of that extraordinary Man, the more I admire him; and cannot but think his underſtanding as much of a ſize beyond that of the reſt of mankind, as *Virgil* makes the ſtature of *Muſæus*, with reſpect

ſpect to that of the multitude ſurrounding him——

—— —— *Medium nam plurima turba*
*Hunc habet, atque humeris extantem ſuſpicit altis.*
ÆN. L. VI. 667,8.

or as *Homer* repreſents *Diana*'s height, among the Nymphs ſporting with her——

Πασάων δ' ὔπερ ἦγε κάρη ἴχει ἠδὲ μέτωπα. OD. L. VI. 107.

Throughout his writings there runs a vein of piety: you can hardly open them, but you find ſome or other teſtimony of the full conviction entertained by him, that Chriſtianity had an eſpecial claim to our regard. He, who ſo clearly ſaw the defects in every ſcience---ſaw from whence they proceeded, and had ſuch amazing ſagacity, as to diſcover how they might be remedied, and to point out thoſe very methods, the purſuit of which has been the remedy of many of them——He, who could diſcern thus much, left it to the Witlings of the following age, to diſcover any weakneſs in the foundation of Religion.

To him and Sir *Iſaac Newton* I might add many others, of eminent both natural and acquired endowments, the moſt unſuſpected favourers of the Chriſtian Religion;

gion; but theſe two, as they may be conſider'd ſtanding at the head of mankind, would really be diſhonoured, were we to ſeek for any weight, from mere authority, to the opinions they had jointly patroniſed, to the opinions they had maintained, after the ſtricteſt enquiry what ground there was for them.

That the grounds of Chriſtianity were thus enquired into by them, is certain: for the One appears, by the quotations from the *Bible* interſperſed throughout his works, to have read *it* with an uncommon care; and it is well known, that the Other made *it* his chief ſtudy, in the latter part of his life.

It may, indeed, appear very idle, to produce authorities on one ſide, when there are none who deſerve the name of ſuch on the other; ſince he, who takes up his pen to deprive the world of the benefits it might receive, were the Chriſtian Religion firmly believed, gives ſuch a proof of a wrong head in the very deſign of his work, that it is impoſſible he ſhould get any credit by the conduct of it.

Is

Is there a juſt foundation for our aſſent to the Chriſtian doctrine? Nothing ſhould then be more carefully conſidered by us, or have a more immediate and extenſive influence upon our practice.

Shall I be told, that if this were a right conſequence, there is a Profeſſion, in which quite different perſons would be found, than we at preſent meet with?

I have too many failings myſelf, to be willing to cenſure others; and too much love for truth, to attempt an excuſe for what admits of none. But let me ſay, that conſequences are not the leſs true, for their truth being diſregarded. *Lucian*'s deſcription of the Philoſophers of his age is more odious, than can belong to any ſet of men in our time: and as it was never thought, that the precepts of Philoſophy ought to be ſlighted, becauſe they who inculcated, diſgraced them; neither can it be any reflection on nobler rules, that they are recommended by perſons who do not obſerve them.

Of this I am as certain as I can be of any thing, That our practice is no infallible teſt

of

of our principles; and that we may do Religion no injury by our ſpeculations, when we do it a great deal by our manners. I ſhall be very unwilling to rely on the ſtrength of my own virtue in ſo many inſtances, that it exceedingly mortifies me to reflect on their number: yet, in whichſoever of them I offended, it would not be for want of conviction, how excellent a precept, or precepts, I had tranſgreſſed—it would not be becauſe I thought not, that a life throughout agreeable to the commands of the Religion I profeſs, ought to be conſtantly my care.

How frequently we act contrary to the obligations, which we readily admit ourſelves to be under, can ſcarcely be otherwiſe than matter of every one's notice; and if none of us infer from thoſe purſuits, which tend to deſtroy our health, or our underſtanding, or our reputation, that he, who engages in them, is perſuaded that Diſeaſe, or Infamy, or a ſecond Childhood, deſerves his choice; neither ſhould it be taken for granted, that *he* is not inwardly convinced of the worth of Religion, who appears, at ſome times,

times, very different from what a due regard thereto ought to make him.

Inconſiſtency is, thro' the whole compaſs of our acting, ſo much our reproach, that it would be great injuſtice towards us, to charge each defect in our morals, upon corrupt and bad principles. For a proof of the injuſtice of ſuch a charge, I am confident, none need look beyond themſelves. Each will find the complaint of *Medea* in the Poet, very proper to be made his own—*I ſee and approve of what is right, at the ſame time that I do what is wrong.*

Don't think, that I would juſtify the faults of any, and much leſs theirs, who, profeſſing themſelves ſet apart to promote the intereſts of Religion and Virtue, and having a large revenue aſſigned them, both that they may be more at leiſure for ſo noble a work, and that their pains in it may be properly recompenſed, are, certainly, extremely blameable, not only when they countenance the immoral and irreligious; but even, when they take no care to reform them.

All

All I aim at is, That the cauſe may not ſuffer by its Advocates—That you may be juſt to *it*, whatever you may diſlike in *them*---That their failures may have the allowance, to which the frailty of human nature is entitled --- That you may not, by their *Manners*, when worſt, be prejudiced againſt their *Doctrine*; as you would not cenſure Philoſophy, for the faults of Philoſophers.

The prevalency of any practice cannot make it to be either ſafe, or prudent; and I would fain have yours and mine ſuch, as may alike credit our religion, and underſtanding: without the great reproach of both, we cannot profeſs to believe that rule of life to be from God, which, yet, we model to our paſſions and intereſts.

Whether ſuch a particular is my duty, ought to be the *firſt conſideration*; and when it is found ſo, common ſenſe ſuggeſts the *next*—— How it may be performed.

But I muſt not proceed. A letter of two ſheets! How can I expect, that you ſhould give it the reading? If you can perſuade yourſelf to do it, from the conviction of the ſincere affection towards you, that has drawn

drawn me into this length; I promiſe you, never again to make ſuch a demand on your patience —— I will never again give you ſo troubleſom a proof of my friendſhip. I have here begun a ſubject, which I am very deſirous to proſecute; and every letter, you may hereafter receive from me upon it, whatever other recommendation it may want, ſhall, certainly, not be without that of brevity.

*I am*, &c.

AP-

# APPENDIX.

SINCE the *Letters on the choice of company* were written, the Continuation of Lord *Clarendon*'s Hiſtory has been publiſh'd: and, as it in ſome parts more diſtinctly and ſtrongly repreſents the hurt accruing from bad company, than any piece of that kind which, I think, I ever met with; I have been hereby induced to make the following extracts from it.

They are of three kinds——

The firſt kind ſhews what King *Charles* the Second was, in his own nature.

The ſecond deſcribes his Companions.

The third repreſents what an unhappy influence ſuch Companions had upon him—how bad, how horribly bad a man they made him.

But as Lord *Clarendon* did not live to ſee the height of wickedneſs, to which this

Monarch proceeded, and has expreſſed himſelf as favourably, as with any regard to truth he could do, of what he did ſee; I have added to his account ſome few particulars from other writers.

I. At *Cologne*, he, with a marvellous contentedneſs, preſcribed ſo many hours in the day to his retirement in his Cloſet—— and, in the whole, ſpent his Time very well. *Hiſt. of Rebel.* B. XIV.

That his Majeſty had the *firm Reſolution* to contain himſelf when married within the ſtricteſt bounds of Virtue and Conſcience, there want not many Arguments, as well from the *excellent temper and juſtice of his own nature*, as from the profeſſions he had made, with ſome ſolemnity, to perſons who were believed to have much credit, and who had not failed to do their duty in putting him in mind of the infinite obligations he had to God Almighty—— of which his Majeſty was piouſly ſenſible. *Contin. of* CLAR. *Life*, Vol. II. p. 318.

His princely breaſt always entertained the moſt tender affections; nor was ever any man's nature more remote from thoughts

thoughts of roughneſs and hardheartedneſs. *Ibid.* 321.

He (the Chancellor) put the King in mind of what he heard his Majeſty himſelf ſay, upon the like exceſs which a neighbour King had lately uſed, in making his Miſtreſs to live in the Court, and in the Preſence of the Queen: That his Majeſty had then ſaid, "that it was ſuch a piece "of ill-nature, that he could never be "guilty of; and if ever he ſhould be guilty "of having a Miſtreſs after he had a Wife, "which *he hoped he never ſhould be*, ſhe "ſhould never come where his Wife was: "He would never add that to the vexation, "of which ſhe would have enough without "it." *Ib.* 326.

The King replied, that if it ſhould pleaſe God ever to give him a Wife and Children, he would make choice of ſuch people to be about Both, in all places of near truſt, who in their Natures and Manners, and, if it were poſſible, in their very Humours, were ſuch as he wiſhed his Wife and Children ſhould be: for he did believe, that MOST YOUNG PEOPLE (and, it may be, ELDER) were, upon the matter, FORM'D by thoſe

whom they SAW CONTINUALLY, and could not but OBSERVE. *Ib.* 336.

He was the beſt-natur'd Maſter in the world. Vol. III. p. 86.

He had an excellent nature and underſtanding. Vol. II. 86.

Lord *Clarendon* obſerves, that impious diſcourſe was not (at firſt) grateful to him (the King) and therefore warily and accidentally uſed by thoſe who had pleaſant wit, and in whoſe company he took too much delight. Vol. II. 318.

II. Take, next, the deſcription of the King's companions.

He ſpent much of his time with confident young men, who abhorred all diſcourſe that was ſerious, and, in the liberty they aſſumed in drollery and raillery, preſerved no reverence towards God or Man, but laugh'd at all ſober men, and even at Religion itſelf. CLAR. *Contin.* Vol. II. p. 85.

There was all poſſible pains taken by that company which were admitted to the King's hours of pleaſure, to divert and corrupt all thoſe impreſſions and principles, which

which his own conſcience and reverent eſteem of Providence did ſuggeſt to him, turning all diſcourſe and mention of Religion into Ridicule. *Ib.* 318.

The nightly meetings had of late made him (the Chancellor) more the ſubject of the diſcourſe; and ſince the time of the new Secretary they had taken more liberty to talk of what was done in Council, than they had done formerly: And the Duke of *Buckingham* pleaſed himſelf and all the company in acting all the perſons who ſpake there in their looks and motions, in which piece of Mimickry he had an eſpecial faculty; and in this exerciſe the Chancellor had a full part. In the height of mirth, if the King ſaid "he would go ſuch a journey, "or do ſuch a trivial thing to-morrow," ſomebody would lay a wager he would not do it; and when he aſk'd why, it was anſwered, "that the Chancellor would not "let him:" And then another would proteſt, "that he thought there was no ground "for that Imputation; however, he could "not deny that it was generally believed "abroad, that his Majeſty was entirely and

" implicitly governed by the Chancellor." *Ib.* 467.

What was preached in the Pulpit was commented upon and derided in the Chamber, and Preachers acted, and Sermons vilified as labour'd Diſcourſes, which the Preachers made only to ſhew their own parts and wit, without any other deſign than to be commended and preferred. *Ib.* 475.

No ſorrow was equal, at leaſt none ſo remarkable, as the King's was for the Earl of *Falmouth*. They who knew his Majeſty beſt, and had ſeen how unſhaken he had ſtood in other very terrible aſſaults, were amazed at the flood of Tears he ſhed for the loſs of this young Favourite, in whom few other men had ever obſerved any Virtue or Quality, which they did not wiſh their beſt friends without. *Ib.* 512.

His Majeſty had been heard during that time [of the fire of *London* in 1666] to ſpeak with great piety and devotion of the diſpleaſure that God was provoked to: And no doubt the deep ſenſe of it did raiſe many good thoughts and purpoſes in his Royal breaſt.

breaſt. But he was narrowly watched and looked into, that ſuch melancholic thoughts might not long poſſeſs him, the conſequence and effect whereof was like to be more grievous than that of the Fire itſelf; of which that looſe company that was too much cheriſhed, even before it was extinguiſhed, diſcourſed, as of an argument for Mirth and Wit to deſcribe the wildneſs of the confuſion all people were in; in which the Scripture itſelf was uſed with equal liberty, when they could apply it to their profane purpoſes. And Mr. *May* preſumed to aſſure the King, "that this was the "greateſt Bleſſing that God had ever con-"ferred upon him, his Reſtoration only ex-"cepted: For the Walls and Gates being "now burn'd and thrown down of that re-"bellious City, which was always an Ene-"my to the Crown, his Majeſty would "never ſuffer them to repair and build "them up again, to be a Bit in his mouth "and a Bridle upon his neck; but would "keep all open, that his Troops might en-"ter upon them whenever he thought ne-"ceſſary for his ſervice, there being no

" other way to govern that rude multitude " but by Force. *Ib.* 675.

III. It is now to be ſhewn—What an unhappy influence the Companions thus deſcrib'd had on the King—how bad, how horribly bad a man they made him.

The King, every day, took leſs care of his affairs, and affected thoſe pleaſures moſt, which made him averſe from the other. *Cont. of* CLAR. 85.

The King was far from obſerving the Rules he had preſcrib'd to himſelf before he came from beyond the Seas, and was ſo totally unbent from his buſineſs, and addicted to pleaſures, that the People generally began to take notice of it. *Ib.* 88.

By liberties, which at firſt only raiſed laughter, they (the King's Companions) by degrees got the hardineſs to cenſure both the Perſons, Counſels, and Actions of thoſe who were neareſt his Majeſty's truſt, with the higheſt malice and preſumption; and too often ſuſpended, or totally diſappointed, ſome reſolutions, which had been taken upon very mature deliberation; and which ought

ought to have been purſued: but this preſumption had not yet come to this length. *Ib.* 324.

The Chancellor told the King, Lord *Arlington* and he were ſpeaking of his Majeſty, and, as they did frequently, were bewailing the unhappy life he lived, both with reſpect to himſelf, who, by the exceſs of Pleaſures which he indulged to himſelf, was, indeed, without the true delight and reliſh of any; and in reſpect to his Government, which he totally neglected, and of which the Kingdom was ſo ſenſible, that it could not be long before he felt the ill effects of it.——It was too evident and viſible, that he had already loſt very much of the affection and reverence the Nation had for him. *Ib.* Vol. III. 681.

Thoſe very men (who in private did the Chancellor the worſt offices) would often profeſs to him (the Chancellor) that they were ſo much afflicted at the King's courſe of life, that they even deſpaired that he would be able to maſter thoſe difficulties which would ſtill preſs him. *Ib.* 680.

The

The Duke of *Buckingham* —— reported all the licence and debauchery of the Court in the moſt lively colours, being himſelf a frequent eye and ear witneſs of it. *Ib.* 701.

The Houſe of Commons —— appeared every day more out of humour, and expreſſed leſs reverence towards the Court. And ſome expreſſions were frequently uſed, which ſeemed to glance at the licence and diſorders—of that place. *Ib.* 709.

He (Earl of *Southampton*) ſaw irregularities and exceſſes to abound (in the Court) and to overflow all the Banks which ſhould reſtrain them. *Ib.* 788.

The people opened their mouths wide againſt the licence of the Court. *Ib.* 788.

The Earl of *Briſtol* told the King, that the Chancellor governed him, and managed all his affairs, whilſt himſelf ſpent his time only in pleaſures and debauchery. *Ib.* 396.

The Duke of *Buckingham* ſays of this Prince—That his unneceſſary wars—were made chiefly to comply with thoſe perſons whoſe diſſatisfaction would have proved more uneaſy to one of his humour, than all that diſtant noiſe of Cannon, which he would often

often liſten to with a great deal of tranquillity.——

In his pleaſures he was rather abandoned than luxurious; and, like our female Libertines, apter to be debauched for the ſatisfaction of others, than to ſeek with choice, where moſt to pleaſe himſelf.——He ſacrificed all things to his Miſtreſſes.

According to Biſhop *Burnet*; This Prince delivered himſelf up to a moſt enormous courſe of vice, without any ſort of reſtraint, even from the conſideration of the neareſt relations: the moſt ſtudied extravagances that way ſeemed, to the very laſt, to be much delighted in, and purſued by him.

When he ſaw young men of quality, who had ſomething more than ordinary in them, he drew them about him, and ſet himſelf to corrupt them both in Religion and Morality; in which he proved ſo unhappily ſucceſsful, that he left *England* much changed at his death, from what he found it at his reſtoration.

The following extracts will prove, to what an utter diſregard to Honour, Truth, Juſtice,

Juſtice, in Lord *Clarendon*'s caſe, the iniquitous companions of *Charles* the Second inſenſibly led him.

I. The King told him, (the Chancellor) he had not any thing to object againſt him, but muſt always acknowledge, that he had always ſerved him honeſtly and faithfully; and that he did believe, that never King had a BETTER Servant. Vol. III. 828.

The Duke put his Majeſty in mind of MANY diſcourſes his Majeſty had formerly held with him of the Chancellor's honeſty and diſcretion, conjuring him to love and eſteem him accordingly, when his Highneſs had not ſo good an opinion of him. *Ibid.* 834.

When ſome aſked his Majeſty, whether their viſiting the Chancellor would offend his Majeſty, he anſwered, No. *Ib.* 836.

When the Lords and Commons had thank'd the King for turning out the Chancellor, he ſaid to his Brother and many of the Lords — That he had now all he deſired, and that there ſhould be no more done to the Chancellor. *Ib.* 843.

The

The King gave to VERY MANY Perſons of honour as great a teſtimony of the Chancellor's Integrity, and the ſervices he had done him, as could be given. 852.

II. Let it now be ſeen, what the inſinuations of bad men and women, continually with their Prince, could effect with regard to his treatment of this, even by his own public acknowledgment, ſo well deſerving a Miniſter.

It appeared every day, that they were beſt look'd on, who forbore going to the Chancellor; and that they who did go to him, found themſelves upon much diſadvantage. Vol. III. 836.

The King expreſſed great diſpleaſure towards the Chancellor, and declared—That he had miſbehaved, That he had given him very ill advice, *&c.* 838.

The King inſinuated in his Speech to the Parliament—That what had been formerly done *amiſs*, had been by the *advice* of the *Perſon* (the Chancellor) whom he had *removed* from his counſels. 840.

The King declared himſelf much offended, that the propoſition in the Houſe of

of Commons for returning him thanks (for having removed the Chancellor) had not ſucceeded, and COMMANDED his own Servants to preſs and renew the motion. 841.

When it had ſucceeded in the Houſe of Commons, but the Lords declined to concur in it —— The King ſent to the Archbiſhop of *Canterbury*, that he ſhould in his Majeſty's name command all the Biſhops Bench to concur in it. 842.

The Duke aſked the King, Whether the Chancellor had ever given him counſel to govern by an Army, or any thing like it? The King anſwered, That he had never given him ſuch counſel in his life; but, on the contrary, his fault was — That he had always *inſiſted* too much upon the LAW. Whereupon his Royal Highneſs aſk'd him —Whether he would give him leave to *ſay ſo to others?* His Majeſty replied, *With all his heart.* The Duke told this to his Secretary Mr. *Wren* and others, and wiſhed them to *publiſh it.* When the King expoſtulated with the Duke for Mr. *Wren*'s having *publiſhed it*, the Duke declared, that Mr. *Wren* had purſued his order, his Majeſty having not only ſaid all that was reported,

but

but having given him leave to divulge it. To which the King made no other anſwer, but that he ſhould be hereafter more careful of what he ſaid to him. 847, 8.

They who had, at firſt, wrought upon the King, only by perſuading him, that the removing the Chancellor from his office was the only way to preſerve him, now importuned the King to proſecute with all his power.——This prevailed ſo far, that they reſumed their former courage, and preſſed that he might be accuſed by the Houſe of Commons of High-Treaſon. 852.

The General *(Monk)* made it his buſineſs to ſolicit and diſpoſe the Members of both Houſes—no longer to adhere to the Chancellor, ſince the King was reſolved to RUIN him, and would look upon all who were his Friends, as Enemies to his Majeſty. Notwithſtanding which, the major Part, by much, of the Houſe of Peers continued firm againſt his commitment: With which the King was ſo *offended*, that there were ſecret conſultations of ſending a guard of Soldiers to take the Chancellor out of his houſe, and ſend him to the *Tower*. 857.

When

When the Chancellor's enemies had forced him to leave his country——They propoſed (to the King) ſince he had fled from the hand of Juſtice, that there could be no more proſecution for his Guilt, a Bill of baniſhment might be brought againſt him; which his Majeſty CONSENTED to, notwithſtanding all that the Duke urged to the contrary, upon the KING's *Promiſe* to him; and which had only betray'd the Chancellor to making his eſcape. 885.

*FINIS.*

MVSEVM
BRITAN
NICVM